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Abstract
The late modern and postmodern theme of homecoming permeates the philosophy of
Martin Heidegger, who grapples with the topic throughout the various phases of his lifelong
meditation on Being. Heidegger continually gave thought to the relationship between Being
and the place or site in which it becomes manifest, whether it is a system of references and
manipulable entities (Being and Time), language (An Introduction to Metaphysics), or
aesthetic works of art (“The Origin of the Work of Art”). Taking as its point of departure
Heidegger’s persistent and dynamic search for home (Heimat), this study will examine the
political implications of his philosophical sojourn with an eye on the nationalistic tendencies
that were exhibited by Heidegger’s rectorship at the University of Freiburg. Moreover, the
study will consider the German philosopher’s attempted philosophical homecoming from the
perspective of Emmanuel Levinas’s pointed critique of Heidegger’s place-bound view of
human existence. Taking aim at the ontological, anti-humanistic, and pagan elements of
Heidegger’s thought, Levinas posits an alternative that is ethical in emphasis, humanistic in
thrust, and transcendent in scope. Supplementing and correcting Heidegger’s homecoming
ethos with a philosophy that stresses hospitality (l’hospitalité) towards the Other (autrui),
Levinas suggests that our ethical responsibility for the stranger, widow, and orphan
supercedes our attachment to place. By facilitating a rapprochement between Heideggerian
dwelling and Levinasian nomadism, this study will make visible a postmodern relation to
home that does not succumb to narrow national particularism nor to rootless, global
cosmopolitanism.

vi

Chapter 1: Heidegger, Levinas, and the Problem of the Homeless Spirit

Philosophy is really homesickness,
an urge to be at home everywhere
Where, then, are we going?
Always to our home.
Novalis
Fragments

I. Introduction
The image of home and the experience of homecoming are recurring themes of
the world’s mythopoetic narratives. According to Joseph Campbell, the adventure of the
hero described in such narratives consists of a three-part sequence of departure, initiation,
and return. Typically, the mythical sequence begins with the hero responding to a “call” that
orders them to depart from home. After the departure from home, the hero journeys into the
realm of the unknown and undergoes an initiation process that entails “a succession of
trials.” Upon completion of the initiation process, the hero then seeks to return back home:
“When the hero-quest has been accomplished, through penetration to the source, or through
the grace of some male or female, human or animal, personification, the adventurer still must
return with his life-transmuting trophy.”1 With the accomplishment of homecoming, the
adventure of the hero comes to an end.
The world’s mythopoetic narratives are thus suffused with the image of home. In
such narratives, the home appears as a place of refuge where the hero is welcomed in its

1

Joseph Campbell, The Hero with a Thousand Faces (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1949), 193. For more, see Campbell, The Power of Myth (New York:
Anchor Books, 1988).
1

embrace. Small wonder, then, that the heroic mood is often one of homesickness. Consider
only Homer’s Odyssey, a poem that has been plausibly described as a poem of homesickness.
Like Campbell’s archetypal hero, Odysseus departs from his native Ithaca to lay siege to the
city of Troy, undergoes an initiation process over the course of his wanderings and
adventures, and then seeks to return back home to his wife Penelope. Of the three stages of
the heroic sequence, it is the motif of return or homecoming (nostos) that is especially
pronounced in Homer’s work.
Here, it is instructive to consider the sequence of events described in Book 5 of the
Odyssey. In the midst of his ninth year of wandering, Odysseus finds himself on the island of
the nymph Calypso. There, Calypso offers Odysseus her hand in marriage and the promise
of eternal life. Odysseus is tempted by Calypso’s offer, but because he is so homesick for his
native Ithaca, he decides to reject Calypso’s proposal: “what I want and all my days pine for
is to go back to my house and see my day of homecoming. And if some god batters me far
out on the wine-blue water, I will endure it, keeping a stubborn spirit inside me, for already I
have suffered much and done much hard work on the waves and in the fighting. So let this
adventure follow” (5.219-224).2 Hence, Odysseus’s desire for homecoming is of such
intensity that even the promise of immortality cannot quench it.
Needless to say, the Odyssey attests to the fact that the ancient Greeks recognized the
importance of having a home. However, in the case of the ancient Hebrews, the image of

2

Homer, The Odyssey of Homer, trans. Richard Lattimore (New York: Harper & Row
Publishers, 1965). For a discussion of the political implications of Homer’s Odyssey, see
Patrick Deneen, The Odyssey of Political Theory: The Politics of Departure and Return
(Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2000).
2

home takes on a different cast. To be sure, the Torah is rife with illustrations of the departure
and initiation sequences of Campbell’s heroic-mythological paradigm. In the Book of
Genesis, God commands Abraham to depart from home: “YHWH said to Avram: Go-youforth from your land, from your kindred, from your father’s house, to the land that I will let
you see” (Gen. 12:1-2).3 With regards to the initiation process, think only of the
“wilderness” that Moses and the Israelites must cross in order to arrive to the promised land
of Canaan as described in the Book Exodus. But what of return? It is at this point that we
encounter one of the most consequential differences between an “Odyssean” and an
“Abrahamic” relationship to place.
Odysseus’s sojourn is a journey of return to a place that was once inhabited but which
has since been abandoned. For Abraham and Moses, however, there can be no return home
because home is not a place of origin. Hence, for Abraham, home is not the “land” of his
“kindred” and his “father’s house,” but is instead a place that God will reveal to him in the
future. Similarly, for Moses, home is not Egypt but is rather the Canaanite land that lies
beyond the wilderness. In both cases, home is a strange and unfamiliar place rather than an
object of historical memory. As Michael Walzer puts it in reference to the Book of Exodus:
The Exodus bears no relation to those ancient tales of voyages that, whatever the
adventures they include, begin and end at home. . . . Nor can it be described as an
odyssey, a long wandering such as Homer recounted, at the end of which wait wife
and child (and ancient servant and faithful dog). According to the biblical story, only

3

Everett Fox, trans. The Five Books of Moses: The Schocken Bible Volume One,
trans. Everett Fox (New York: Schocken Books, 1995). As we will see, Levinas seizes upon
this episode as the model of a proper relationship to place. I will re-examine the political
implications of this episode in the final chapter.
3

Joseph’s bones return to Canaan; for the living Israelites the promised land is a new
home, and no one is waiting there to greet them.4
Considered from this perspective, the Abrahamic-Mosaic adventure is capped by the process
of arrival rather than of return. Obviously, this is a matter of no small consequence,
particularly in relation to the question of politics.
I have merely scratched the surface of the lessons that the Odyssey and the Hebraic
scriptures have to teach us about the question of place. Suffice to say, the ancient Greek and
Hebraic traditions are suffused with the image of home and the experience of homecoming.
That being said, these motifs are also present in the Western philosophical tradition that
originates from ancient Greece. Here, the figure who inspires debate is not Odysseus but
Socrates, the personification of Western philosophy. What is Socrates’s relationship to
home? As it stands, the answer that is given to this question bears decisive implications, not
only in relation to Socrates himself but also with respect to the legacy of Western
philosophy. Can the philosopher be at home in the world? Or is he condemned to exist in a
state of homelessness? In modernity, the thinker who has most fully grappled with this
question is Hegel. Because his discussion foreshadows the concern with subjectivity that is a
cornerstone of Continental thought, it is instructive to consider Hegel’s view of Socrates in
some detail.

4

Michael Walzer, Exodus and Revolution (New York: Basic Books, 1985), 11-12.
For a discussion of the themes of exile and homecoming in Jeremiah, Ezekiel, and 2 Isaiah,
see Walter Brueggemann, Hopeful Imagination (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1986).
4

II. Hegel’s Discussion of the Homeless Spirit
In the Phenomenology of Spirit, Hegel describes the journey of human consciousness
by which human beings become self-aware at a certain juncture of their history. In the
Philosophy of History, Hegel relates this development to the Oriental, Greek, Roman, and
German worlds. From the perspective of this study, it is Hegel’s discussion of the Greek
epoch that is of the most interest. Why? In his discussion of the Greek world, Hegel
describes the birth of the homeless spirit in Greek antiquity. On Hegel’s account, the person
who gives birth to the homeless spirit in the Greek world is Socrates.
Prior to the appearance of Socrates, the Athenian city-state (polis) was a unified
entity. In the Athenian polis, citizens submitted to the laws that governed their communal
existence without reflection. On Hegel’s account, citizens of Athens readily adhered to the
rule of law because laws were viewed as being a product of nature rather than convention.
Hence, Athenian citizens obeyed law on the basis of custom rather than out of a
consideration of individual freedom or right: “For the concrete vitality found among the
Greeks, is customary morality – a life for religion, for the state, without further reflection,
and without analysis leading to abstract definitions, which must lead away from the concrete
embodiment of them, and occupy an antithetical position to that embodiment.”5
According to Hegel, the natural and continuous style of the Athenian polis was wellsuited to a democratic constitution. A democratic constitution was appropriate for Athens
because its citizens were unaware of their particular interests. Insofar as Athenian citizens

5

Georg W.F. Hegel, Philosophy of History, trans. J. Sibree (Buffalo: Prometheus
Books, 1991), 268-269.
5

were not cognizant of their essential individuality, there was no necessary conflict between
the subjective will of the citizenry and the objective will of the state. As Hegel writes, “The
democratic constitution is here the only possible one: the citizens are still unconscious of
particular interests, and therefore of a corrupting element: the objective will is in their case
not disintegrated.”6
All of this changed with the appearance of Socrates. What did Socrates do to destroy
the homogeneity of the “objective will” of the Athenian state? In Hegel’s view, what is
decisive is the fact that Socrates liberated the principle of subjectivity: “And it was in
Socrates, at the beginning of the Peloponnesian War, that the principle of subjectivity – of
the absolute independence of thought – attained free expression.”7 Hence, the Socratic
liberation of subjectivity effectively shattered the holistic world of the polis.
Socrates liberated the principle of subjectivity through the propagation of his
teaching. More specifically, Socrates “taught that man has to discover and recognize in
himself what is right and good, and that this right and good is in its nature universal.”8
Socrates liberated subjectivity by teaching that human beings are compelled to look inward
to discover the nature of the right and the good.

6

Hegel, Philosophy of History, 252. Hegel’s discussion implies that democracy is
essentially incompatible with the emancipation of the individual. In the words of Herbert
Marcuse, “Hegel held that a society of emancipated individuals conflicted with democratic
homogeneity.” Marcuse, Reason and Revolution: Hegel and the Rise of Social Theory
(Boston: Beacon Press, 1960), 243.
7

Hegel, Philosophy of History, 269.

8

Hegel, Philosophy of History, 269.
6

In teaching that the individual is compelled to look inward to be capable of ethical
action, Socrates distinguishes himself as the “inventor” of morality: “Socrates is celebrated
as a teacher of morality, but we should rather call him the inventor of morality.”9 Socrates is
the inventor of morality because he liberated man’s moral sense from the yoke of custom.
In a customary moral schema, a moral individual is one who merely performs just actions. In
a Socratic moral schema, however, a moral individual is conscious of the acts that he or she
is performing.
By way of inventing morality, Socrates posits the individual as the ultimate locus of
moral authority. Whereas earlier moral commands were autocratically issued by the twin
authorities of country and custom, Socratic morality posits the individual as the supreme
arbiter of ethical action: “Socrates – in assigning to insight, to conviction, the determination
of men’s actions – posited the individual as capable of a final moral decision, in
contraposition to country and customary morality, and thus made himself an oracle, in the
Greek sense.”10
Moreover, by making himself an “oracle,” Socrates distinguishes himself as a foe of
the customary morality that undergirded the world of the Athenian polis. To be sure,
Socrates did remain outwardly loyal to his native city. Essentially, however, Socrates’s
relationship to Athens is one of estrangement: “Though Socrates continued to perform his

9

Hegel, Philosophy of History, 270.

10

Hegel, Philosophy of History, 269-270.
7

duties as a citizen, it was not the actual state and its religion, but the world of thought that
was his true home.”11
Perhaps the clearest sign of Socrates’s alienation from the world of the polis was his
aversion to direct political participation. Of course, Socrates did more than merely abstain
from direct political participation but also encouraged his students to disengage themselves
from political life and enter into a world of pure thought. Such a development is an
unmitigated disaster for the polis because the customary morality that governed its
communal existence was characterized by the seamless connection between thought and real
life. As Hegel writes, “The principle of Socrates manifests a revolutionary aspect towards
the Athenian state; for the peculiarity of this state was, the customary morality was the form
in which its existence was moulded, viz. – an inseparable connection of thought with actual
life.”12 By teaching his students to avoid the world of politics, Socrates challenges the
authority of the customary morality that unites thought and action into a unified whole.
Moreover, Socrates destroys the nexus between thought and action by questioning the
everyday opinions of his interlocutors. Through the process of Socratic cross-examination,
individuals gradually realize that their opinions lack natural foundation. “When Socrates
wishes to induce his friends to reflection, the discourse has always a negative tone; he brings
them to the consciousness that they do not know what the right is.”13 Because they have
come face to face with their essential ignorance, students are unable to act with the

11

Hegel, Philosophy of History, 270.

12

Hegel, Philosophy of History, 270.

13

Hegel, Philosophy of History, 270.
8

confidence that flows from moral certainty. Socratic cross-examination is thus inherently
destructive of the action-oriented world of the Athenian polis.
For Hegel, Socrates’s estrangement from the Athenian city-state is evident in his
atheistic stance towards the gods of the city. Socrates’s hostility towards the traditional
religious forms of Athens is exemplified in the thought of his greatest pupil, Plato. In the
Republic, Plato’s Socrates banished the poets from his ideal city. By doing so, Plato
effectively exiled the individuals who created the religious foundation of the Athenian polis:
“The disciple of Socrates, Plato, banished from his ideal state, Homer and Hesiod, the
originators of that mode of conceiving of religious objects which prevailed among the
Greeks; for he desiderated a higher conception of what was to be reverenced as divine – one
more in harmony with thought.”14 In banishing the gods from his ideal city in speech,
however, Plato merely follows the example set by his mentor. Suffice to say, the Platonic
banishment of the gods is emblematic of Socrates’s alienation from the Greek polis.
Given the fact that he challenged the authority of the Athenian state at the deepest
level, it was perhaps inevitable that Socrates would be condemned to death. However, for
Hegel, the Athenian execution of Socrates was an ambiguous event. As Hegel explains,
But when on account of the giving utterance to that principle which was advancing to
recognition, Socrates is therefore condemned to death, the sentence bears on the one
hand the aspect of unimpeachable rectitude – inasmuch as the Athenian people
condemns its deadliest foe – but on the other hand, that of a deeply tragic character,
inasmuch as the Athenians had to make the discovery, that what they reprobated in
Socrates had already struck root among themselves, and that they must be
pronounced guilty or innocent with them.15

14

Hegel, Philosophy of History, 270.

15

Hegel, Philosophy of History, 270.
9

On the one hand, the Athenian polis’s condemnation of Socrates is eminently justified in that
the city condemns its “deadliest foe.” By identifying the individual as the locus of moral
authority and by encouraging his students to retreat into the realm of thought, Socrates
distinguishes himself as an implacable foe of Athens’s customary morality and its actionoriented political culture. On the other hand, by sentencing Socrates to death, Athens also
condemns itself because the principle of subjectivity had already taken root within its own
walls.
Neither the death of Socrates nor the subsequent destruction of Athens put a halt to
the spirit of subjectivity that he unleashed in the Greek world, however. As Hegel writes, “In
Athens that higher principle which proved the ruin of the Athenian state advanced without
intermission.”16 Put in Hegelian parlance, the appearance of Socrates engendered a
transformation of the spirit (Geist) in the Greek world from complacent non-reflection to
searching deliberation: “Spirit had acquired the propensity to gain satisfaction for itself – to
reflect.”17 From this point on, there could be no return to the primeval state that preceded the
irruption of individual subjectivity.
Hegel’s discussion of Socrates illuminates the estrangement that is concomitant with
the rise of individual subjectivity. In becoming conscious of its essential selfhood, the
individual subject also becomes conscious of its separateness from the tribe. On Hegel’s
account, Socrates epitomizes this dual structure of consciousness. Socrates’s consciousness
of self is symbolized by his fidelity to his inner daimon: “He said that he had a daimon
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within him, which counseled him what to do, and revealed to him what was advantageous to
his friends.”18 However, Socrates’s loyalty to his daimon renders him alienated from his
native city.
But what of the possibility of return? Is it possible for the individual subject to return
the objective community? In the case of Socrates, such a return was manifestly impossible
because the holistic world of the polis was inherently unable to accommodate the
autonomous individual. “That very subjective freedom which constitutes the principle and
determines the peculiar form of freedom in our world – which forms the absolute basis of
our political and religious life, could not manifest itself in Greece otherwise than as a
destructive element.”19 Hence, in the Greek epoch, the individual subject is homeless.
But what of the modern world? For Hegel, the idea of the modern state renders a
reconciliation between the subjective individual and the objective community possible.
However, the Continental thinkers who followed in Hegel’s footsteps were not merely as
sanguine as he about the possibility of a reconciliation between subject and object. For such
thinkers, the problem of homelessness is as present in the modern world as it was in postSocratic Greece. One such thinker was Martin Heidegger. For other thinkers, such as
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Emmanuel Levinas, homelessness is not a problem to be solved but is rather an essential
aspect of the human condition.
III. Heidegger and Levinas
In the twentieth century, no thinker was more concerned about the problem of
homelessness than Heidegger. Like Hegel, Heidegger associates the problem of
homelessness with the liberation of subjectivity, and in his later work he traces the
development of subjectivity in the thought of Descartes, Leibniz, Kant, Hegel, Schelling, and
Nietzsche to the rise of modern technology.20 However, for Heidegger, the liberation of
subjectivity and the spread of global technology is a manifestation of a larger problem. More
specifically, subjectivity – and the homelessness that flows from its liberation – is a
manifestation of what Heidegger calls the “oblivion of Being.” For Heidegger, the oblivion
of Being is the ontological estrangement that eventuates when man fails to address the
question of Being. Hence, for Heidegger, the problem of homelessness is a byproduct of
man’s failure to address the question of existence.
For Heidegger, the origins of the modern oblivion of Being can be traced back to the
thought of the ancient Greeks. In this sense, Heidegger follows Hegel. However, the
contrast between Hegel and Heidegger is stark: whereas Hegel traces the appearance of the
homeless spirit back to Socrates, Heidegger regards Socrates as the “purest thinker of the
West.” As Heidegger explains:
Once we are so related and drawn to what withdraws, we are drawing into what
withdraws, into the enigmatic and therefore mutable nearness of its appeal.
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Whenever man is properly drawing that way, he is thinking – even though the
withdrawal may remain as veiled as ever. All through his life and right into his death,
Socrates did nothing else than place himself into this draft, this current, and maintain
himself in it. This is why he is the purest thinker of the West. This is why he wrote
nothing. For anyone who begins to write out of thoughtfulness must inevitably be
like those people who seek refuge from any draft too strong for them. An as yet
hidden history still keeps the secret why all great Western thinkers after Socrates,
with all their greatness, had to be such fugitives.21
On this account, Socrates placed himself in the “draft” of Being and did not flinch.
However, the thinkers who followed in Socrates’s footsteps were not as resolute as he. The
most important such thinker is, of course, Plato. Plato and the thinkers who followed him
composed philosophical treatises that attempted to supply a definitive answer to the question
of Being. The end result of their labors is the homelessness that blights the modern age.
Heidegger’s project is to put an end to the problem of homelessness by reopening the
forgotten question of Being. Through the sheer force of his thinking, Heidegger seeks to
engineer a return to the ground of Being upon which Socrates, as well as the pre-Socratics,
originally stood. By effecting a return to the “house of Being” abandoned by Plato and
Aristotle, Heidegger attempts to effect a homecoming for Western man. As George Steiner
puts it, “Post-Socratic Greek thought, whether in Platonic idealism or Aristotelian
substantiality, never returned to this pure and primal ‘ground of Being,’ to this illumination
of and through the presentness of the existing. But it is to just this ground that we must strive
to come home.”22
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Heidegger’s philosophy is thus a philosophy of homecoming. But what exactly is the
“home” that is the object of Heidegger’s homecoming project? For Heidegger, the home is
the world in which human beings are existentially embedded. In Being and Time, Heidegger
identifies the world as a system of “ready-to-hand” entities. In “The Origin of the Work of
Art,” Heidegger identifies the world as the communal-historical nexus that spars with the
earth and produces the work of art. In later writings such as “Building, Dwelling, Thinking,”
Heidegger identifies the “fourfold” (Geviert) of earth, sky, divinities, and mortals as the
world where Being becomes manifest. Needless to say, Heidegger’s endeavor to help man
rediscover his worldly home was dynamic and ever-changing. However, while Heidegger’s
concept of the home was prone to a certain flux, his emphasis on the ontological necessity of
the home remained constant through all of these various permutations.
In its own way, Heidegger’s personal biography reflects this homebound ethos.23 As
is well known, Heidegger spent much time in a cabin that overlooks the small village of
Todtnauberg in the Black Forest region of Baden-Wurttemberg. To Heidegger, the cabin
was home, a place where the philosopher from Messkirch was at one with his environment.
As Heidegger explained in his 1934 radio address entitled “Creative Landscape: Why Do
We Stay in the Province,” this home was foundational to his own thinking:
The inner relationship of my own work to the Black Forest and its people comes from
a centuries-long and irreplaceable rootedness (Bodenständigkeit) in the AlemannianSwabian soil. . . . But my whole work is sustained and guided by the world of these
mountains and their people. Lately from time to time my work up there is interrupted
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by long stretches by conferences, lecture trips, committee meetings, and my teaching
work down here in Freiburg. But as soon as I go back up there, even in the first few
of hours of being at the cabin (Hüttendasein), the whole world of previous questions
forces itself upon me in the very form in which I left it. I simply am transported into
the work’s own rhythm and in a fundamental sense I am not at all in command of its
hidden law.24
Considered from this perspective, then, Heidegger’s philosophical work is less the product of
a free-floating mind than of the “Alemannian-Swabian soil” that produced it. Suffice to say,
Heidegger exhibited a personal need for roots that was striking, at times even disconcerting.
The language that Heidegger uses in his philosophical writings mirrors his personal
stress on autochthony. Heidegger’s propensity to use terms such as “clearing,” “earth,”
“field path,” “native ground,” “soil on the field” attests to his emphasis on the ontological
significance of place. Considered in tandem with his homecoming ethos and his personal
attachment to his native soil, Heidegger’s “homely” language is revealed to be the proper
idiom of a thinker whose concern with rootedness is simply unmatched by any other thinker
of comparable stature. As James F. Ward puts it, Heidegger “belongs . . . to the tradition of
völkische nationalism; a number of texts evoke the völkische vision of a homogenous, rural,
and pastoral people, deeply rooted in the soil of a place, suspicious of, if not hostile to,
industrialism, capitalism, urbanization, and even national unification.”25
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Indeed, Heidegger’s celebration of Bodenständigkeit (rootedness in the soil) can even
be considered to be the central aspect of his thought.26 Consider the following observation
by Leo Strauss:
Heidegger’s philosophy has the same structure as Marx and Nietzsche’s: the moment
in which the final insight is arriving opens the eschatological prospect. But
Heidegger is much closer to Nietzsche than to Marx. Both thinkers regard as decisive
the nihilism that according to them began in Plato (or before) – Christianity being
only Platonism for the people – and whose consequence is the present decay.
Hitherto every great age of humanity grew out of Bodenständigkeit (rootedness in the
soil). Yet the great age of classical Greece gave birth to a way of thinking which in
principle endangered Bodenständigkeit from the beginning and in its ultimate
contemporary consequences is about to destroy the last relics of that condition of
human greatness. Heidegger’s philosophy belongs to the infinitely dangerous
moment when man is in a greater danger than ever before of losing his humanity and
therefore – danger and salvation belonging together – philosophy can have the task of
contributing toward the recovery or return of Bodenständigkeit or rather of preparing
an entirely novel kind of Bodenständigkeit: a Bodenständigkeit, a being at home
beyond the most extreme homelessness.27
On Strauss’s account, Heidegger argues that Bodenständigkeit is the vital precondition for
every great historical epoch. However, the fate of Bodenständigkeit hangs in the balance
because of the influence of the metaphysical approach to reality that began in ancient Greece.
The challenge, then, is to create a philosophy that will facilitate a “recovery or return” to
Bodenständigkeit to help man to become at home in the world. For Strauss, Heidegger’s
emphasis on Bodenständigkeit is the aspect of Heidegger’s philosophy of history that serves
to differentiate it from the historical frameworks advanced by Marx and Nietzsche.
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No thinker was more disturbed by Heidegger’s celebration of Bodenständigkeit than
Emmanuel Levinas.28 Put simply, Levinas posits himself as a severe critic of Heidegger’s
stress on autochthony and all that comes with it. Whereas Heidegger celebrates the passing
of Western metaphysics, Levinas posits himself as a (qualified) defender of Western
metaphysics.29 Whereas the later Heidegger turns towards the “saving power” of art, Levinas
declares that aestheticism is a perpetual source of human cruelty. Whereas Heidegger
decries the uprooting effect of technology, Levinas celebrates technology because it frees
human beings from the “superstition of place.” Whereas the later Heidegger looked to the
poetry of Hölderlin for guidance, Levinas looks to the Talmud for inspiration.30 Finally, one
28
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searches in vain for nostalgic ruminations on the town in which Levinas was born and raised,
he being a Russian by birth who eventually emigrated to France.31 In sum, Levinas criticizes
Heidegger’s emphasis on Bodenständigkeit from a variety of angles.
Writing as a Jew whose entire family had been killed during the Holocaust, Levinas’s
critique of Heidegger was partly driven by his repugnance at the latter’s Nazi political
sympathies. However, Levinas’s more than understandable antipathy to Heidegger’s Nazism
did not dampen his recognition of the German philosopher’s undeniable brilliance. As
Levinas told an interviewer in 1982:
For me, Heidegger is the greatest philosopher of the century, perhaps one of the very
great philosophers of the millennium; but I am very pained by that because I can
never forget what he was in 1933 . . . he has a very great sense for everything that is
part of the landscape, but the place in which man is enrooted. It is absolutely not a
philosophy of the emigre! I would even say that it is not a philosophy of the
emigrant. To me, being a migrant is not being a nomad. Nothing is more enrooted
than the nomad. But he or she who emigrates is wholly human: the migration of man
does not destroy, does not demolish the meaning of Being.32
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To Levinas, Heidegger’s Nazi political sympathies were fundamentally intertwined with his
stress on the ontological significance of place. From a Levinasian perspective, what is
needed is a philosophical deconstruction of the Heideggerian sanctification of place.
In various writings, Levinas levels a radical critique of Heidegger’s place-bound
ontology. In Totality and Infinity, Levinas accuses Heidegger’s fundamental ontology of
being averse to transcendence and conducive to tyranny. In “The Contemporary Criticism of
the Idea of Value,” Levinas accuses Heidegger’s thought of being anti-humanistic in failing
to recognize the inherent dignity of the human person. And in his essay, “Heidegger,
Gagarin and Us,” Levinas accuses Heidegger’s sanctification of place as being a
manifestation of latter-day paganism. All in all, Levinas accuses Heidegger’s place-bound
ontology of ontological supremacy, anti-humanistic animus, and pagan religiosity.
Levinas does not merely level a blistering critique at Heidegger’s homecoming
project; he also posits an alternative manner of thinking about the home (la maison). In
Levinas’s 1961 book Totality and Infinity, Levinas engages in a prolonged discussion of the
home in which he identifies the home as a place where wanderers find refuge. For Levinas,
the home rises to the fulness of its dignity when it is used as an instrument of welcome
(accueil). Hence, whereas a Heideggerian relationship to place is one that is characterized
by Bödenstandigkeit, a Levinasian relation to home is characterized by the welcome of
otherness.
As with the case of Heidegger, Levinas’s use of language in these discussions is
instructive. If Heidegger’s use of Black Forest imagery provides subtle intimations of his
emphasis on autochthony, Levinas’s use of household imagery reveals his own stress on
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welcome. As Jacques Derrida notes, Levinas is particularly fond of the image of the door (la
porte), the door representing an opening to infinity. As Derrida puts it,
Is it insignificant that Levinas speaks in this place of a door (porte)? Is the place that
he designates in this way simply a trope in a rhetoric of hospitality? If the figure of
the door, on the threshold that opens the at-home (chez-soi), were a “manner (façon)
of speaking,” this would suggest that speech is a manner of speaking, a manner of
doing or managing (faire) with one’s hand held out, addressing oneself to the Other
so as to give him something to eat or drink, or allow him to breathe, as Levinas so
often recalls elsewhere. The open door, as a manner of speaking, calls for the
opening of an exteriority or of a transcendence of the idea of infinity. This idea
comes to us through a door, and the door passed through is none other than reason in
teaching.33
For Derrida, the door is hardly an “insignificant” aspect of Levinas’s philosophical thought,
but rather symbolizes the “opening” that enables the inhabitant of a particular site to
encounter the transcendence wrought by the presence of the Other.
So, in Heidegger and Levinas, we are presented with two philosophical visions that
conceptualize the human relationship to place in radically dissimilar terms. On the one side,
there is Heidegger, a philosopher whose endeavor to help man to return to the ground of
Being led him to emphasize the ontological necessity of rootedness. On the other side, there
is Levinas, a thinker whose concern with the ontological meaning of otherness led him to
stress the ethical necessity of welcoming strangers. In the debate between Heidegger and
Levinas, we are presented with a conflict between ontology and ethics, anti-humanism and
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humanism, paganism and Judaism. But what of the question of politics? In this study, I will
attempt to relate the debate between Heidegger and Levinas to the question of politics.
Moreover, I shall consider Heidegger’s homecoming project as well as Levinas’s critique of
that project. Furthermore, I will also consider Levinas’s alternative vision of how human
beings should relate to place. Thus, the central question of this dissertation: what are the
political implications of the debate between Heidegger and Levinas on home and
homelessness? Moreover, what lessons can we, Westerners poised on the brink of the
postmodern age, take away from this debate in an age characterized by the simultaneous
spread of globalization and the resurgence of tribalism?
IV. Literature Review
Since the publication of books by Victor Farias, Jacques Derrida, and Hugo Ott
detailing the sordid details of Heidegger’s involvement with German National Socialism,
there has been a plethora of books that seek to assess the German philosopher’s significance
for politics.34 As of yet, however, no study has been published that engages in a full-length
comparison of Heidegger and Levinas on the question of the home. A rare exception is a
1998 article by Peter Tijimes entitled “Home and Homelessness: Heidegger and Levinas on
Dwelling.” As a whole Tijimes’ piece attempts to examine Heidegger and Levinas’s debate
over the “cultural impact of technology” and the “meaning of the place where we live in.”35
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Moreover, the essay also endeavors to propose a synthesis of Heidegger and Levinas’s
contradictory positions by utilizing the theory of eccentricity advanced by Helmuth Plessner.
Tijimes’s piece is of obvious importance to this dissertation in that it engages in a
comparison between Heidegger and Levinas on the question of place. That being said,
Tijimes’s piece is of limited value because it fails to consider many key sources of
Heidegger’s and Levinas’s corpus and fails to consider the question of politics in any detail.
The present study will seek to remedy these deficiencies.
Turning to the secondary literature devoted exclusively to Heidegger, the work that
most fully grapples with the question of the German philosopher’s emphasis on autochthony
is Charles Bambach’s book entitled Heidegger’s Roots: Nietzsche, National Socialism and
the Greeks. Bambach’s work attempts to situate Heidegger’s philosophy into the historical
context of German right-wing thought by examining his language of rootedness as it appears
in his 1933-1945 work. In his study, Bambach focuses on two terms from the Heideggerian
lexicon: Bodenständigkeit and Selbstbehauptung (self-assertion). Bambach focuses on these
two terms in order to advance the thesis that “Heidegger’s writings from 1933 to 1945
constitute a philosophical attempt at a geo-politics, a grand and metaphysical vision of
German destiny based on the notion of a singularly German form of autochthony or
rootedness in the earth (Bodenständigkeit).”36
Although Bambach’s book is of obvious relevance, it differs markedly from the
present study. Two differences in particular stand out. For one, whereas Bambach’s book
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narrowly focuses on Heidegger’s 1933-1945 thought, this study will consider the entire body
of Heidegger’s philosophic work as it stretches from the 1920s to the 1970s. Second,
whereas Bambach’s book is partly a historical study of Heidegger’s significance in the larger
context of German mandarin thought, the present study is primarily philosophical in nature.
Bambach’s interest in the geo-political implications of Heidegger’s thought is
mirrored by Stuart Elden. Elden considers the implications of Heidegger’s thought for the
study of political geography in Mapping the Present: Heidegger, Foucault, and the Project
of a Spatial History and in “Rethinking the Polis: Implications of Heidegger’s Questioning
the Political.” In the latter piece, Elden endeavors to “provide a detailed reading of
Heidegger’s remarks on the polis and the nature of the political.”37 Elden accomplishes this
by considering Heidegger’s remarks on the polis as they were made in several lecture courses
around the time of his rectorship. Elden’s piece is valuable because it sheds light on
Heidegger’s middle-period thought, a period in which Heidegger’s homecoming project
engendered his disastrous foray into politics.
Another work of uncommon interest is Leslie Paul Thiele’s book entitled Timely
Meditations: Martin Heidegger and Postmodern Politics. As a whole, Thiele’s book
attempts to relate Heidegger’s thought to the question of human freedom. Thiele’s book
contains a chapter entitled “Saving the Earth: The Plight of Homelessness” that attempts to
make Heidegger’s thought consonant with “an understanding of home” that “is appropriately
embedded within an ecological framework that identifies the earth as the human habitat in
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need of caretaking.”38 In seizing on the elements of Heidegger’s homecoming project that
complement ecological theory, Thiele’s chapter illuminates an aspect of Heidegger’s thought
that would become especially pronounced in his later work.
James F. Ward’s book entitled Heidegger’s Political Thinking attempts to come to
terms with Heidegger’s political thought. Ward’s book contains a chapter entitled “Poetic
Dwelling: Homeland” that endeavors to examine Heidegger’s encounter with Hölderlin. In
Ward’s view, “Heidegger uses Hölderlin to show the depth and severity of our present
condition, and he shows that the authentic appropriation of the poet by the Germans is
precisely what has not happened.”39 Inasmuch as some of Heidegger’s most extended
discussions of the home are prompted by his grapplings with Hölderlin, Ward’s chapter is of
obvious relevance in relation to the present study.
Finally, Fred Dallmayr’s book entitled The Other Heidegger is of significant interest.
Dallmayr’s book explores “a Heidegger estranged from his contexts and exposed to
otherness” in order to “delineate the contours of an alternative political perspective, one quite
at odds with the traditional metaphysics and the prevalent issues of his time.”40 Dallmayr’s
“Homecoming through Otherness” chapter attempts to consider Heidegger’s entire oeuvre
through the different ways that the German philosopher approaches the topic of estrangement
of “alter-ation” (Veranderung). Dallmayr’s chapter differentiates Heidegger’s corpus into
several distinct phases in relation to the topic of Veranderung, dividing it between the war
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years (the middle-period) and the postwar era (his later period). Needless to say, Dallmayr’s
focus on Veranderung heavily complements the present study’s focus on homelessness in
Heidegger’s thought.
In recent years, there has been an explosion of interest in the philosophy of Levinas.
Indeed, Levinas is read not only in philosophy but also in religious studies, sociology, and
literary theory. In contrast to Heidegger, however, only a handful of books have been
published that examine Levinas’s political theory. Donald Awerkamp’s book entitled
Emmanuel Levinas: Ethics and Politics was the first work to tackle the question of Levinas’s
politics. Besides providing a valuable overview of the relationship between ethics and
politics in Levinas’s work, Awerkamp’s book is important because it contains a discussion of
the section of Totality and Infinity in which Levinas engages in an extended discussion of the
home. However, Awerkamp published his book before Levinas wrote his second major
work, Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence in 1974. Furthermore, Awerkamp fails to
make adequate use of Levinas’s essays, many of which have important implications with
regards to Levinas’s view of place.
William P. Simmons’s book entitled An-archy and Justice: An Introduction to
Emmanuel Levinas’s Political Thought is a more comprehensive overview of Levinas’s
political thought. As a whole, Simmons’ s book argues that Levinas “offers a plausible
antidote to modern political thought and to the Heideggerian project.” Inasmuch as
Simmons’s book was published in 2003, it considers not only Otherwise than Being but also
many other works that Awerkamp’s book did not. Of particular interest to the current study
is the chapter entitled “Levinas’s Humanism of the Other as a Response to Modern and
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Postmodern Anti-Humanisms.” In this chapter, Simmons situates Levinas’s “humanism of
the other person, the Other, in the context of the recent debates between humanists and antihumanists.”41 Naturally, one of the anti-humanists that Simmons considers is Heidegger.
Inasmuch as Levinas’s critique of Heidegger’s anti-humanism was a core component of his
critique of Heidegger’s homecoming project, Simmons’s book illuminates an essential
component of the Heidegger-Levinas debate.
Also of interest is Bettina Bergo’s book entitled Levinas Between Ethics and Politics:
For the Beauty that Adorns the Earth. Bergo’s book examines the “the nature of the
relationship between ethics and justice in Levinas’s philosophy.”42 The focus of Bergo’s
book is thus similar to Awerkamp’s and Simmons’s. Whatever its merits, however, Bergo’s
work touches on questions of home and homelessness only peripherally.
This is also the case with Simon Critchley’s book entitled Ethics, Politics,
Subjectivity: Essays on Contemporary French Thought. Like his earlier book The Ethics of
Deconstruction: Derrida and Levinas, Critchley’s book “brings together essays written in
contemporary French thought insofar as they have a common thematic concern with the
questions of ethics, politics and subjectivity.”43 By way of doing so, Critchley’s book
attempts not only to delineate the relationship between ethics and politics in Levinas’s
thought, but also seeks to situate it in the larger context of Continental philosophy.
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Howard Caygill’s book entitled Levinas & the Political attempts to explicate the
problematic nature of politics in Levinas’s thought. As Caygill puts it, “The reading of
Levinas and the political undertaken in this book proposes to show how the question of the
political consistently troubles Levinas’s thought.”44 Considered in relation to the rest of the
secondary literature, Caygill’s book is perhaps the richest study of Levinas’s political
thought that has been published thus far. However, Caygill does not focus on Levinas’s
critique of Heidegger or his concept of welcome in any significant detail. Despite these
omissions, however, Caygill’s book is an invaluable resource for any serious student of
Levinasian politics.
Levinas’s concept of the home is examined in Michael Purcell’s article entitled
“Homelessness as a Theological Motif: Emmanuel Levinas and the Significance of the
Home.” In this piece, Purcell uses Levinas’s concept of the home to re-ground theology in a
properly ethical and transcendent foundation: “This article, drawing on the writings of
Emmanuel Levinas, attempts to understand the modern-day phenomenon of homelessness as
a theological motif which questions theological subjectivism, and re-affirms transcendence
as the proper object of theology, ethics as its first act.”45 Purcell’s piece is especially useful
for chapter six of this study, a chapter which will fully examine Levinas’s concept of the
home.
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Levinas’s discussion of the home emphasizes the ethical necessity of extending
hospitality to the Other. One of the few scholars who has examined Levinas’s concept of
hospitality (hospitalité) in any detail is Jacques Derrida. Derrida’s book Adieu to Emmanuel
Levinas contains the text of a lecture entitled “A Word of Welcome” given in homage to
Levinas on the first anniversary of his death. In this lecture, Derrida asks “whether the ethics
of hospitality that we will try to analyze in Levinas’s thought would be able to found a law
and a politics, beyond the familial dwelling, within a nation, State, or Nation-State.”46
Derrida’s essay represents the most fully-realized attempt to come to grips with the political
implications of Levinas’s concept of hospitality that has been penned thus far. For that
reason alone, Derrida’s essay merits serious consideration.
V. Conclusion
At this point, it is necessary to say a word about the structure of the dissertation,
particularly in relation to Heidegger. Heidegger insisted that his thought is marked by a
linear continuity, and that the attempt to distinguish between its various phases is compelled
to take proper account of this fact. As Heidegger put it, such a distinction is “justified only
on the condition that this is kept constantly in mind: only by way of what Heidegger I has
thought does one gain access to what is to-be-thought by Heidegger II.”47 With this in mind,
this study will divide Heidegger’s corpus into three phases. The first phase of Heidegger’s
thought began in the 1920s and culminated with the 1927 publication of Being and Time.
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The second phase began in 1929 with the onset of the “turn” (Kehre) and ended in 1935 or
1936 when Heidegger confronted the thought of Nietzsche. The final phase of Heidegger’s
thought officially began with the publication of his 1947 “Letter on Humanism” essay and
extended until his death in 1976.
In the case of Levinas, however, the same difficulties do not present themselves with
regards to structure. Although there are consequential differences between Levinas’s two
major works, Totality and Infinity and Otherwise than Being, particularly with regard to the
question of language, these differences are not pronounced enough to merit a demarcation
between Levinas I and Levinas II. Given that this is the case, this study will approach
Levinas’s thought from a more thematic angle by focusing on his critique of Heidegger’s
politics of place and his alternative view of a proper relationship to place.
The dissertation will contain seven chapters. The chapters are listed below, followed
by a brief description of the contents of each.
•

Chapter 2: Primordial Homelessness: The Politics of Anxiety in Heidegger’s
Being and Time

Chapter two will analyze Heidegger’s early search for home through the interpretative lens
of his discussion of anxiety (Angst) in Being and Time. Heidegger’s phenomenology of
“Being-in-the-world” (In-der-Welt-Sein) and “Being-with” (Mitsein) represents his early
attempt to combat the influence of Cartesian subjectivism. However, Heidegger’s analysis of
existential angst illuminate the groundless nature of human existence (Da–sein). In the face
of this primordial homelessness, Da–sein is presented with two basic options: flight (Flucht)
or resoluteness (Entschlossenheit). For Heidegger, resolute action necessitates that Da–sein
merge its identity with that of its “people” or “community” (Volk).
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•

Chapter 3: Finding a Home in the German Polis: Heidegger and the Politics of
Aesthetic Nationalism

Chapter three will examine the politics of aesthetic nationalism in Heidegger’s middle-period
thought. In An Introduction to Metaphysics, Heidegger bemoans the presence of a fullblown spiritual crisis in the West. On Heidegger’s account, the only way for Germany to
offset the spiritual enervation that threatens to overtake Europe is to engender a full-blown
metaphysical revolution in the West. The impetus for Heidegger’s newfound nationalism
can be found in the theory of aesthetics that he advances in his 1935 essay entitled “The
Origin of the Work of Art.” In that essay, Heidegger argues that the founding of a political
state is akin to the creation of work of art. Hence, Heidegger’s rectorship represents a selfconscious attempt to participate in a Germanic state-founding that will put an end to the
modern crisis of the West.
•

Chapter 4: Homecoming in a Post-Technological Age: Building, Dwelling, and
Thinking in the Fourfold

Chapter four will examine the political implications of Heidegger’s postwar homecoming
attempt. In the “Letter on Humanism” and the “Memorial Address,” Heidegger bemoans the
crisis of homelessness that ails the modern West, a crisis exacerbated by the uprooting effect
of modern technology. While man does not possess the power to put an end to this
ontological crisis, he nonetheless can prepare for its eventual overcoming by building,
dwelling, and thinking in the “fourfold” (Geviert). Heidegger’s later philosophy is as amoral
as it is apolitical, steadfastly maintaining that the very attempt to posit an ethics and politics
is a contributing factor to the contemporary crisis of the West.
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•

Chapter 5: The Violence of Homecoming: Levinas’s Critique of Heidegger

Chapter five will analyze Levinas’s critique of Heidegger’s place-bound ontology. For
Levinas, Heidegger’s emphasis on Bodenständigkeit is misguided in three respects. For one,
Heidegger’s thematic focus on Being is objectionable because it totalizes otherness and
promotes the freedom of the self. Second, Heidegger’s critique of humanism fails to
recognize an arche capable of grounding human dignity. Third, Heidegger’s pagan emphasis
on the centrality of place is inherently cruel because it implicitly draws a distinction between
natives and foreigners. For Levinas, Heideggerian ontology is as amoral as it is politically
pernicious.
•

Chapter 6: Dwelling in the Face of the Other: Levinas and the Politics of
Hospitality

Chapter six will examine the political implications of Levinas’s concept of welcome. In
Levinas’s ethical schema, the home achieves its full dignity when the Other is welcomed into
it, thereby transforming it from a pagan site to one that illuminates the existence of the
transcendent. The presence of the Third (la tiers), however, necessitates that the self create
political-juridical institutions that are apt vehicles for extending hospitality. In turn, the
creation of such institutions necessitates the overcoming of political Caesarism and the
embrace of a monotheistic political vision. For Levinas, such a vision emphasizes the ethical
necessity of extending welcome to the foreigner.
•

Chapter 7: Conclusion: Towards a Postmodern Politics of Place

Chapter seven will attempt to engage the thought of Heidegger and Levinas in a critical
fashion. In different ways, both Heidegger and Levinas are concerned with the problem of
the homeless spirit that preoccupied Hegel. However, whereas Heidegger attempts to
31

respond to the Hegelian problematic through a reinvigorated stress on autochthony, Levinas
calls for an embrace of otherness. At its worst, Heidegger’s call for rootedness complements
a fascistic political stance, while Levinas’s stress on welcome fails to due justice to the
human need for rootedness. Hence, the necessity for a politics of place that is ontological
and ethical. By attempting to effect a balance between Heideggerian homecoming and
Levinasian hospitality, such a politics will successfully navigate between the twin extremes
of tribal nationalism and rootless cosmopolitanism.

32

Chapter 2: Primordial Homelessness:
The Politics of Anxiety in Heidegger’s Being and Time

He who sees me, knows me,
he who knows me, names me
The homeless man.
. . . . . . . .
No one may dare
Question me where
My home is.
I am simply not confined
To space and fleeting time.
Friedrich Nietzsche
“Without a Home”

I. Introduction
Published in 1927, Martin Heidegger’s Being and Time (Sein und Zeit) mirrors the fin
de siecle mood that characterized Europe in the years following World War I.1 The first
world war called into question the Enlightenment faith in reason and science that had driven
European civilization since the early modern era. The carnage of World War I, of course,
revealed the vulnerability of the rational and scientific foundations of the modern West. Had
rationalism reached a dead end in the West? Or was the contemporary crisis the result of
modern, as distinct from pre-modern, rationalism? Such were the questions in the air at the
time of Being and Time’s publication.

1

As is well known, the publication of Being and Time was preceded by a series of
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Concept of Time.” For more, see Martin Heidegger, The History of the Concept of Time:
Prologema, trans. Theodore Kiesel (Bloomington: Indiana University Press,1985).
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Heidegger never explicitly mentions this crisis in Being and Time. The fact that
Heidegger recognizes the presence of such a crisis, however, becomes immediately apparent
in the introduction to the work, where he mentions a pressing problem: the “forgetfulness of
Being (Sein).” For Heidegger, forgetfulness of Being is forgetfulness of the “question of
Being” (Seinsfrage). In the modern world, the question of Being “has been forgotten –
although our time considers itself progressive in again affirming ‘metaphysics.’”2 At the
outset, then, Heidegger boldly declares that the modern world has forgotten the question of
Being.
The modern age, however, is not unique in its ontological amnesia. On Heidegger’s
account, Being was forgotten during the twilight of Greek antiquity. Plato and Aristotle
performed “avid research” on the question of Being and produced impressive – if
questionable – results. However, these results subsequently hardened into an ontological
“dogma” that has so enchanted succeeding thinkers that the question of Being “ceased to be
heard as a thematic question of actual investigation.” What is the content of the dogma that
has bewitched everyone from St. Thomas Aquinas to Hegel? As elaborated by Heidegger, it
is the notion that Being is a universal, indefinable and self-evident concept. That is to say,
Being is assumed to be universal in constituting the most general property that gives to
entities their sense of quiddity or “whatness,” indefinable by virtue of the fact that it cannot

2

Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. Joseph Stambaugh (Albany: State
University of New York Press, 1996), 1.
34

be associated with a particular being that has definable properties, and self-evident in the
truism that it is seemingly “understandable ‘without further ado.’”3
Such is the nature of the ontological dogma advanced by Plato and Aristotle, and
which has dominated the history of Western ontology. For Heidegger, the only thing as
obvious as the historic influence of this dogma is its utter questionability. Being is not a
genus, a point even conceded by Aristotle.4 Moreover, the fact that Being is not akin to a
particular being does not thereby render it impermeable to thematic investigation. Just as
significantly, the fact that Being is comprehensible to the average intellect does not
necessarily prove that it is a self-evident concept. In sum, the question of Being has not been
answered. Indeed, the question of Being itself has not been asked properly: “But a
consideration of the prejudices has made it clear at the same time that not only is the answer
to the question of Being lacking but even the question itself is obscure and without
direction.”5
For Heidegger, the fact that the question of Being has not been answered is a problem
of the greatest magnitude. The question of Being is important because it is the ground of all
ontologies, and, as such, is the ultimate source of all human understanding. As Heidegger
writes, “All ontology, no matter how rich and tightly knit a system of categories it has at its
disposal, remains fundamentally blind and perverts its innermost intent if it has not
previously clarified the meaning of being sufficiently and grasped this clarification as its
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fundamental task (italics Heidegger’s).”6 This is why the fact that “the question today has
been forgotten” is such an indictment of modern thought, for it suggests that reason and
science are ontologically groundless.
This is obviously a fact of no small consequence. But this is not all, for the
forgetfulness of Being has affected everyday life in the modern West, on Heidegger’s
account. As Heidegger complains, the notion that Being is a general, inscrutable, and
obvious concept is utilized not only by academic philosophers but by “everybody”:
“Everybody uses it constantly and also already understands what is meant by it.”7 Hence,
everyday language and thought bear the indelible imprint of the Platonic-Aristotelian
ontological dogma that has dictated the course of Western philosophy.
In its introductory chapter, then, Being and Time contains an explicit critique of
modern thought and an implicit critique of modern life. As it stands, however, it is not the
only place in the text where Heidegger casts aspersions on modernity. As I will argue,
Heidegger’s description of everyday life can, and perhaps should, be read as an incisive
critique of the modern world. In Heidegger’s description, man’s day-to-day existence is
dominated by the invisible hegemony of “the they” (das Man). The they crushes human
singularity via its intrinsic tendency towards “distantiality” (Abständigkeit), “averageness”
(Durchschittlichkeit) and “levelling down” (Einebnung). Encouraged to play the part of the
“they-self,” man falls into a state of existential inauthenticity by way of being absorbed into

6

Heidegger, Being and Time, 9.

7

Heidegger, Being and Time, 1.
36

the prevailing social order, thereby succumbing to the “idle talk” (Gerede), “curiosity”
(Neugier), and “ambiguity” (Zweideutigkeit) that permeates the public space.
On Heidegger’s account, the only time that man becomes conscious of his everyday
inauthenticity is when he experiences anxiety (Angst). In anxiety, man’s primordial
homelessness becomes manifest. That is to say, man comes to realize that his identity and
the social order that undergirds that identity are without natural foundation. In the midst of
anxiety, man can either flee back into his everyday roles or he can become resolute in facing
up to the groundlessness of his everyday existence. For Heidegger, the latter necessitates
that the individual struggle to realize the “destiny” (Geschick) of its “people” or
“community” (Volk).
In this chapter, I will consider how Being and Time grapples with the problem of
modern homelessness. At the outset, I shall examine Heidegger’s phenomenological analysis
of how human existence is “Being-in-the-world” (In-der-Welt-Sein) and “Being-with”
(Mitsein). Then, I shall analyze Heidegger’s discussion of everydayness (Alltäglichkeit),
noting how the pejorative tone of his description hints at an incisive critique of modern civil
society. Turning to Heidegger’s analysis of existential angst, I will note how this mood
singularly illuminates the homeless nature of human existence. After discussing the two
responses to anxiety, flight (Flucht) and resoluteness (Entschlossenheit), I will discuss
Heidegger’s concept of the Volk. I will conclude with some reflections on the political
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implications of Being and Time, noting how Heidegger’s discussion of the Volk foreshadows
his later call for a metaphysical revolution in the West.8
II. Being-in-the-World and Being-with
Decrying the ontological groundlessness of the Western tradition, Heidegger raises
the question of the meaning of Being through an analysis of human being, Da–sein. As
defined by Heidegger, Da–sein is “this being which we ourselves in each case are and which
includes inquiry among the possibilities of its being.”9 Da–sein, then, is human being. The
statement that Da–sein is human being, however, is somewhat misleading in the fact that, in
the colloquial German, Da–sein can be interpreted to mean “everyday human existence.” In
order to do justice to the non-subjective connotation of its original German meaning, then, it
is more accurate to define Da–sein as human existence. Hence, the thematic focus of Being
and Time is not human beings as such, but their manner of existence. For Heidegger, the
difference is crucial.
In Heidegger’s view, an investigation of Da–sein is the most appropriate way to
answer the question of Being. Why? According to Heidegger, Da–sein has both ontic and
ontological priority over other beings.10 On an ontic level, Da–sein is “ontically
distinguished by the fact that in its being this being is concerned about its very being.”11 On
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an ontological level, Da–sein is the only being that is ontological. Both ontically and
ontologically, then, the human being has priority because it is the only being that maintains a
relationship with its existence (Existenz). Additionally, Da–sein is the only being that can
understand beings unlike itself. For all of these reasons, Da–sein is the being most worthy of
being “interrogated” with regard to the question of Being.
From the very outset, Heidegger is at pains to demonstrate that Da–sein is not merely
a conscious subject. As Heidegger writes, “one of our first tasks will be to show that the
point of departure from an initially given ego and subject totally fails to see the phenomenal
content of Da–sein.”12 Here, Heidegger evinces his antipathy to the thought of Descartes,
who inaugurates the subjective turn in modern philosophy with his endeavor to prove that the
ideas in the human mind correspond to the reality of the external world. But we can also see
the subject/object dichotomy at work in the thought of Heidegger’s mentor, Husserl, whose
conception of the meaning-giving, transcendental subject bears the unmistakable imprint of
the Cartesian tradition. In conceptualizing the human relation to the world as one in which
subjects contemplate objects, the Cartesian-Husserlian approach reduces all human
experiences to the distinction between perceiver and perceived. Attempting to distance
himself from both the Cartesian and Husserlian conceptions, Heidegger argues that Da–sein
is not a subjective ego detached from its worldly surroundings.
Instead, Heidegger argues that human existence is Being-in-the-world (In-der-Weltsein). What is the meaning of this strange, seemingly obvious, contention? In sum,
Heidegger is arguing that human beings are ensconced within a nexus of shared social
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practices that determines the relations between all beings. These practices determine the
manner in which human beings exist because they structure the activities in which they are
engaged and the purposes that drive them. And for Heidegger, perhaps the most telling
testament to the importance of these social practices is the way in which human beings relate
to ontic things. Inasmuch as these “ready-to-hand” (Zuhanden) entities exist in an overall
system of relevance, the human use of them operates on a pre-rational and pre-cognitive
level. In other words, the human relationship to things is, for the most part, practical in
nature.
Heidegger’s assertion that Da–sein is Being-in-the-world is also significant because it
cuts against the grain of the Cartesian conception of space. For Descartes, human beings
exist in objective space (res extensa). For Heidegger, the spatial dimension of human
existence is only explainable in terms of Da–sein’s concernful Being-in-the-world:
“Da–sein is ‘in’ the world in the sense of a familiar and heedful association with the beings
encountered in the world. Thus when spatiality is attributed to it in some way, this is
possible only on the basis of this Being-in.”13 Hence, human existence in objective space is
derivative of human Being-in-the-world.
Heidegger famously points to the relation between a workman and his workshop as
an example of the nonreflective way in which human beings relate to their “thingly”
environment. The workman does not give thought to the hammer that he uses to pound in a
nail. As Heidegger writes, “Association geared to useful things which show themselves
generally only in this association, that is, hammering with the hammer, neither grasps these
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beings thematically as occurring things nor does it even know of using or the structure of
useful things as such.”14 Nor is such knowledge necessary for the workman’s utilization of
the hammer, for what is important is the workman’s manipulation of this particular item-ofgear. It is only when the hammer ceases to fulfill its designated function – when it breaks –
that the workman views it as a “present-at-hand” (Vorhanden) entity that is theoretically
significant.
If the human relationship to the world corresponds to the relation between the
workman and his workshop, how do human beings relate to each other in this scheme?
Sticking to the above analogy, we might ask how workmen relate to other workmen in the
Heideggerian schema. Heidegger addresses this question by way of asserting that human
being-in-the-world is also “Being-with” (Mitsein). By Being-with, Heidegger means our
normal social way of being. Like the nonsocial facets of human existence, human Beingwith others mostly operates on a nonsubjective level: “The others are not encountered by
grasping and previously discriminating one’s own subject, initially objectively present, from
other subjects also present.”15 Rather, for the most part, we work with and deal with others
without having any beliefs about them.
In Heidegger’s view, the presence of other human beings is permanently etched into
the fabric of our existential constitution. That is to say, human Being-with is constitutive of
Da–sein’s way of being. By extension, others are not existentially external to the boundaries
that demarcate the boundaries of the self: “The ‘others’ does not mean everyone else but me
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– those from whom the ‘I’ distinguishes itself. They are, rather, those from whom one
mostly does not distinguish oneself, those among whom one is too.”16 Indeed, human Beingwith is such a fundamental aspect of human existence that it persists even in the physical
absence of other human beings. As such, it makes possible the encountering of particular
others, others whose way of being Heidegger calls Mitda-sein.
On Heidegger’s account, we relate to others through concern (Fürsorge): “the other
is initially disclosed in the taking care of concern.”17 Initially, of course, human beings are
not subjectively concerned for one another because the with-world is an implicit, rather than
explicit, facet of human existence. But simply by way of existing in an inter-subjective
world, we are concerned about others even if we are seemingly aloof in our dealings with
them. Because we by care about our own Being-in-the-world, we are concerned about the
being of others.
Heidegger thus nods towards the social facet of human existence. However, one
should not go too far in blurring the lines between Heidegger and Aristotle with regard to the
question of man’s natural sociability. For Heidegger, human Being-with must be understood
as an existential byproduct of human Being-in-the-world. In other words, human existence is
Being-with because the world in which Da–sein is ensconced is a “with-world”: “On the
basis of this like-with being-in-the-world, the world is always already the one that I share
with the others.”18 Needless to say, this is not exactly the same thing as Aristotle’s teaching
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that man is a naturally political animal because of his capacity for speech or reason (logos), a
capacity that enables him to make moral judgements (1253a7). Nonetheless, Heidegger’s
conception of Being-with is significant even if his recognition of man’s social nature is
decidedly halfhearted. That said, Heidegger’s description of the everyday consequences that
flow from human Being-with depict a decidedly negative picture of human sociability.
III. Everydayness and Publicness
In his self-conscious attempt to understand human existence purely on its own terms,
Heidegger focuses on what previous Western ontology had contemptuously shoved aside in
favor of an exaggerated focus on theoretical contemplation or ecstatic communion with the
divine: the everyday world. A pervasive – if invisible – feature of everydayness
(Alltäglichkeit) is what Heidegger calls “the they” (das Man). What is the they? The they is
the mass of ordinary mankind that dictates the conduct of life as it is lived in an everyday
context: “The they, which is nothing definite and which all are, although not as a sum,
prescribes the kind of being of everydayness.”19
In prescribing the “kind of being of everydayness,” the they exercises a “dictatorship”
over the individual that is nearly unlimited in scope. Heidegger describes the nature of the
they’s dictatorship in the following passage:
In utilizing public transportation, in the use of information services such as the
newspaper, every other is like the next. This Being-with-one-another dissolves one’s
own Da–sein completely into the kind of being of “the others” in such a way that the
others, as distinguishable and explicit, disappear more and more. In this
inconspicuousness and unascertainability, the they unfolds its true dictatorship. We
enjoy ourselves and have fun the way they enjoy ourselves. We read, see, and judge
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literature and art the way they see and judge. But we also withdraw from the “great
mass” the way they withdraw, we find “shocking” what they find shocking.20
The above quote is illuminating in that it points to why the they is able to exercise unlimited
power over the individual. For one, its rule is marked by “inconspicuousness” and
“unascertainability” in that its exercise of power operates surreptitiously beneath the surface
of everyday life. The deeper reason for its seeming invisibility, though, is that the they is
“nothing definite and which all are, though not as a sum.” Hence, one cannot point to a
specific aggregate of individuals as being the ultimate source of tyranny: the they is
everyone and no one. The they is able to dictate the way we ride the bus and read the
morning paper because it is the nonspecific – but nonetheless palpable – enforcer of the
public norms and social conventions that dictate the course of everyday conduct. Indeed,
even when we rail against the vulgarity of mass culture and seek to separate ourselves from
the bovine masses, the they’s dictatorship remains unchallenged.
On Heidegger’s account, the they possesses existential characteristics of its own that
enable it to turn the individual into an anonymous “they-self.” More specifically, the they’s
way of being consists of distantiality (Abständigkeit), averageness (Durchschnittlichkeit),
and levelling down (Einebnung). Distantiality refers to the manner in which the they induces
the individual to measure itself in relation to others with regards to the distance that
ontologically separates it from them. As Heidegger puts it, in distantiality one is encouraged
to exercise “constant care as to the way one differs from them, whether this difference is to
be equalized, whether one’s own Da–sein has lagged behind others and wants to catch up in
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relation to them, whether Da–sein in its priority over others is intent on suppressing them.”21
Hence, distantiality not only makes one cognizant of human heterogeneity, but also leaves it
vaguely disquieted by it.
Complementary to distantiality is what Heidegger calls “averageness”
(Durchschnittlichkeit). As an existential characteristic of the they, averageness is the way in
which das Man “maintains itself in what is proper, what is allowed, and what is not.”22 In
other words, through averageness the they holds up a particular model of life as “normal.”
Such a way of life, the they emphasizes, is not only permissible but is also the most likely to
yield societal “success.” Hence, if the they’s distantiality causes the self to become aware of
the way in which it is not “normal,” das Man’s averageness causes the self to recognize what
is “proper” and “allowed” in the everyday world.
“Levelling down” (Einebnung) is the third existential characteristic of the they
identified by Heidegger, and can be seen as perhaps the most aggressive means by which das
Man enforces social control. In the process of levelling down, the they attempts to suppress
everything that does not conform to its peculiar notion of what is normal. As Heidegger
writes:
This averageness, which prescribes what can and may not be ventured, watches over
every exception which thrusts itself to the fore. Every priority is noiselessly quashed.
Overnight, everything primordial is flattened down as something long since known.
Everything gained by a struggle becomes something to be manipulated. Every
mystery loses its power.23
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As the above quote demonstrates, this process is all the more effective by virtue of the fact
that it operates “noiselessly.” All in all, levelling down invisibly annihilates all traces of
what Nietzsche calls the “pathos of distance.”
What are we to make of all this? Heidegger’s discussion of the they and its
existential characteristics presents a highly unflattering portrait of the “mass man.” Under
his rule, individuals are encouraged to hate their singularity. Indeed, they are encouraged to
crush their own “eccentricities” in order to be viewed as “normal.” And if by chance one
manages to retain one’s individuality, the mass man will see to it that individual differences
are not conspicuous enough to challenge the conventions of the social order. It is not
difficult to see how Heidegger’s picture of the they-self resonates with Nietzsche’s picture of
the Last Man. As Nietzsche puts it, in a world governed by the Last Man there is “No
shepherd and one herd! Everyone wants the same, everyone is the same: whoever feels they
are different goes voluntarily to the madhouse.”24
Obviously, Heidegger is not the first thinker to level a critique of mass society. In
painting a bleak picture of mass culture, Heidegger echoes not only conservatives such as
Nietzsche but also such liberal thinkers as Tocqueville and Mill. Certainly, it is not difficult
to discern in Heidegger’s discussion subtle intimations of the “tyranny of the majority”
identified and feared by thinkers on both the Right and the Left. That being said,
Heidegger’s analysis of everydayness is not explicitly presented as a critique of modern mass
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society, or indeed of any other society. Ostensibly, Heidegger’s analysis describes everyday
human existence as it is experienced by human beings at all times and in all places. But the
pejorative tone of Heidegger’s discussion of everydayness is unmistakable. At the very least,
if Heidegger is describing everyday life as it is lived in all societies, then it is questionable
whether society as such is desirable at all. But if such sections are read as critiques of
modern society, then Heidegger’s discussion of everydayness can be viewed as
complementary to the critique of modern philosophy that he presents in the introduction to
Being and Time. The fact that the latter interpretation is more likely is evident when
Heidegger’s discussion of “publicness” (Öffentlichkeit) is taken into account.
What is publicness? As a descriptive term, publicness describes the obscuring effect
that Being-with has on our attempt to understand ourselves and the world. In the public
space, “publicness initially controls every way in which the world and Da–sein are
interpreted, and it is always right, not because of an eminent and primary relation of being to
‘things,’ not because it has an explicitly appropriate transparency of Da–sein at its disposal,
but because it does not get to ‘the heart of the matter,’ because it is insensitive to every
difference of level and genuineness.”25 Put differently, the public space is inherently
distorting because it is organically incapable of taking into account meaningful differences.
Even worse, the public realm presents an illusion of transparency that covers up its true
nature. Hence, publicness not only obscures phenomena, but also obscures the fact that it
obscures phenomena.
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The distorting effect of publicness manifests itself in the existential tendencies of the
individuals who occupy the public space. Heidegger identifies three such tendencies: “idle
talk” (Gerede), “curiosity” (Neugier), and “ambiguity” (Zweideutigkeit). With regards to the
first of these tendencies, Heidegger insists that “the expression ‘idle talk’ is not to be used
here in a disparaging sense,” but rather illuminates “a positive phenomenon which
constitutes the mode of being of the understanding and interpretation of everyday Da–sein.”26
“Positive phenomenon” or no, idle talk signifies the deterioration of language that occurs in
the public realm. Whereas language presupposes a given understanding of the phenomena
that is linguistically signified, idle talk is the prattle that results when language becomes
disconnected from originary experience. When language becomes unhinged from its worldly
foundation, it becomes a type of linguistic currency that is thoughtlessly transferred from
person to person. “Since this discoursing has lost the primary relation of being to the being
talked about, or else never achieved it,” Heidegger writes, “it does not communicate in the
mode of a primordial appropriation of this being, but communicates by gossiping and
passing the word along.”27 Moreover, when this linguistic deterioration reaches an advanced
enough stage, individuals are effectively uprooted from the world.
Curiosity (Neugier) is another existential tendency exhibited by individuals who
occupy the public space. For Heidegger, curiosity is characterized by “not-staying” insofar
as it ignores “what is nearest” in favor of “restlessness and excitement from continual
novelty and changing encounters.” Similarly, curiosity is marked by “distraction” inasmuch
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as it seeks to know phenomena “just in order to have known.” Just as significantly, however,
curiosity is “never dwelling anywhere.” That is to say, one who is curious is “everywhere
and nowhere” because one’s intense craving for new sights, new experiences, new faces, and
untraveled-to places renders one always “on the move.” In sum, curious Da–sein “constantly
uproots itself.”28
Ambiguity (Zweideutigkeit) is the third characteristic exhibited by individuals who
inhabit the public realm. For Heidegger, a person existing in the midst of others will often
adhere to the opinions that others hold, even about subjects of which they have no immediate
knowledge. In a milieu where every topic is accessible to every inquiring mind, one’s ability
to distinguish between truth and falsity on the basis of one’s own understanding is severely
hampered. “When in everyday being with one another,” Heidegger writes, “we encounter
things that are accessible to everybody and about which everybody can say everything, we
can soon no longer decide what is disclosed in genuine understanding and what is not.”29 In
ambiguity, the line between what is genuinely understood and what is superficially grasped
dissolves into a misty haze.
Ambiguity has ontological as well as epistemological effects. That is to say,
ambiguity not only affects the way in which we apprehend phenomena, but also affects our
existential manner of Being-in-the-world. As Heidegger puts it, “Ambiguity not only affects
the way we avail ourselves of what is accessible for use and enjoyment, and the way we
manage it, but it has already established itself in understanding as a potentiality for being,
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and in the way Da–sein projects itself and presents itself with possibilities.”30 Considered
from this vantage point, ambiguity cripples not only the way we think about the world, but
also how we act in it.
Heidegger’s discussion of ambiguity – like his discussion of publicness in general –
paints a devastating picture of the public space as it exists in the everyday world. Although
Heidegger does not simply equate everydayness with inauthenticity, he nonetheless comes
close to conflating the two. Seemingly, everydayness encourages human beings to “drift”
towards inauthenticity by inducing them to submit to the dictatorship of the they. In the
public space, this dictatorship is so extreme that human beings are effectively uprooted from
their worldly home and are turned into shallow, nattering Last Men seeking one distraction
after another.
As it stands, Heidegger’s discussion of everydayness can be read as a critique of dayto-day life as it is lived in the modern world. Of course, Heidegger outwardly denies this,
arguing that his analysis of everydayness applies equally to both modern as well as premodern societies: “everydayness is also and precisely the kind of being of Da–sein, even
when Da–sein moves in a highly developed and differentiated culture.”31 Perhaps. But later
on, Heidegger concedes that the degree to which the they exercises its “dictatorship” in the
everyday world varies from epoch to epoch: “The extent to which its (the they’s) dominance
becomes penetrating and explicit may change historically.”32 Hence, although the they
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dominates the they-self in every social order, certain orders give it more room to exercise its
hegemony than others. The fact that Heidegger regarded the modern order as one such order
is evident when we consider how his discussion of everydayness illuminates some of the
more negative aspects of modern commercial society.
For one, consider Heidegger’s use of the term “publicness” itself. It is arguable that
Heidegger’s use of this term is revealing in that, as Michael E. Zimmerman notes, the term is
often used in conjunction with modern civil society.33 Is Heidegger’s description of the
everyday world really a description of modern civil society? Here, it is instructive to
consider the thought of the fellow German thinker who had thought the most penetratingly
about the nature of modern civil society: Hegel.
For Hegel, civil society is a distinctly modern phenomenon, and is properly
understood as the realm where individuals are free to pursue their private desires. Indeed, in
civil society, the individual, considered as an autonomous entity, is one of the defining
principles of civil society as such: “The concrete person, who is himself the object of his
particular aims, is, as a totality of wants and a mixture of caprice and physical necessity, one
principle of civil society.”34 Hence, civil society is constituted by an aggregate of
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individuals, and is a realm where egoism and individualism runs rampant. As such, it is the
realm of individual particularity par excellence.35
For Hegel, then, the realm of civil society is one in which the individual is given “free
reign in every direction to satisfy its needs, accidental caprices, and subjective desires.”36
For his part, Heidegger paints a devastating picture of what a social realm characterized by
the liberation of “subjective desires” concretely looks like. On Heidegger’s account, the
liberation of egoism that occurs in civil society results in a world of chattering quasi-humans
shuffling from one distraction to another. Cut off from family and community, individuals
are transformed into homeless mass men.
My point here should not be misunderstood. In arguing that Heidegger’s picture of
everydayness alludes to some of the darker implications of the Hegelian conception of civil
society, I am not suggesting that Heidegger necessarily had Hegel in mind when he
composed Being and Time. Rather, I seek to illuminate the anti-modern biases that lurk in
the background of Heidegger’s discussion of everydayness. Hegel provides an illustrative
counterpoint to Heidegger because he had thought that modern society, whatever its
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shortcomings, constitutes an improvement over pre-modern societies.37 “The Eastern nations
knew only that one is free; the Greek and Roman world only that some are free; while we
know that all men absolutely (man as man) are free.”38 So goes the Hegelian formulation.
For Heidegger, however, in modern society mass taste crushes individuality, trivial chatter
about topics of no consequence supplants meaningful discourse, and shallow curiosity about
new places, faces, and products replaces sustained inquiry about the nature and meaning of
existence.
To those who have succumbed to the temptations offered by modern society,
however, the fact that they have fallen into a state of existential inauthenticity is hidden from
view. Indeed, the human fall into the abyss of self-alienation is experienced as comfortable
self-contentment. Hence, even though idle talk, curiosity, and ambiguity have effectively
uprooted them from the world, human beings still feel at home. The fact that this feeling of
Being-at-home is superficial, however, is revealed by the experience of anxiety.
IV. Heidegger’s Analysis of Anxiety
The human experience of moods (Stimmung) or attunements is a core aspect of
human Being-in-the-world. Although Heidegger examines various moods, he pays special
attention to anxiety (Angst). Why? For Heidegger, anxiety is a key mood because it reveals
the nature of human existence in its totality. More specifically, anxiety reveals that man’s
being is characterized by what Heidegger calls “care” (Sorge). Da–sein’s being is marked by
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care in the sense that it is continuously concerned with the question of its own being. In
illuminating the nature of Da–sein’s being, Heidegger’s analysis of anxiety serves the same
function as Husserl’s phenomenological reduction. Much as Husserl’s bracketing of the
world reveals the transcendental ego, so too does Heidegger’s existential reduction reveal
Da–sein. That being said, exactly what anxiety reveals about human existence points to the
gap that separates Heideggerian ontology from Husserlian phenomenology. More
specifically, as Hubert L. Dreyfus puts it, “while both reductions isolate Da–sein as a ‘solus
ipse,’ and both reveal to the natural attitude that takes intelligibility for granted that
intelligibility must be produced, Husserl’s reduction reveals the transcendental ego as the
absolute source of all intelligibility, while anxiety reveals Da–sein as dependent upon a
public system of significances that it did not produce (italics Dreyfus’s).”39 As we will see,
this difference is of no small consequence.
Borrowing from Kierkegaard’s Concept of Anxiety, Heidegger draws a contrast
between fear and anxiety.40 In sum, fear is marked by specificity: fear is a mood in which
we are afraid of being harmed in some specific respect by something that approaches us in
some specific way from some specific sector of the environment: “What we fear is always a

39

Hubert L. Dreyfus, Being-in-the-World: A Commentary on Being and Time,
Division I (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1991), 177. The following analysis of anxiety is greatly
indebted to Dreyfus’s insightful discussion.
40

Kierkegaard’s influence on Being and Time generally and on the text’s analysis of
anxiety in particular is self-evident. For more on the relationship between Heidegger and
Kierkegaard, see Calvin O. Schrag, Existence and Freedom: Towards an Ontology of
Human Finitude (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1961); George J. Stack,
Kierkegaard’s Existential Ethics (University, Alabama: The University of Alabama Press,
1977); and Michael Wyschogrod, Kierkegaard and Heidegger: Ontology and Existence
(New York: Humanities Press, 1969).
54

detrimental innerworldly being, approaching nearby from a definite region, which may
remain absent.”41 Hence, we can readily point to the thing that provokes our fear, identify
why we fear it, and locate its ultimate point of origin.
Anxiety is radically different. For one, angst is not provoked by anything specific:
“What Angst is about is not an innerworldly being.” Secondly, anxiety does not threaten us
in any specific way: “The threat does not have the character of a definite detrimentality
which concerns what is threatened with a definite regard to a particular factical potentiality
for being.”42 Hence, whereas we can always point to the object of our fear and identify how
it threatens us, we are unable to do so in the case of angst.
In anxiety, no worldly entity is “relevant.” That is to say, we can neither point to any
worldly being as the source of our angst, nor to any such entity as a potential source of
solace. By extension, the world itself ceases to seem important. This is not to suggest that
the world suddenly disappears, however. Rather, the world has revealed itself as an
indifferent place that does not care one iota whether the individual is alienated from it or not.
Instead, it goes on precisely as before, seemingly oblivious to the fact that it has lost all
intrinsic meaning to the angst-ridden individual. This is why the world “obtrudes” more
oppressively than ever in the experience of anxiety: “The utter insignificance which makes
itself known in the nothing and nowhere does not signify the absence of world, but means
that innerworldly beings are in themselves of so little importance that, on the basis of this
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insignificance of what is worldly, the world is all that obtrudes itself in its worldliness.”43 In
other words, because it has revealed itself to be irrelevant to the experience of anxiety, the
world is arguably more “present” than ever, if in a decidedly unpleasant way.
Inasmuch as the world reveals itself to be insignificant to the anxious individual, the
roles that one embraces during one’s everyday occupations are likewise revealed to be of no
inherent value. Such roles, the individual realizes, can be played by anyone. This, on
Heidegger’s account, partially accounts for the vaguely threatening nature of anxiety. The
world does not appear “absurd,” as Camus would have it, because it lacks any sense of
logical coherence. Instead, the world is absurd because the coherence that it possesses has
no essential relation to the individual qua individual. As Heidegger writes, “the threat does
not come from something at hand and objectively present, but rather from the fact that
everything at hand and objectively absolutely has nothing more to ‘say’ to us.”44
In anxiety, the world appears as alien and other. Hence, it ceases to present itself as a
place in which one can be at home. For Heidegger, this is why the experience of existential
angst corresponds to an “uncanny” (unheimlich) feeling. To feel uncanny is to feel not-athome. As Heidegger puts it, “in Angst one has an ‘uncanny’ feeling. Here the peculiar
indefiniteness of that of that which Da–sein finds itself involved in with Angst initially finds
expression: the nothing and nowhere. But uncanniness means at the same time not-Being at
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home.”45 In experiencing anxiety, we feel that we are not at home in the world, and
experience a foretaste of our inevitable death.
At this point, we come face-to-face with an apparent contradiction that requires
addressing. If human existence is Being-in-the-world, how is it possible for human beings to
experience the uncanny sensation of not-Being-at-home-in-the-world? Is not such a feeling
manifestly impossible in light of the embedded nature of human existence? As if to answer
this question, Heidegger argues that his analysis of anxiety does not contradict his earlier
analysis of everydayness. In our everyday state, Heidegger suggests, we do indeed enjoy the
sensation of Being-at-home when we submit to the dictatorship of the they: “This
characteristic of Being-in was then made more concretely visible through the everyday
publicness of the they which beings tranquillized self-assurance, ‘Being-at-home’ with all its
obviousness, into the average everydayness of Da–sein.” However, the experience of
anxiety destroys this “tranquillized self-assurance”: “Being-in enters the existential ‘mode’
of not-Being-at-home.”46 Thus, when human beings experience existential angst, their
relationship to worldly place modulates from a feeling of Being-at-home to one of not-Beingat-home.
But if this is the case, then how are we to assess these various modulations with
regard to the characteristics of human existence? Is the feeling of Being-at-home to be
regarded as more “real” than not-Being-at-home, or vice versa? Or are they to be regarded
as equal in existential merit? Heidegger’s answer is as direct as it is unambiguous:
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“Tranquillized, familiar being-in-the-world is a mode of the uncanniness of Da–sein, not the
other way around. Not Being-at-home must be conceived existentially and ontologically as
the more primordial phenomenon (italics Heidegger’s).”47 Hence, the sensation of
homelessness disclosed in anxiety is more “primordial,” and hence more real, than the
feeling of homeliness that accompanies our inhabitation of the everyday world .
To feel homeless is to feel exiled from the world. But to feel homeless is also to feel
displaced from one’s sense of identity. By displacing us from the world, anxiety thereby
undermines our very identity. Angst makes the individual cognizant of how the world has no
inherent value even as it makes it aware of how the world undergirds its own sense of self.
In this sense, anxiety reveals Da–sein as “thrown” (Geworfen) in a world that it did not
produce. But anxiety also makes the individual aware of the “individuated” facet of its
being, if only because it illuminates how its “ownmost” identity has been hijacked by the
they. All in all, “It (anxiety) brings one back to the pure That of one’s ownmost,
individuated thrownness.”48
Viewed in light of anxiety, the everyday world is revealed to be a “fallen” place
because it mistakenly presents itself as home, as a place where one can be a self without
sacrificing one’s integrity. Just as significantly, it is exposed as a place where the painful
fact of our primordial homelessness is systematically covered up. This holds especially true
for the public space, which can be viewed as a place of refuge where inauthentic individuals
gather to avoid facing the disturbing fact that their worldly existence lacks natural
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foundation: “Entangled flight into the Being-at-home of publicness is flight from not-Beingat-home, that is, from the uncanniness which lies in Da–sein as thrown, as Being-in-theworld entrusted to its own being.” Understandably, people who inhabit the public space will
attempt to insulate themselves from the shock engendered by their encounter with
uncanniness by advancing interpretations of it that cover up its true reality. “The everyday
world in which Da–sein understands uncanniness is the entangled turning away which
‘phases out’ not-Being-at-home.”49 Such interpretations obscure the “facticity” of our
uncanny Being-in-the-world.
Heidegger’s discussion of anxiety illuminates the homeless nature of our Being-inthe-world. Anxiety reveals that the world is not our home because it is governed by the they.
Viewed from this perspective, the experience of anxiety is a profoundly subversive
experience because it tears off the veil of illusion that covers up the full extent of the they’s
dictatorship. But how can individuals build upon the experience of anxiety to liberate
themselves from the they’s dictatorship?
V. Flight and Resoluteness
In the face of anxiety, the individual is faced with two basic options. One such option
is “flight” (Flucht). In flight, one flees into distractions as a means of hiding from the
realization that one’s identity and one’s culture is groundless. By fleeing, Da–sein
voluntarily seeks to become reabsorbed into the everyday world even though it realizes that it
is utterly without natural foundation. Moreover, in flight Da–sein implicitly renounces its
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ability to be an authentic self: as Heidegger writes, “Da–sein plunges out of itself into itself,
into the groundlessness and nothingness of inauthentic everydayness.”50
Flight is an intentional act. This aspect distinguishes it from the ordinary “falling”
that occurs when one inhabits the everyday world.51 Whereas falling is essentially a
precognitive process that occurs as one’s identity becomes inexorably submerged into the
prevailing social order, fleeing is voluntary: “The absorption of Da–sein in the they and in
the ‘world’ taken care reveals something like a flight of Da–sein from itself as an authentic
potentiality for being itself.” Hence, in fleeing one voluntarily surrenders to the they,
effectively choosing “the they for its ‘hero.’”52
Flight, however, represents merely one of two paths that the individual can take in the
wake of an anxious episode. The other option is what Heidegger calls “resoluteness”
(Entschlossenheit). What is resoluteness? The term resoluteness usually means
“decisiveness.” In the original German, Entschlossenheit derives from the German verb
“schliessen,” which means to shutter, lock, or latch. Literally translated, Entschlossenheit
means to un-shutter or un-lock. Stressing this Germanic connotation, Heidegger argues that
a resolute individual is someone who un-locks their suppressed potentiality to be a self.
Moreover, resolute Da–sein un-shutters its authenticity by choosing to “disclose”
(erschliessen) its own finite existence independently of the they. Hence, whereas flight
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signifies one’s submersion into the they, “resoluteness means letting oneself be summoned
out of one’s lostness in the they.”53 All in all, resoluteness is the means by which Da–sein
discloses its independence of the they by way of autonomously grappling with the finite
nature of its existence.
Like flight, resoluteness is somewhat voluntary in nature. Here, it is instructive to
note that, in English, the term “resolution” can refer to an optical image that is clear and
well-defined. Heidegger’s concept of resoluteness reflects this English connotation by
stressing the clarity required for resolute action. Human beings must attain clarity about
what they resolve to do. In this sense, resoluteness is voluntaristic in nature. That being
said, it is also disclosive, a fact evident in Heidegger notion of the “call of conscience.”
On Heidegger’s account, a resolute individual responds to the call of conscience. The
call of conscience is the silent voice of Being telling us that we are “guilty” (schuldig) of
ontological inauthenticity. More specifically, we are guilty of letting the they dictate our
way of being and the way in which we understand our own death. But we are also guilty of
naively thinking that our existential options are unlimited. The call of conscience tells us
otherwise, making us cognizant of the limited nature of the choices available to us. The call
of conscience does not emanate from the ego; it cannot be willed. As Heidegger writes, “The
call is precisely something that we ourselves have neither planned nor prepared for nor
willfully brought about. ‘It’ calls against our expectations and even against our will. On the
other hand, the call without doubt does not come from someone else who is with me in the
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world. The call comes from me, and yet over me.”54 That said, there is a voluntaristic
element to the call of conscience in the fact that the individual must want to be summoned by
it. Heidegger calls this “wanting-to-have-a-conscience.”
Inasmuch as Heideggerian resoluteness has a voluntaristic element, this element is
“anticipatory” in nature. By this, Heidegger means that resolute individuals anticipate the
eventuality of their own death, and by doing so disclose their own finitude or “Being-guilty.”
Ironically enough, however, by anticipating one’s own death, one is enabled to seize control
of one’s own life. It would seem to be the case that the only way in which one can gain
freedom for oneself is by “Being-towards-death.” As Heidegger writes, “Anticipation
reveals to Da–sein its lostness in the they-self and brings it face-to-face with the possibility
to be itself, primarily unsupported by concern taking care of things, but to be itself in
passionate anxious freedom towards death which is free of the illusions of the they, factical
and certain of itself (italics and bold Heidegger’s).”55 In passages such as these, Heidegger’s
prose evinces the existential ecstacy that is experienced in the performance of resolute action.
Indeed, Heidegger later writes of the “unshakable joy” that occurs when one liberates oneself
from the dictatorship of the they and accepts responsibility for one’s own existence.
Clearly, anticipatory resoluteness entails an inner transformation that, in its intensity,
resembles nothing so much as a religious conversion. Heidegger’s notion of the call of
conscience certainly supports this impression. For his part, Heidegger stresses the inner
dimensions of the existential transformation that occurs in resolute action. It is not so much
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that the world itself changes, but the way in which the individual copes with it that undergoes
a modulation, on Heidegger’s account: “The ‘world’ at hand does not become different as
far as ‘content,’ the circle of others is not exchanged for a new one, and yet the being toward
things at hand which understands and takes care of things, and the concerned Being-with
with the others is now defined in terms of their ownmost potentiality of Being-a-self.”56 It
would seem to be the case that resoluteness is an “inner-directed” rather than “outerdirected” activity.
But this inward-looking ethos is not the whole story, or even most of it, for that
matter. As we shall see, Heidegger is not content to argue that the individual should retreat
into the inner sanctum of the self in order to cultivate personal authenticity. As George
Steiner writes, “For ‘resoluteness’ towards authenticity is not solipistic; it does not alienate
Da–sein from others.”57 The fact that resoluteness propels human beings towards others is
evident in Heidegger’s brief yet significant discussion of the means by which Da–sein
achieves ontological completion in a “people” or “community” (Volk).
VI. Heidegger’s Discussion of the Volk
Heidegger’s discussion of the Volk occurs in the second section of Being and Time, a
section where he considers the question of Being in relation to temporality (Zeitlichkeit).
Why the importance of temporality? As we have seen, for Heidegger the being of Da–sein is
characterized by care in the sense that “the being of Da–sein means Being-ahead-of-oneself-
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already-in (the world) as Being together-with (innerworldly beings encountered).”58 For
Heidegger, the fact that Da–sein is “ahead-of” itself in a world that it already inhabits in the
presence of other beings points to its ecstatic temporal structure. Da–sein does not exist in a
temporal vacuum but acts in such a way that it opens up the past, present, and future. In light
of this truism, an adequate analysis of human existence is compelled to consider man’s status
as a temporal being. The second section of the text witnesses Heidegger’s attempt to reexamine the ontological structures of Da–sein in light of their temporal meaning.
Heidegger introduces the Volk by way of revisiting the concept of resoluteness. As
we have seen, resoluteness is the means by which human beings face up to their individual
“fate.” In his discussion of the Volk, however, Heidegger argues that a resolute individual is
someone who accepts their “destiny” (Geschick). What is a destiny? For Heidegger, a
destiny is “the occurrence of the community, of a people (Volk).” But how does a person
realize their communal destiny? In Heidegger’s view, Da–sein realizes its communal destiny
through “communication and in battle”: “in communication and in battle the power of
destiny first becomes free.” Seemingly, communicative struggle is the means by Da–sein
realizes the destiny of a Volk.
Obviously, Heidegger’s discussion raises a host of questions. What exactly does it
mean to engage in “communication” and “battle”? Heidegger is characteristically vague on
this question. In other instances, however, Heidegger gives us some clues as to what such
collective action concretely looks like. For one, a resolute individual pursues its destiny by
appropriating its cultural “heritage” in constructive fashion. Every culture possesses what
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Heidegger calls “possibilities that have-been.” By this phase, Heidegger means the vestigial
remnants of past cultural practices that were once commonplace fixtures of the everyday
world but are now largely considered to be dated oddities that have outlived their practical
utility. Such remnants remain present – if hidden – in our day-to-day world, even if they
have been shoved to the periphery of it. These discarded practices provide the fodder that
resolute individuals can seize upon to actualize their latent authenticity. As Heidegger
writes, “The resoluteness in which Da–sein comes back to itself discloses the actual factical
possibilities of authentic existing in terms of the heritage which that resoluteness takes over
as thrown.”59
In appropriating a pre-given cultural heritage, the resolute individual can model itself
after examples. Heidegger refers to this as “the possibility that Da–sein may choose its
heroes.” Of course, the term “choose” is more than a little misleading in this context,
inasmuch as it signifies a passive resignation to fate as much as an active act of the
individual will: “The finitude of existence thus seized upon tears one back out of endless
multiplicity of possibilities offering themselves nearest by – those of comfort, shirking, and
taking things easy – and brings Da–sein to the simplicity of its fate.”60 At any rate, by
choosing its hero and taking over an inherited – if forgotten – cultural heritage, Da–sein
fulfills its individual fate. And by fulfilling one’s fate in this fashion, one also fulfills the
destiny of one’s Volk.
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Needless to say, these are provocative words. Provocative as they are, however,
Heidegger’s discussion of the Volk is not without precedent in the context of Being and Time.
As we have seen, for Heidegger Being-in-the-world is Being-with. Here, he suggests that
Da–sein has a destiny because it exists in the midst of others: “But if fateful Da–sein
essentially exists as being-in-the-world in being-with-others, its occurrence is an occurrencewith and is determined as destiny.”61 From this perspective, one can say that Heidegger
sneaks his völkisch rhetoric through the space or opening provided by his phenomenology of
Mitsein. Even so, it is not without its difficulties.
For one, Heidegger is frustratingly vague about what the nature of the Volk itself.
What is the ontological basis of the Volk that renders it a coherent community? For
Heidegger, what unites the members of the Heideggerian community together is the
collective pursuit of a historical destiny. On one level, this metaphysical definition is
admirable in that it sets Heidegger’s thought apart from other völkisch writers who
conceptualize the Volk in crudely racist and biological terms. On another level, however, it
is frustrating in the fact that its essential vagueness fails to address the question of why the
individual is compelled to act collectively to actualize its latent authenticity. Somehow, the
argument that Being-in-the-world is Being-with does not settle this question. Indeed, it is
entirely possible to concede the inter-subjective nature of human existence without
necessarily maintaining that collective action is necessary to the cultivation of human
authenticity. By neglecting to discuss the Volk in any significant detail, Heidegger fails to
establish its necessity.
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What little we know about the Volk is that it is roughly analogous to the individual.
Much as individuals have fates, peoples possess historical destinies. In the words of
Zimmerman, “the resolute people discloses and acts on its destiny just as the resolute
individual discloses and acts on its fate.”62 From this perspective, peoples can be just as
resolute as individuals. But can they flee from their sense of primordial homelessness as
individuals can? Apparently so. However, as we have seen, resoluteness and flight are the
two options that individuals are faced with in the wake of an anxious episode. Do peoples
too experience anxiety? Indeed, do peoples exist in an everyday state? I indulge in this
reductio ad absurdum not to ridicule Heidegger, but rather to illuminate some of the more
awkward implications of the Da–sein:Volk analogy that lurks in the background of his
discussion.
As it stands, this represents merely one of several problems that plagues Heidegger’s
discussion of the Volk. In the first part of Being and Time, Heidegger’s discussion of
publicness identifies the existential self-alienation that occurs in the public space. In a public
space dominated by the they, Heidegger had argued, the individual becomes an anonymous
they-self prone to idle talk, curiosity, and ambiguity. As Dominique Janicauld writes, “In
Being and Time, there is an especially negative phenomenology of Being-with, which at no
point introduces a positive phenomenology of political sociability.”63 Now, Heidegger
argues that the individual can only become authentic in the context of its community or
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people. Instead of hindering the cultivation of human authenticity, Being-with is downright
instrumental to it.
Obviously, Heidegger’s transfigured view of being-in raises a host of questions. How,
it may be asked, can Being-with facilitate inauthentic idle talk, curiosity, and ambiguity in
one instance and authentic communication and battle the next? Obviously, for Heidegger to
have given a satisfactory answer to this question, it would have been necessary for him to
distinguish between the Being-with that occurs in the everyday public space from the Mitsein
that inheres in a community or people. Such a distinction, unfortunately, is absent from the
text of Being and Time.
VII. Conclusion
As we have seen, Heidegger’s Being and Time contains a powerful critique of
modernity. Heidegger accuses modern philosophy of failing to address the all-important
question of Being, a failure that entails the ontological groundlessness of modern reason and
science. As it stands, this groundlessness exacts the severest civilizational consequences, for
we live in a world very much shaped by the influence of modern philosophy and its scientific
offshoot. We live in, as Max Weber would have it, an “iron cage” governed by procedural
rationality.64 Heidegger’s pejorative description of the everyday world paints a dreary
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picture of what a world governed by procedural rationality concretely looks like. Such a
world is characterized by the dominance of the mass man, who annihilates every exception to
the rule through a soft, numbing tyranny of the majority. This is the real import of
Heidegger’s discussion of the they and its inherent tendencies towards distantiality,
averageness, and levelling down.
Heidegger’s description of the public space – and of the idle talk, curiosity, and
ambiguity that occurs within its confines – stands as a similarly damning indictment of
modern civil society. To Heidegger, modern civil society is a place where language is
degraded into mindless prattle, where rootless individuals travel to and fro looking to satisfy
their curiosity, and where solid convictions melt into ambiguous “shades of grey.” Here, it is
instructive to link Heidegger’s picture of the rootless nature of contemporary civil society
with Marx’s description of the uprooting effected by the rule of the modern bourgeoise. The
bourgeoise, Marx recognized, has “pitilessly torn asunder the motley feudal ties that bound
man to his ‘natural superiors,’ and has left no other nexus between man and man than naked
self-interest, callous ‘cash payment.’” Under the rule of the bourgeoise, “All fixed, fast
frozen relations, with their train of ancient and venerable prejudices and opinions, are swept
away, all new-formed ones become antiquated before they can ossify. All that is solid melts
into air, all that is holy is profaned, and man is at last compelled to face with sober senses his
real conditions of life and his relations with his kind.”65 Hence, long before Heidegger, Marx
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had identified the rootless nature of modern capitalist society. Heidegger shares Marx’s
diagnosis, but refuses to attribute it to economic factors.
But if Heidegger’s discussion of the rootless nature of modern civil society owes a
certain debt to Marx, his analysis of anxiety is more indebted to Kierkegaard. While
Heidegger follows Marx in leveling a powerful critique of modern society, he also seconds
Kierkegaard’s contention that no society can be a fitting home for man. Heidegger’s
argument that man is not truly at home in the world has exerted a powerful influence on the
existentialist thinkers who followed in his wake, few of whom held out hope that radical
socio-political transfiguration could make man at home in a world that is perpetually strange.
Indeed, Heidegger’s assertion of man’s “primordial homelessness” foreshadows the
apolitical tendencies of postmodern thinkers such as Derrida. As Richard Bernstein puts it,
“Derrida seeks to show us that we never quite are or can be at home in the world. We are
threatened by the uncanniness of what is canny; we are always in exile – even from
ourselves. We may long and dream of being at home in the world, to find a ‘proper’ center,
but we never achieve this form of presence or self-presence.”66 Of course, Derrida has
become more political of late, but it is unclear what intrinsic value politics has in the
Derridean schema, where the fact of exile is admitted at the outset. So, too, in the thought of
the early Heidegger, who understandably has little to say about the conduct of day-to-day
politics in an everyday world that, in its “fallenness,” is one in which an authentic individual
would not want to be at home.
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Seemingly, Heidegger’s contention that man is essentially homeless implies that a
proper relationship with the place in which we live is an apolitical one. In a fallen world, the
individual is compelled to retreat back into the inner sanctum of the self, the only place
where one can grapple with one’s mortality without sacrificing one’s authenticity. But, as
we have seen, Heidegger’s concept of resoluteness propels the individual towards his or her
community. On one level, this is an outright contradiction in that Heidegger’s discussion of
publicness illuminates how communities hinder the individual’s attempt to face death. In the
presence of the they, Heidegger argues, we are inexorably led to interpret our death in terms
of the way that das Man does. On another level, however, it perfectly jibes with Heidegger’s
assertion that Da–sein is Being-in-the-world. Human beings do not exist detached from their
surroundings but are embedded into their communal environment. And the individual human
being always exists in the midst of other human beings, even when none are ontically
present. From this perspective, a solitary confrontation with mortality is manifestly
impossible. To be sure, in the end we are utterly alone. But the way that we grapple with
that end is conditioned by others.
Such is the significance of Heidegger’s discussion of the Volk. In sum, the Volk is a
community where the individual can face death free from the obfuscating effects of Beingwith. Is such a community possible, given Heidegger’s discernible animus towards the
public realm? If we interpret Heidegger’s discussion of publicness as a critique of modern
civil society rather than Being-with as such, then it certainly is. Considered from this
vantage point, it is only in modern society that Being-with necessarily engenders
inauthenticity. By extension, alternative social orders can make a more authentic Being-with
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possible. Arguably, Heidegger’s discussion of the Volk represents the German philosopher’s
early attempt to envision a social order that is not tainted by the pathologies endemic to
everydayness. To be sure, Heidegger’s attempt is underdeveloped and is riddled with
undeniable contradictions. This, however, does not render it any less significant.
On this reading, Heidegger’s discussion of how the resolute individual takes over a
pre-given cultural heritage appears in a different light. More specifically, the collective reappropriation of a common heritage is revealed to be the means by which the public space is
transformed from an inauthentic to an authentic place. By acting in concert to take over their
common heritage, individuals take over the much-ridiculed conservative aspects of that
culture that have fallen into disrepute and infuse them with new life and vitality. In so doing,
such individuals effectively combat the slide towards decadence that occurs in a society
characterized by individualism.
Obviously, we can detect in Heidegger’s discussion of the Volk certain echoes of the
collectivistic tendencies that were later exhibited in his 1933 rectorship at the University of
Freiburg. That being said, these tendencies are decidedly muted in Being and Time. As
noted earlier, Heidegger’s discussion of the Volk is as brief as it is vague. Moreover, while
Heidegger looks towards a potential reinvigoration of the public space, such a reinvigoration
is not necessarily synonymous with a full-blown metaphysical revolution in the West.
Suffice to say, in 1927, Heidegger was not yet ready to counsel full-fledged political action
as a remedy to the ills of modernity. At this point, his thought was still characterized by an
inward-looking ethos that has more in common with Kierkegaard than with the other völkisch

72

philosophers who populated the late-1920s German intellectual landscape. A few years later,
this would change radically.
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Chapter 3: Finding a Home in the German Polis:
Heidegger and the Politics of Aesthetic Nationalism

Every myth is a myth of origin.
Paul Tillich
The Socialist Decision

I. Introduction
The 1927 publication of Being and Time did not put an end to Heidegger’s
investigation of the question of Being (Seinsfrage). When viewed from the holistic
perspective of his lifelong investigation of the question of Being, Heidegger’s magnum opus
is the concrete manifestation of the first phase of a three-part career trajectory, and an
incomplete manifestation at that. As is well known, Heidegger had originally planned for
Being and Time to be comprised of two parts, both of which were to consist of three
divisions. With regards to part one, Heidegger failed to complete the third division (“Time
and Being”) by the time that Being and Time was published in 1927. Furthermore,
Heidegger failed to complete any sections of the second part of the text, a part which would
have effected a “destructuring” (Destruktion) of the history of Western ontology. To be sure,
Heidegger did eventually accomplish this destructuring in his 1929 work Kant and the
Problem of Metaphysics, his 1938 lecture “The Age of the World Picture,” and his 1930s
lectures on Aristotle. However, in 1929, Heidegger experienced a “turn” (Kehre) that was of
such importance that it marks the onset of a new phase of his thinking.1
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What is the turn? Ironically, Heidegger speaks to the turn that characterized his
middle-period thought in the essay that initiates the third phase of his thought. In the “Letter
on Humanism,” Heidegger wrote the following:
The adequate execution and completion of this other thinking that abandons
subjectivity is surely made more difficult by the fact that in the publication of Being
and Time the third division of the first part, “Time and Being,” was held back (cf.
Being and Time, p. 87, above). Here everything is reversed. The division in question
was held back because thinking failed in the adequate saying of this turning (Kehre)
and did not succeed with the help of the language of metaphysics. The lecture “On
the Essence of Truth,” thought out and delivered in 1930 but not printed until 1943,
provides a certain insight into the thinking from “Being and Time” to “Time and
Being.” This turning is not a change of standpoint from Being and Time, but in it the
thinking that was sought first arrives at the location of that dimension out of which
Being and Time is experienced, that is to say, experienced from the fundamental
experience of the oblivion of Being.2
On this account, the onset of Heidegger’s turn was precipitated by his failure to complete the
third section of part one of Being and Time. Heidegger failed to complete the third section
because the traditional language of metaphysics was ill-suited to the task of delineating the
relationship between Being and time. Because he was unable to do justice to the temporal
dimension of human existence, Heidegger was unable to break out of the subjective tradition
of modern thought.
Heidegger’s “Letter on Humanism” essay was published in 1947, more than a decade
after his turn had come to an end. Hence, by the time that he wrote the aforementioned
passage, Heidegger was in a better position to assess the significance of what happened to his
thinking in 1929. What, then, is the turn? On the basis of Heidegger’s 1947 account, the
turn is characterized by four aspects: the abandonment of subjectivity; a rejection of the
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language of Western metaphysics; a more thoroughgoing attempt to delineate Being’s
temporal nature; and an experience of the contemporary oblivion of Being.
In the “Letter on Humanism,” Heidegger defines modern homelessness as the
experience of the oblivion of Being. Inasmuch as the turn caused Heidegger to experience
the oblivion of Being, the Kehre saw the German philosopher fully coming to grips with the
experience of homelessness. To say that Heidegger experienced this homelessness intensely
is an understatement. As Michael E. Zimmerman puts it,
Heidegger experienced this homesickness profoundly, so much so that his very sanity
seems to have been threatened by the loss of familiarity and meaning in a world
devoid of God. . . . Heidegger’s thought was motivated in part by his profound
homesickness, by his yearning to overcome isolation, alienation and meaninglessness.
Here, his proximity to völkisch authors was very close indeed. He believed that his
task as a philosopher was to help the German Volk find a home for itself, although
this was an uphill task.3
Indeed, Heidegger’s experience of homelessness was of such intensity that it colored his
view of what philosophy is. In a 1929-1930 lecture course entitled “The Fundamental
Concept of Metaphysics,” Heidegger declared:
Novalis on one occasion says in a fragment: ‘Philosophy is really homesickness, an
urge to be at home everywhere.’ A strange definition, romantic of course.
Homesickness – does such a thing still exist today at all? Has it not become an
incomprehensible word, even in everyday life? Has not contemporary city man, the
ape of civilization, long since eradicated homesickness? And homesickness as the
very determination of philosophy!4
Adhering to Novalis’s definition of philosophy, Heidegger’s middle-period thought bears the
imprint of the experience of homesickness that is attendant with the oblivion of Being.

3

Zimmerman, Heidegger’s Confrontation with Modernity, 5.

4

Martin Heidegger, The Fundamental Concept of Metaphysics, trans. William
McNeill and Nicholas Walker (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995), 5.
76

It is during this middle-period that Heidegger’s experience of homesickness would
lead to a brief and disastrous foray into the world of politics. As is well known, in 1933
Heidegger assumed the position of rector at Freiburg University. By becoming rector,
Heidegger effectively threw his support behind the German National Socialist movement that
had seized control of the German nation. As rector, Heidegger hoped to revolutionize the
German university, an intention signaled by his inaugural address entitled “The SelfAssertion of the German University.”5 Apparently, Heidegger thought that a spiritual
reformation of the German university would engender a spiritual rejuvenation of the German
nation. Needless to say, Heidegger’s attempt to reform the university was a failure. Faculty
colleagues at Freiburg University resisted his attempts at reform. Even worse, the Nazis
themselves came to view Heidegger as a suspicious figure because of his unwillingness to
dismiss Jewish faculty members, and he resigned from his position in 1934, his term as rector
lasting approximately one year.
Heidegger’s feeling of homesickness thus engendered his ill-fated attempt to reform
the German university system. As it stands, Heidegger’s rectorship can be linked to his
theory of aesthetics. For Heidegger, the work of art is the place in which Being becomes
unconcealed.6 Moreover, the founding of a political state is a way in which truth rises to
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unconcealment. Furthermore, the polis is the place that underlies the works of art that attest
to the existence of a historical people. Putting all of this together, the founding of a polis is
an act of matchless ontological significance. By founding a new home, the founder creates a
place conducive to creative action.
In this chapter, therefore, I shall examine the politics of aesthetic nationalism in
Heidegger’s middle-period thought. I will begin by analyzing Heidegger’s discussion of the
contemporary spiritual crisis of the West in An Introduction to Metaphysics. Then, I shall
consider Heidegger’s call for the German nation to engender a full-blown metaphysical
revolution in the Occident that will put an end to modern homesickness. Turning to
Heidegger’s 1935 essay entitled “The Origin of the Work of Art,” I will analyze Heidegger’s
discussion of the work of art. I shall conclude with an examination of Heidegger’s brief yet
significant discussion of the founding of the polis in An Introduction to Metaphysics. For
Heidegger, the founding of the polis is the act by which the place that undergirds man’s
historical existence is established.
II. The Spiritual Crisis of the West
In Being and Time, Heidegger’s critique of modernity was ambiguous. On the one
hand, Heidegger had argued that the everyday world as such engenders existential selfalienation. On the other hand, Heidegger’s description of the everyday world resonated with
conservative criticisms of modern commercial society. In An Introduction to Metaphysics,
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Heidegger eliminates this ambiguity by identifying the presence of a full-blown spiritual
crisis in the West. Heidegger speaks to the nature of this crisis in the following passage:
This Europe, in its ruinous blindness forever on the point of cutting its own throat,
lies today in a great pincers, squeezed between Russia on the one side and America
on the other. From a metaphysical point of view, Russia and America are the same:
the same dreary technological frenzy, the same unrestricted organization of the
average man. At a time when the farthermost corner of the globe has been conquered
by technology and opened to economic exploitation; when any incident whatever,
regardless of where or when it occurs, can be communicated to the rest of the world
at any desired speed; when the assassination of a king in France and a symphony
concert in Tokyo can be ‘experienced’ simultaneously; when time has ceased to be
anything other than velocity, instantaneousness, and simultaneity, and time as history
has vanished from the lives of all peoples; when a boxer is regarded as a nation’s
great man; when mass meetings attended by millions are looked upon as a triumph –
then, yes then, through all this turmoil a question still haunts us like a specter: What
for? – Whither? – And what then?7
On Heidegger’s account, Europe stands poised on the brink of cultural suicide. Russia and
America threaten to transform Europe into a place characterized by technological “progress”
and social standardization. This is not to say that Russia and America are the ultimate
sources of danger, however. Rather, Russia and America are merely symptomatic of an age
characterized by the growth of global technology and mass communications, economic
exploitation, experiential overload, historical amnesia, and mass spectacle.
Heidegger continues in the same vein:
The spiritual decline of the earth is so far advanced that the nations are in danger of
losing the last bit of spiritual energy that makes it possible to see the decline (taken in
relation to the history of ‘Being’), and to appraise it as such. This simple observation
has nothing to do with Kulterpessimismus, and of course it has nothing to do with any
sort of optimism either; for the darkening of the world, the flight of the gods, the
destruction of the earth, the transformation of men into a mass, the hatred and
suspicion of everything free and creative, have assumed such proportions throughout

7

Martin Heidegger, An Introduction to Metaphysics, trans. Ralph Manheim (New
Haven: Yale University Press, 1959), 37-38.
79

the world that such childish categories as pessimism and optimism have long since
become absurd.8
According to this passage, all of the nations in the world are in danger of succumbing to
nihilism. So much so, in fact, that they are scarcely able to recognize that they are threatened
at all. Hence, the worldly disenchantment, environmental destruction, growth of mass
society, conformism, and philistinism that threatens to snuff out the last bit of spiritual
vitality in Europe also threatens the world as a whole.
In this passage, Heidegger uses the phrase “darkening of the world” to describe the
spiritual crisis that faces Europe and the world. What is the darkening of the world?
“Darkening of the world means emasculation of the spirit, wasting away, repression, and
misinterpretation of the spirit.”9 The “emasculation” of the spirit has four aspects. The first
and most important aspect is the interpretation of spirit as intelligence. Second, the
interpretation of spirit as intelligence engenders the corresponding illusion that spirit is a
ready-to-hand tool that can be readily manipulated. Third, with spirit degraded to the level
of a piece of equipment, all spiritual activities – poetry, art, politics, religion – are divided up
into autonomous spheres where they become objects of conscious planning. Finally, spirit is
situated into the realm of what moderns call “culture.” As Heidegger memorably writes, “In
the end the spirit as utilitarian intelligence and the spirit as culture become holiday
ornaments cultivated along with many other things.”10
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For Heidegger, the decline of the spirit is reflected in two views of philosophy that
characterize the modern intellectual landscape. One such view is the notion that philosophy
should be the foundational aspect of a nation’s culture. The second view is that philosophy
is “a cultural force, whether because it gives us an overall, systematic view of what is,
supplying a useful chart by which we may find our way around the various possible things
and realms of things, or because it relieves the sciences of their work by reflecting on their
premises, basic concepts, and principles.”11 For Heidegger, both of these views are
fundamentally mistaken. The first view fails to recognize the fact that philosophy is
essentially an elitist endeavor, a concern of the few and not the vulgar. The second view
glosses over the fact that philosophy is an inherently obtrusive activity. Hence, while the
first view overestimates the value of philosophy by asking it to be the foundational aspect of
a nation’s culture, the second reduces it to the status of a schematic chart designed to help the
modern mind to glide more effortlessly through the various spheres that characterize
contemporary life.
In and of itself, the fact that these two “misinterpretations” of philosophy are so
influential is indicative of the presence of a discernible spiritual crisis. Philosophy, after all,
is itself a spiritual endeavor. Arguably, philosophy is the spiritual activity par excellence in
that “philosophy is one of the few autonomous creative possibilities and at times necessities
of man’s historical being-there.”12 Thus, the fact that philosophy is misinterpreted by
moderns says something about the nature of modern existence.

11

Heidegger, An Introduction to Metaphysics, 10-11.

12

Heidegger, An Introduction to Metaphysics, 9.
81

On Heidegger’s account, the process of spiritual emasculation began in the first half
of the nineteenth century. At that time:
The lives of men began to slide into a world which lacked that depth from out of
which the essential always comes to man and comes back to man, so compelling him
to become superior and making him act in conformity to a rank. All things sank to
the same level, a surface resembling a blind mirror that no longer reflects, that casts
nothing back. The prevailing dimension became that of extension and number.
Intelligence no longer meant a wealth of talent, lavishly spent, and the command of
energies, but only what could be learned by everyone, the practice of a routine,
always associated with a certain amount of sweat and a certain amount of show.13
That is to say, in the late nineteenth century, a flattening of the spiritual realm occurred that
precluded the possibility of full human striving. Consequently, the worldly horizon within
which men live took on a flat quality as well, resulting in a spiritual sterility. Into this
spiritual vacuum steps science. The calculating and measuring spirit that characterizes the
scientific world-view achieves such hegemony that it casts its shadow over everyone and
everything. In this milieu, intelligence ceases being a quality cultivated in order to facilitate
individual flourishing and instead becomes a universalized, routinized, and transparent
quality inculcated into everyone by mass education.
Not surprisingly, it is in Russia and America where this development reaches its
apex. Heidegger continues:
In America and in Russia this development grew into a boundless etcetera of
indifference and always-the-sameness, so much so that the quantity took on a quality
of its own. Since then the domination in those countries of a cross section of the
indifferent mass has become something more than a dreary accident. It has become
an active onslaught that threatens to destroy all rank and every world-creating
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impulse of the spirit, and calls it a lie. This is the onslaught of what we call the
demonic (in the sense of destructive evil).14
Hence, in America and Russia, the decline of the spirit manifests itself in the indifference and
uniformity that permeates the social whole. More recently, these tendencies have become so
pronounced that all traces of nobility and spiritual vitality have become comprehensively
destroyed. In America and Russia, the “demonic” process of spiritual flattening and
egalitarian leveling is a phenomenon that reduces these countries to a spiritual vacuum.
The spiritual crisis that faces Europe in the form of America and Russia is a
manifestation of the oblivion of Being. It was Nietzsche who had illuminated the oblivion of
Being when he labeled such “highest concepts” as Being “the last cloudy streak of
evaporating reality.” By this, Nietzsche meant that Being is “no more than an empty word.
It means nothing real, tangible, material. Its meaning is an unreal vapor.” For Heidegger,
Nietzsche is correct in the sense that, in the modern world, Being indeed has been reduced to
the status of an “unreal vapor.” But whereas Nietzsche had welcomed the fact that “the error
of Being” would no longer distract man from coming to grips with the true nature of his
condition, Heidegger regards it as tragic. For Heidegger, Being is “the spiritual destiny of
the Western world”15 The fact that Being has become an “unreal vapor” is thus a tragic
reflection of the impending arrival of Western nihilism.
For Heidegger, the fate of the word Being is not atypical. In Heidegger’s view, all
current language is characterized by the same vapidity. In sum, the modern use of language
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operates on the assumption that language is an indifferent means of communication.
Language “in general is worn out and used up – an indispensable but masterless means of
communication that may be used as one pleases, as indifferent as a means of public transport,
as a street car in which everyone rides in.”16 In Heidegger’s view, the fact that language is
“worn and used up” is the final result of a lengthy process of linguistic deterioration.
This process of linguistic deterioration began after the twilight of Greek antiquity.
For the ancient Greeks, Being was called physis. “In the age of the earliest and crucial
unfolding of Western philosophy among the Greeks, who first raised the authentic question
of the essent as such in its entirety, the essent was called physis.” The term physis is usually
translated as “nature.” For Heidegger, this translation completely misses the essence of
physis. Physis “denotes self-blossoming emergence (e.g. the blossoming of a rose), opening
up, unfolding that which manifests itself in such unfolding and perseveres and endures in it;
in short the realm of things that emerge and linger on.”17 The ontological power of the Greek
concept of physis was destroyed by the Latin translation of physis into natura, which means
“to be born” or “birth.” Hence, with the Latin translation, the real meaning of physis is cast
into oblivion.
In Heidegger’s view, the example of physis is emblematic of the way in which the
Roman translation of the Greek language destroyed the latter’s metaphysical power: “What
happened in this translation from the Greek into the Latin is not accidental and harmless; it
marks the first stage in the process by which we cut ourselves off and alienated ourselves
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from the original essence of Greek philosophy.”18 Subsequent historical developments only
further served to cement this process of linguistic ossification. The Roman translation of the
Greek language was passed on to the Christian Middle Ages. The Middle Ages passed on
the Roman translation to the modern world. In sum, each historical epoch merely gives its
own stamp of approval to the Roman destruction of the Greek language and passes it on to
succeeding generations in essentially unaltered form.
Why is the Latin translation of physis to natura so important for Heidegger? The
reason is that the Latin translation stands as a linguistic barrier between modern man and the
Greek language. For Heidegger, this is a source of regret because of the metaphysical
superiority of the Greek language: “For along with German the Greek language is (in regard
to its possibilities for thought) at once the most powerful and spiritual of languages.”19
Considered from this perspective, the Latin translation of the Greek language is the decisive
event whereby the spiritual heft of the Greek language is lost to posterity. But there is a
notable exception to this linguistic decline: the German language.20 Heidegger’s attempt to
draw a linkage between the Greek and German languages will prove to be a gesture of no
small importance, as we shall see. In the meantime, it will suffice to note the tragic nature of
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the process by which the original meaning of words such as physis are obscured by
subsequent translations. For Heidegger, this is especially catastrophic because “it is in words
and language that things first come into being and are.”21 Hence, the decay of language is an
existentially significant phenomenon because it effects a corresponding distortion of the
human relationship to reality.
As it stands, the end result of this process of linguistic decline is the spiritual crisis that
faces Europe. “When the creators vanish from the nation, when they are barely tolerated as
an irrelevant curiosity, an ornament, as eccentrics having nothing to do with real life; when
authentic conflict ceases, converted into mere polemics, into the machinations and intrigues
of man within the realm of the given,” then the nation in question sadly exhibits the
symptoms of spiritual decline.22 What is a nation to do in the face of this decline? In An
Introduction to Metaphysics, Heidegger gives an answer of sorts by way of imploring his
own nation, the German nation, to actively offset the spiritual enervation that threatens to
overtake not only the West but the entire globe.
III. The Destiny of the German Nation Revealed
At this point, it is useful to recall Heidegger’s discussion of the “people” (Volk) in
Being and Time. In that discussion, Heidegger had argued that the full attainment of
individual authenticity necessitates that Da–sein pursue the “destiny” (Geschick) of one’s
Volk. That said, Heidegger fails to identify what the Volk’s pursuit of a destiny concretely
entails. In An Introduction to Metaphysics, however, Heidegger argues that the destiny of
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the German nation is to engender a full-blown metaphysical revolution in the West that will
put an end to the oblivion of Being.
In An Introduction to Metaphysics, Heidegger writes,
We are caught in a pincers. Situated in the center, our nation incurs the severest
pressure. It is the nation with the most neighbors and hence the most endangered.
With all this, it is the most metaphysical of nations. We are certain of this vocation,
but our people will only be able to wrest a destiny from it if within itself it creates a
resonance, a possibility of resonance for this vocation, and takes a creative view of its
tradition. All this implies that this nation, as a historical nation, must move itself and
thereby the history of the West beyond the center of their future ‘happening’ and into
the primordial realm of the powers of Being. If the great decision regarding Europe
is not to bring annihilation, that decision must be made in terms of new spiritual
energies unfolding historically from out of the center.23
This densely-written passage requires some careful examination. At the outset, it is
necessary to address the following question: who, exactly, is “we”? Here, it is instructive to
note the larger context within which these comments were made. Heidegger’s An
Introduction to Metaphysics is based on the text of a lecture course that Heidegger gave in
the summer semester of 1935 at the University of Freiburg in Breisgau. Hence, the “we”
referred to here is Heidegger and his student listeners, all of whom are presumed to be
representatives of the German nation.
Heidegger begins with a startling pronouncement: the German nation is caught in a
“pincers.” The pincers that apply pressure on the German nation are the same pincers that
apply pressure to the European continent: Russia and America. Indeed, all of Germany’s
European “neighbors” are similarly threatened by the Russo-American axis. Centrally
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located within Europe, Germany is pressured with singular intensity; it is “endangered” by its
European neighbors as well as by Russia and America.
“With all this,” Heidegger declares, Germany is “the most metaphysical of nations.”
Why is Germany more “metaphysical” than its European neighbors? It would seem to be the
case that Germany is more metaphysical because of the spiritual profundity of its language.
But in this passage, Germany’s status as the metaphysical nation par excellence is the result
of the fact that it is the nation that is the most “endangered.” Seemingly, the experience of
existential danger enables Germany to achieve a metaphysical depth that a more secure
existence would render impossible. All in all, Germany’s metaphysical depth is the
consequence of its spiritually-rich language as well as its experience of existential danger.
Germany’s singularly metaphysical nature propels what Heidegger calls its
“vocation.” According to Heidegger, Germany pursues its vocation when the German nation
takes “a creative view of its tradition.” Considered from this perspective, Germany must be
both revolutionary and conservative if its people are to be able to accomplish the vocation
that will enable it to achieve its destiny. Furthermore, if the German nation is to accomplish
its vocation, it must do so “within itself.” In order to move into the “primordial realm of the
powers of being,” the German nation must look inward and tap into its own spiritual energies
that unfold “historically from out of the center” of itself.
As it turns out, tapping into the spiritual energies that lie at the heart of the German
nation necessitates a return to the Greek origins of the Western world. Why the necessity of
return? For Heidegger, the ancient Greeks existed in a state of proximity to Being that is
unmatched in the history of the West. Hence, they experienced the struggle between Being
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and appearance with unrivaled intensity. Because of this, the ancient Greeks were enabled to
create works that enabled Being to become unconcealed. “Solely in the enduring struggle
between Being and appearance did they wrest being from the essent, did they carry the essent
to permanence and unconcealment: the gods and the state, the temples and the tragedy, the
games and philosophy; all this in the midst of appearance, beset by appearance, but also
knowing of its power.”24
Considered in this light, in order for the German nation to accomplish its vocation, it
must experience the struggle between Being and appearance previously experienced by the
ancient Greeks. On Heidegger’s account, the German nation does this by merely asking
“How does it stand with Being?” When contemporary Germans ask this question in a
suitably serious manner, they effect a return to the epoch of ancient Greece: “To ask ‘How
does it stand with Being?’ means nothing less than to recapture, to repeat (wieder-holen) the
beginning of historical-spiritual existence.”25
The return to the origins of Western existence is no mere exercise in historical
nostalgia, however. Germany does not recapture the beginning of Western existence by
merely emulating the example of the ancient Greeks. Rather, an authentic return to the
beginnings of Western existence necessitates a return to the ground of Being that produced
the golden age of ancient Greece. As Heidegger writes, “But we do not repeat a beginning
by reducing it to something past and now known, which need merely be imitated; no, the
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beginning must be begun again, more radically, with all the strangeness, darkness, insecurity
that attend a true beginning.”26
Germany’s return to the origins of Western existence is necessary to forestall the
prospect of its own “annihilation.” Indeed, a German return to the origins of Western
existence is necessary to forestall Europe’s annihilation at the hands of the AmericanRussian techno-economic behemoths. And Germany saves itself and Europe by asking the
question of Being:
Thus the inquiry into the essent as such and as a whole, the asking of the question of
Being, is one of the essential and fundamental conditions for an awakening of the
spirit and hence for an original world of historical being-there. It is indispensable if
the peril of world darkening is to be forestalled and if our nation in the center of the
Western world is to take on its historical mission.27
Hence, serious inquiry into the question of Being is the impetus to a spiritual rejuvenation of
the Western world.
What conclusions can be drawn about Heidegger’s call for a German national
uprising? The least that can be said is that Heidegger’s middle-period thought is tainted by
nationalistic, chauvinistic, and xenophobic enthusiasms. If Heidegger’s nationalism is
evident in his attempt to meld his identity with that of the German nation, his chauvinism is
manifest in his conviction that the German nation is singularly chosen to save Europe from
the threat of nihilism. As for the question of xenophobia, it will suffice to note Heidegger’s
call for the German nation to look “within itself” to pursue its vocation. Seemingly, the
“foreign” elements that fall outside of the scope of German culture are superfluous influences
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that hinder Germany’s attempt to realize its destiny. The fact that Heidegger’s middle-period
thought is sporadically prone to nationalistic, chauvinistic, and xenophobic outbursts is selfevident, as is the influence of Hellenism on the thought of the middle-period.
In its mood of longing for the world of the Greek polis, Heidegger’s thought serves as
a decisive confirmation of an observation made by Nietzsche in the Will to Power:
German philosophy as a whole . . . is the most fundamental form of romanticism and
homesickness that has ever been. . . . One is no longer at home anywhere, at last one
longs back for that place in which alone one can be at home, because it is the only
place in which one would want to be at home: the Greek world! But it is precisely in
that direction that all bridges are broken – except the rainbow bridges of concepts! . .
. concepts! . . . To be sure, one must be very subtle, very light, very thin to step across
these bridges! But what happiness there is already in this will to spirituality, to
ghostliness almost. . . . One wants to go back through the Church Fathers to the
Greeks. . . . German philosophy . . . is at least will to Renaissance . . . the digging up
of ancient philosophy, above all of the pre-Socratics – the most deeply buried of all
Greek temples! . . . We are growing more Greek by the day; at first, as is only fair, in
concepts and evaluations, as Hellenizing ghosts as it were; but one day, let us hope,
also in our bodies!28
From a Nietzschean perspective, Heideggerian ontology uses the question of Being in order
to build a “rainbow bridge of concepts” back to the Greek world, a rainbow that will enable
Heidegger’s fellow Germans to assert themselves as modern day Greeks in both mind and
body.
So, Heidegger aims to recreate the ancient Greek polis on modern Germanic terms.
But what is the deeper reason for the nationalistic tendencies in Heidegger’s thought? On the
basis of the aforementioned passages, Heidegger’s concern with the question of Being
provides the impetus for his nationalism: “That is why we have related the question of being
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to the destiny of Europe, where the destiny of the earth is being decided – while our own
historical being-there proves to be the center for Europe itself.”29 When the German nation
asks the question of Being, Heidegger argues, it is enabled to summon the spiritual will to
power to pursue its vocation. And, of course, Heidegger’s chauvinism is interconnected with
his emphasis on the ontological significance of language. Language conditions the way in
which man relates to Being, and the spiritual strength of the German language seemingly
enables the German nation to achieve a proximity to Being that was only achieved by the
ancient Greeks.
However, in and of itself, this does not explain why Heidegger would identify the
collective entity of the nation as an ontologically significant entity. Why the “we”?
Heidegger’s attempt to merge his identity with the German nation is especially striking when
considered in light of the fact that, in Being and Time, Heidegger had identified the
individual human being (Da–sein) as the place in which Being becomes temporally unconcealed. What accounts for Heidegger’s leap from the individual to the collective? The
answer lies in Heidegger’s discussion of the work of art.
IV. Heidegger’s Concept of the Work of Art
During the same time in which he delivered the lectures that would subsequently be
published as An Introduction to Metaphysics, Heidegger delivered a lecture entitled “The
Origin of the Work of Art” (Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes).30 In this essay, Heidegger

29

Heidegger, An Introduction to Metaphysics, 42.

30

For more on Heidegger’s “Origin” essay, see Jacques Derrida, The Truth in
Painting (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987).
92

advances a bold new theory of aesthetics. According to Heidegger, the Western mind
typically views the work of art as the union of matter and form: “The distinction between
matter and form is the conceptual schema which is used, in the greatest variety of ways, quite
generally for all art theory and aesthetics.”31 In this conceptual schema, the work of art is
essentially formed matter shaped by the hand of the artist. However, for Heidegger, the
form-matter schema is an entirely inappropriate way of viewing the work of art because it is
only appropriate in reference to equipment. Given the obvious inadequacy of the formmatter distinction, then, how should we view the work of art? Heidegger’s answer is that the
work of art is the place where the truth of an entity comes to stand in the light of its being:
“In the work of art the truth of an entity has set itself to work.”32
Heidegger points to a painting by Van Gogh of a pair of peasant shoes to elucidate his
point. At first glance, Van Gogh’s painting merely depicts an empty, unused pair of peasant
shoes that exists within an undefined space. To Heidegger, however, Van Gogh’s painting
illuminates something much more. Heidegger’s phenomenological description is worth
quoting in full:
From the dark opening of the worn insides of the shoes the toilsome tread of the
worker stares forth. In the stiffly rugged heaviness of the shoes there is the
accumulated tenacity of her slow trudge though the far-spreading and ever-uniform
furrows of the field swept by a raw wind. On the leather lie the dampness and
richness of the soil. Under the soles slides the loneliness of the field-path as evening
falls. In the shoes vibrate the silent call of the earth, its quiet gift of ripening grain
and its unexplained self-refusal in the fallow desolation of the wintry field. This
equipment is pervaded by uncomplaining anxiety as to the certainty of bread, the
wordless joy of having once more withstood want, the trembling before the
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impending childhood and shivering at the surrounding menace of death. This
equipment belongs to the earth, and it is protected in the world of the peasant woman.
From out of this protected belonging the equipment itself rises to its resting-withoutitself.33
On this account, the Van Gogh painting illuminates not only a pair of peasant shoes but also
the earth and the world of the peasant woman who uses them. In this sense, the Van Gogh
painting is a place that reveals the peasant shoes in the sense of the Greek word al‘theia, the
“un-concealment” of Being.
So, the Van Gogh painting reveals the earth and the world of the peasant shoes. But
what is the earth? “Earth is that which comes forth and shelters. Earth, self-dependent, is
effortless, and untiring. Upon the earth and in it, the historical man grounds his dwelling in
the world.”34 In this highly poetic description, the multifaceted nature of the earth is
apparent. In it, at least three meanings are apparent. For one, the earth is the self-concealing
dimension of the peasant shoes. Second, the earth is the autonomous aspect of the peasant
shoes that exists independently of human making. Third, the earth is the ground upon which
the peasant woman stands. These three definitions of the earth permeate Heidegger’s
discussion of the work of art.
What is the world? For Heidegger, “the world is the self-secluding openness of the
broad paths of the simple and essential decisions in the destiny of an historical people.
Wherever those decisions of our history that relate to our very being are made, are taken up
and abandoned by us, go unrecognized and rediscovered by new inquiry, there the world
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worlds.”35 Hence, the world is not the individual world of the peasant woman, but is rather
the collective world of the people of which she is a part. In other words, the world is the
historico-communal whole in which the peasant shoes are embedded.
Given the fact that the work of art is characterized by the simultaneous presence of
the earth and the world of an entity, it would seem to be the case that the earth and the world
are static in nature. This, however, is not the case. There is a battle that occurs between the
earth and the world that facilitates the ontological revelation that occurs in the work of art.
The battle between the earth and the world is the natural consequence of their dissimilar
natures. In the work of art, the world strives to surmount the earth. For its part, the earth
passively resists the world’s attempt to dominate it: “The world, in resting upon the earth,
strives to surmount it. As self-opening, it cannot endure anything closed. The earth,
however, as sheltering and concealing, tends always to draw the world to itself and keep it
there.”36 However, there is no ultimate victor in this agonistic struggle, for both parties
require the continued existence of the other. The earth requires the world to disclose its selfsecluding nature even as the world requires the earth to be its solid foundation.
For Heidegger, the battle between the earth and the world is the essence of the work
of art. In this sense, one can say that the battle between the earth and the world is the “workbeing” of the work of art: “The work-being of the work consists in the fighting of the battle
between world and earth.”37 Thus, the work of art is characterized by the battle between the
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earth and the world, a battle that engenders the ontological unconcealment of an entity that
occurs in the work of art.
Heidegger’s “Origin” essay is one of the most celebrated pieces of Heidegger’s entire
oeuvre. As it stands, Heidegger’s discussion of the work of art serves to illuminate the
changes wrought by Heidegger’s turn. For one, it evinces Heidegger’s newfound interest in
the ontological significance of language. The work of art, after all, is a linguistic
phenomenon inasmuch as “All art, as the advent of truth of what is, is, as such, essentially
poetry.”38 Similarly, by emphasizing the key role that the world of a historical people plays
in the work of art, Heidegger exhibits his determination to elucidate the temporal nature of
Being. Moreover, Heidegger’s attempt to distance himself from the form-content schema
that characterizes traditional Western aesthetics, in its own way, manifests his cognizance of
the oblivion of Being. But how does Heidegger’s discussion of the work of art relate to the
Germanic nationalism exhibited in An Introduction to Metaphysics?
In order to answer this question, it is necessary to consider a particular passage from
the text of Heidegger’s “Origin” essay. At a later point in the essay, Heidegger lists the
various ways in which truth becomes manifest: “One essential way in which truth establishes
itself in the beings it has opened up is truth setting itself into work. Another way in which
truth occurs is the act that founds a political state.”39 From the standpoint of this study, of
course, it is Heidegger’s almost casual mention of political founding that is the most interest.
To Heidegger, the act by which a political state is founded is an act of ontological
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significance. Hence, truth “happens” not only in Van Gogh paintings and other works that
appeal to the aesthetic palate, but in political states as well. The state is akin to a work of art.
It is difficult to overestimate the significance of this particular passage. Heidegger’s
notion that the founding of a political state is an act of ontological revelation has the ultimate
effect of opening a space for Heidegger’s collectivistic tendencies. In Being and Time,
Heidegger used his phenomenology of “Being-with” (Mitsein) to justify his movement from
individualism to collectivism. In the “Origin” essay, however, Heidegger uses his aesthetic
theory to justify his embrace of collectivism. In a single sentence, Heidegger’s “Origin”
essay completes the process, already begun in Being and Time, of substituting the collective
for the individual as the locus of ontological unconcealment.
Unfortunately, Heidegger does not explore this particular manifestation of ontological
truth in any particular detail in his “Origin” essay. However, An Introduction to Metaphysics
contains a brief but illuminating discussion of political founding. Here, Heidegger argues
that the establishment and consolidation of the polis is performed by exceptional individuals
whose experience of pathos propels creative action.
V. The Founding of the Polis
Heidegger’s discussion of the founding of the polis occurs in the context of a
meditation on the choral “ode to man” in Sophocles’s Antigone. Heidegger consults
Sophocles’s Antigone in order to flesh out the definition of human existence advanced by
Parmenides. The lines of the choral ode that arouse Heidegger’s discussion of political
founding are the following: “Rising high above his place, he for the sake of adventure takes
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the essent for essent loses his place in the end.” For Heidegger, what is key about this
sentence is the fact that it speaks of man’s “place,” the polis.
Heidegger’s definition of the polis gives a wholly new twist to a familiar concept.40
When translated from the original Greek, polis is conventionally translated as “city” or “citystate.” For Heidegger, this translation fails to capture the real meaning of the word.
Heidegger’s definition of the polis is worth quoting in full:
Polis means, rather, the place, the there, wherein and as which historical being-there.
The polis is the historical place, the there in which, out of which, and for which
history happens. To this place and scene of history belong the gods, the temples, the
priests, the festivals, the games, the poets, the thinker, the ruler, the council of elders,
the assembly of the people, the army and the fleet.41
The polis, then, is the place in which man’s historical existence attains concreteness. Hence,
the polis is the place in which man experiences the flow of history. Indeed, the polis can be
viewed as the source of man’s history because it is the place that gives meaning to man’s
existence as a historical being. All in all, the polis is the center stage in which man acts out
the history of Being.
In defining the polis as site rather than city-state, Heidegger attempts to recover the
ancient Greek concept of space. For moderns, space is defined by extension. However, the
ancient Greeks had no word for space. Rather, space was subsumed under the rubric of the
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Greek term topos (place): “they experienced the spatial on the basis not of extension but of
place (topos).” However, even the term topos does not fully capture how the ancient Greeks
experienced space. As Heidegger argues, the ancient Greeks experienced space as “chÇra,
which signifies neither place nor space but that which is occupied by what stands there. The
place belongs to the thing itself. Each of all the various things has its place. That which
becomes is placed in the local ‘space’ and emerges from it.”42 Hence, rather than viewing
space as an extended medium that contains things, the ancient Greeks regarded space as the
product of the things themselves.43
Viewed in light of the Greek concept of chÇra, the polis cannot be regarded as an
anonymous piece of territory but as the space created by the things that exist within its
purview. As described by Heidegger, the polis is constituted by everything from
supernatural entities (the gods) to buildings (the temples) to various classes of individuals
(the priests, the poets, the thinkers, the ruler) to rituals (the festivals, the games) to political
institutions (the council of elders, the assembly of the people) to military institutions (the
army and the fleet). As the “foundation and scene of man’s being-there,” the polis is the
“point” at which supernatural deities, classes of individuals, rituals, military and political
institutions “meet” at the site of history.44
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So, the polis is the historical site where various things converge. But in what sense is
the polis a political place? Moderns would be inclined to argue that the polis is political
because its inhabitants, whether they be citizen or non-citizen, maintain a certain relationship
with the “state.” For his part, Heidegger agrees that the polis is a political entity of sorts.
That being said, Heidegger’s explanation of why the polis is political radically departs from
the modern concept of the political. From a Heideggerian perspective, the polis is political
because it is the “site of history.” As Heidegger explains, “All this does not first belong to
the polis, does not become political by entering into a relation with a statesman and a general
and the business of the state. No, it is political, i.e. at the site of history provided there be
(for example) poets alone, but then really poets, priests alone, but then really priests, rulers
alone, but then really rulers.”45 The polis, then, is not political because it is characterized by
a “social contract” between the individual and the state. Rather, the polis is political because
it is the site of history where isolated individuals meet in a communal context.
Needless to say, this is an exceedingly strange concept of the political. The gap that
separates Heidegger’s concept of the political from the modern conception is readily
apparent in Heidegger’s account of the process by which man founds the site of history.
Again, Heidegger:
Be, but this means: as violent men to use power, to become pre-eminent in historical
being as creators, as men of action. Pre-eminent in the historical place, they become
at the same time apolis, without city and place, lonely strange and alien, without issue
amid the essent as a whole, at the same time without statute and limit, without
structure and order, because they themselves must first create all this.46
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Individuals facilitate their entrance into the realm of the polis by creating it; thanks to the
constructive activity of “violent men,” the polis comes into existence. By asserting
themselves as “creators” adept at the utilization of “power,” “men of action” create the
“statute and limit” and “structure and order” that characterizes polis-life. Furthermore, by
asserting themselves as the creators of the polis, they concomitantly realize themselves as the
“pre-eminent” individuals of the “historical place” that they actively construct. All in all, the
creation of the polis is accomplished by singular individuals whose aesthetic-creative activity
marks them as the superior few who tower over the historical place that they effectively
create.
For Heidegger, man is primordially homeless prior to his entrance into the polis. In
this sense, one can say that man is uncanny at the most primeval level of his existence. As
Heidegger writes, “We are taking the strange, the uncanny (das Unheimliche), as that which
casts us out of the “homely,” i.e. the customary, familiar, secure. The unhomely
(Unheimische) prevents us from making ourselves at home and therein it is overpowering.”47
Man is thus unhomely because it is his nature to break out of the “customary, familiar,
secure.” Considered from this viewpoint, the notion that man is naturally at home, and that
the experience of uncanniness is a mere derivation from the normal state of affairs, is
revealed to be a fallacy.
For Heidegger, this fallacious idea is interconnected with the notion that man himself
is the sole master of the powers that lie at his disposal. “How far man is from being at home
in his own essence is revealed by his opinion of himself as he who invented and could have
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invented language and understanding, building and poetry.”48 Man’s capacity to create
“language and understanding, building and poetry” is the result of his receptivity to the
uncanny powers that seize him rather than any power he has over them. In sum, man does
not create the overpowering forces that propel his greatest artistic achievements but is rather
the medium through which these forces work their magic.
Still, Heidegger argues that the polis is founded by “violent men.” This is a
provocative claim, to say the least. What does Heidegger mean when he contends that the
founding of the polis is performed by “violent men”? Heidegger insists that the “violence”
spoken of here is not necessarily synonymous with physical violence: “Here we use the
word violence in an essential sense extending beyond the common usage of arbitrary
brutality.”49 Thus, Heidegger is at pains to suggest that ontological violence is not to be
confused with mere “arbitrary brutality.”
Furthermore, Heidegger insists that the violent man is not violent by virtue of the
power that he subjectively wields over his adversaries, but by virtue of his ability to channel
the powers that seize him. As Heidegger writes, “The violence of poetic speech, of thinking
projection, of building configuration, of the action that creates states is not a function of
faculties that man has, but a taming and ordering of powers by virtue of which the essent
opens up as such when man moves into it.”50 Hence, the ontological violence that occurs
when man founds the polis is not subjectively created by the state-founder, but rather is a
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manifestation of the founder’s attempt to tame and order the powers that assail him.
So, the violence that accompanies the founding of the polis is neither synonymous
with ontic violence nor subjective in nature. However, Heidegger’s notion of violence
certainly does not preclude the possibility of ontic brutality. As Gregory Fried notes, “But
while this violence is not mere ‘brutality and arbitrariness,’ Heidegger makes no attempt to
deny that the ontological catastrophe (in the sense of its Greek roots as upheaval and
overturning) wrought by the apolis (sic) creators has ontic repercussions.”51 This much is
evident in Heidegger’s other pronouncements on the founding process.
We can see the more ominous implications of Heidegger’s view of the founding
process in several key passages. One such passage is the following:
The violent one, the creative man, who sets forth into the un-said, who breaks into the
un-thought, compels the unhappened to happen and the unseen appear – this violent
one stands at all times in venture (tolma, line 371). In venturing to master being, he
must risk dispersion, in-stability, disorder, mischief. The higher the summit of
historical being-there, the deeper will be the abyss, the more abrupt the fall into the
unhistorical, which merely thrashes about in issueless and placeless confusion.52
Considered in relation to the act of political founding, this passage is disturbing indeed. For
what it highlights is the highly dangerous and precarious nature of the founding act. The act
of founding is prone to “dispersion, instability, mischief.” Such an insight would not have
surprised Machiavelli, to be sure. However, the type of grandiose experimentation alluded to
in this passage occurs in a realm far removed from the realm of Machiavellian raison d’état.
The founding act is an aesthetic endeavor, the side effects of which are “political.” The
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political founder attempts to “master Being,” not secure a monopoly of violence over a given
territory. Because the ultimate aims of founding are ontological rather than political, the
process of founding is marked by a radical indeterminancy. By alluding to the “abyss” that
lurks beneath the feet of the “violent men” who found the polis, Heidegger advances a
political vision that is more Nietzschean than Machiavellian.53
Heidegger points to the ominous implications of the founding act in another passage.
There, Heidegger writes the following:
Being itself hurls man into this breaking-away, which drives him beyond himself to
venture toward being, to accomplish being, to stabilize it in the work, and so open the
essent as a whole. Therefore the violent one knows no kindness and conciliation
(Güte und Begütigung) (in the usual sense); he cannot be mollified or appeased by
success or prestige. In all this the violent, creative man sees only the semblance of
fulfillment, and this he despises. In willing the unprecedented, he casts aside all help.
To him disaster is the deepest and broadest affirmation of the overpowering. In the
shattering of the wrought work, in the knowledge that it is mischief (Unfug) and
sarma ( a dunghill), he leaves the overpowering to its order (Fug).54
Here, Heidegger argues that the founders exist entirely beyond the realm of social convention
and morality. That is to say, the founding creator’s attempt to consolidate the polis is

53

Besides the Nietzschean overman (Übermensch), Heidegger’s notion of the political
founder recalls Rousseau’s notion of the legislator in the Social Contract. Like Heidegger’s
“violent man,” Rousseau’s founding legislator is entrusted with the Herculean task of
creating a political community ex nihilo: “One who dares to undertake the founding of a
people should feel that he is capable of changing human nature, so to speak; of transforming
each individual, who by himself is a perfect and solitary whole, into a part of a larger whole
from which this individual receives, in a sense, his life and his being, of altering man’s
constitution in order to strengthen it; of substituting a partial and moral existence for the
physical and independent existence we have all received from nature.” Jean-Jacques
Rousseau, On the Social Contract, ed. Roger D. Masters, trans. Judith D. Masters (New
York: St. Martin’s Press, 1978), 68. Of course, Heidegger would find Rousseau’s
description of political founding to be entirely too subjective. For Heidegger, the founding
act is as disclosive as it is actively constructive.
54

Heidegger, An Introduction to Metaphysics, 163.
104

performed in a social and ethical vacuum. The approval or disapproval conferred by the
founder’s fellows is of absolutely no consequence because the founder “cannot be mollified
by success or prestige.” Nor do demands for ethical compassion and practical restraint factor
into the equation because “the violent one knows no kindness or conciliation.” All that
matters is the endeavor to stabilize Being in the site. Thus, the founder need not be troubled
by the potential for disaster. Indeed, to such an individual, the potential for disaster is a
salutary reminder of the authentically creative nature of the founding act: “to him disaster is
the deepest and broadest affirmation of the overpowering.”55 Thus, in embarking upon
dangerous experimentation, the founding creator affirms the truth of his confrontation with
the overpowering.
VI. Conclusion
As we have seen, Heidegger’s 1929 turn witnessed a turn away from subjectivity, a
turn towards a greater attentiveness to the ontological significance of language, a more
thoroughgoing grappling with the temporal dimension of human existence, and an intensified
cognizance of the contemporary oblivion of Being. Heidegger’s pathos over the
contemporary oblivion of Being informs his diagnosis of the contemporary crisis of the
West. For Heidegger, this crisis is manifest in the fact that Europe is caught between the
twin pincers of Russia and America, two countries that threaten to transform the Continent
into a place characterized by economic hustle and bustle, the disappearance of historical
memory, the degradation of heroism, and mass spectacle. Hence, for Heidegger, the
Russian/American axis epitomizes a social order in which worldly disenchantment,
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ecological devastation, the growing dominance of the mass man and mindless conformity are
the norm. Russia and American represent the nightmare that awaits Europe and the world if
its present course continues unabated.
Heidegger’s scathing critique of Russian communism and American corporate
capitalism represents one of the most powerful critiques of these two ideological systems
penned by any thinker of the twentieth century. Heidegger brazenly declares that Russia and
America are “metaphysically the same”: “We have said, Europe lies in a pincers between
Russia and America, which are metaphysically the same, namely in regard to their world
character and relation to the spirit.”56 Russia and America both have the same “world
character” because both seek to achieve global hegemony. Moreover, Russia and American
both have the same “relationship to the spirit” because both countries are characterized by
technological libido dominandi and social standardization. In making these assertions,
Heidegger effectively undermines the self-understanding of both systems. After all, both
Russia and America viewed themselves as alternatives to the other. For his part, Heidegger
boldly declares that their philosophical presuppositions are essentially identical. Both
systems are technological in their essence and seek to remake the world in their image.
Perceived differences notwithstanding, Russia and America are two sides of the same coin.
Heidegger’s conflation of Russianism and Americanism is nothing short of
breathtaking. That being said, Heidegger’s response to the modern crisis of the West is
perhaps even more startling. For Heidegger, a spiritual rejuvenation of the German
homeland is the panacea to the crisis of the modern West. Implicit in this call is the specter
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of nationalism, chauvinism, and xenophobia. Heidegger exhibits a profound sense of
German national consciousness in his diagnosis of the crisis that threatens the German nation
and in his call for it to realize its world-historic destiny. Heidegger’s notion that the German
language is the most spiritual of languages and his corresponding conviction that Germany is
the most metaphysical of nations pushes his nationalistic tendencies to chauvinistic extremes.
And Heidegger’s contention that the realization of Germany’s destiny necessitates that it
creatively appropriate its tradition evinces a certain xenophobia as well in that it exhibits an
apparent suspicion of the external cultural influences that stand outside of the realm of
German culture.
Clearly, Heidegger’s middle-period work exhibits tendencies that can only be
described as nationalistic and chauvinistic. The impetus for Heidegger’s nationalism lies in
his theory of aesthetics. Heidegger’s concept of the work of art identifies how the work of
art is the place in which the truth of an entity sets itself to work; and for Heidegger, the work
of art rises to unconcealment in the founding of the polis: “Unconcealment occurs only when
it is achieved by work: the work of the word in poetry, the work of stone in temple and
statue, the work of the word in thought, the work of the polis in which all this is grounded
and preserved.”57 Indeed, considered from the perspective of this statement, the polis is of
supreme importance because it grounds and preserves all of the other works of a historical
Volk.
In Heidegger’s description, the founding of the polis is accomplished by “violent
men” whose confrontation with the “overpowering” fuels the founding process. Heidegger’s
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apparent willingness to sanction grandiose experimentation and his seeming obliviousness to
the human costs of such experimentation is ominous indeed. To the founder, the more
beautiful and elevated the polis, the better. Furthermore, the more dangerous the nature of
the experiment involved, the more justified the founder is in styling himself as an authentic
creator.
This political irresponsibility is rendered even more toxic by the utter vagueness of
the Heideggerian political vision. To be sure, Heidegger is hardly the only thinker to be
frustratingly vague about political matters. For example, the “realm of freedom” that will
follow the communist revolution is only described in the vaguest terms by Marx: “in
communist society, where nobody has one exclusive sphere of activity but each can become
accomplished in any branch he wishes, society regulates the general production and thus
makes it possible for me to do one thing today and another tomorrow, to hunt in the morning,
fish in the afternoon, rear cattle in the evening, criticise after dinner.”58 The same is true of
Nietzsche’s description of the planetary aristocracy that will step into the vacuum created by
the death of God and steer humanity towards a new goal. But Heidegger outdoes both
Heidegger and Marx in conceptual fuzziness. As Eric Voegelin puts it, “Gone are the
ludicrous images of positivist, socialist, and super man. In their place, Heidegger puts Being
itself, emptied of all content, to whose approaching power we must submit.”59 Whereas
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Marx and Nietzsche’s Gnostic visions of the future possessed limited content, Heidegger’s
eschatological vision of the future is content-free. Seemingly, the home that is created by the
founder’s creative endeavor is defined by its very indeterminancy.
In his middle-period thought, Heidegger diagnosed the crisis of homelessness in the
West and argued that a spiritual rejuvenation of the Western world is the cure. For
Heidegger, such a rejuvenation does not require a mere conservation of the status quo, but
rather the founding of wholly new structures. As Thomas L. Pangle puts it, “Heidegger
never ceased indicating his loathing for every kind of mere conservatism, his anguish at the
contemporary ‘world-night,’ his fear of an increasingly mechanized, comfortable future, and
his radical hopes and longings for a shattering new age of either transformation or debacle
(Untergang).”60 In an age in which Being has been reduced to the status of a mere “vapor,”
the only authentic options are “transformation” or “debacle.” For the middle-period
Heidegger, it is up to select individuals to effect such a “transformation” of the Western
world by founding the polis that enables a historical people to exist in a state of proximity to
Being. In his “Origin” essay, Heidegger argues that the founding of a political state is a
process by which “truth establishes itself in the beings it has opened up.” Arguably,
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Heidegger’s rectorship represents the German philosopher’s attempt to contribute to such a
truth-establishing event in the modern world.61
Needless to say, the founding that occurred in Germany in 1933 was more of a
“debacle” than a “transformation.” Far from establishing a political home for the German
Volk, the German National Socialist movement left millions of Germans and neighboring
Europeans literally homeless. By participating in the German National Socialist movement,
Heidegger exacerbated the disease that he meant to cure. As damning as it is, however,
Heidegger’s rectorship debacle does not exhaust his significance for politics. For in the mid1930s, Heidegger’s turn would come to a conclusion, and his thought about the proper
response to the contemporary oblivion of Being would once again undergo a fundamental
change. This Heidegger, as it turns out, offers a more restrained and less politically
ambitious tone than the Heidegger of 1933. This kinder, gentler Heidegger is the subject of
the following chapter.
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Chapter 4: Homecoming in a Post-Technological Age:
Building, Dwelling, and Thinking in the Fourfold

Cordial greetings to the new honorary citizen
of their common hometown Messkirch –
Bernhard Welte – from an older one . . . May
this feastday of homage be joyful and life-giving.
May the contemplative spirit of all participants
be unanimous. For there is need for contemplation
whether and how, in the age of uniform technological
world civilization, there can still be such a thing as
home.
Martin Heidegger
Thought Experiences

I. Introduction
Heidegger’s 1929 “turn” (Kehre) came to an end in the mid-1930s when he confronted
the thought of Nietzsche.1 Of course, Heidegger had been aware of Nietzsche prior to the
mid-1930s, and it is not difficult to discern the influence of Nietzsche on Heidegger’s early
thought. Why, then, the sudden importance of Nietzsche? In the early 1930s, Heidegger
attempted to carve out a niche for his own philosophical project, and Nietzsche posed a
special problem. In Nietzsche, Heidegger encountered a kindred spirit, a thinker who had
leveled a critique of Western rationalism as radical as Heidegger’s own “destructuring”
(Destruktion) of the Occidental metaphysical tradition. Hence, the confrontation with
Nietzsche compelled Heidegger to distinguish his own thought from that of a close rival. In
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so doing, Heidegger cleared a path for the third phase of his philosophy, a phase that would
begin in 1947 with the publication of his “Letter on Humanism” essay.
What Heidegger would take away from his encounter with Nietzsche would leave an
indelible imprint on his later thought. With regards to Nietzsche himself, Heidegger came to
the conclusion that his German forebear had failed in his attempt to break free from the grip
of Western metaphysics. More specifically, Nietzsche’s attempt failed because his endeavor
to reverse Platonism is itself an expression of Platonism. “As a mere countermovement,”
Heidegger writes, Nietzsche’s anti-Platonist project “remains, as does everything ‘anti,’ held
fast in the essence of that over against which it moves.”2 Instead, Nietzsche’s philosophy
brings Platonism to its final consummation.
Prior to Nietzsche, Western metaphysicians thought about Being (Sein) in relation to
beings. In Nietzsche’s thought, however, Being is just another among a myriad of dissimilar
beings. Because Being disappears completely in Nietzsche’s philosophy, future
metaphysical thinking about the Being of beings is manifestly impossible. “For inasmuch as
through Nietzsche metaphysics has in a certain sense divested itself of its own essential
possibility,” Heidegger declares, “other possibilities of metaphysics can no longer appear.”3
Indeed, inasmuch as the West itself has been defined by metaphysics, one can say that in
Nietzsche’s philosophy the West itself has exhausted its own possibility.
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I have merely scratched the surface of Heidegger’s provocative interpretation of
Nietzsche’s thought. Needless to say, Heidegger’s reading of Nietzsche has aroused much
criticism, and this is not the place to explore the reading or the critique. Still, the preceding
summary is useful in the fact that it illuminates Heidegger’s conclusion that Nietzsche’s
thought brings the Western metaphysical tradition to an end. Heidegger does not argue that
philosophy will cease to make its presence felt, however. Rather, for Heidegger metaphysics
lives on in the form of modern technology.
In Heidegger’s view, technology is the logical outgrowth of Western philosophy and
its scientific offshoot. Philosophy engenders modern science, and modern science gives birth
to technology: “Philosophy turns into the empirical science of man, of all that can become
for man the experiential object of his technology, the technology by which he establishes
himself in the world by working on it in the manifold modes of making and shaping.”4 And
lying at the heart of modern technology is Nietzsche’s will to power doctrine, the final
manifestation of Western metaphysics. Viewed from this perspective, Heidegger’s encounter
with Nietzsche brought him face-to-face with the metaphysical essence of technology.
After his confrontation with Nietzsche, Heidegger would proceed to level a powerful
critique of modern technology, a critique that was greatly assisted by the work of another
German thinker, Ernst Jünger. For Heidegger, Jünger’s 1932 book The Worker (Der
Arbeiter) illuminates how the worker is the paradigmatic figure of the modern technological
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world.5 According to Jünger, in the modern world “each individual life becomes, ever more
unambiguously, the life of a worker; and that, following the wars of knights, kings, and
citizens, we now have wars of workers.”6 However, whereas Jünger affirmed the arrival of a
world “stamped” by the “form” (Gestalt) of the worker, Heidegger took a more negative
view.
In his writings on technology, Heidegger identified numerous dangers that are
concomitant with the rise of modern technology. Such dangers include technological
dehumanization and increased conflict, among others. However, for Heidegger one of the
most disturbing aspects of modern technology is the way in which it uproots human beings
from the earth. As he put it in the famous Der Spiegel interview:
Everything is functioning. This is exactly what is so uncanny, that everything is
functioning and that the functioning drives us more and more to even further
functioning, and that technology tears men loose from the earth and uproots them. I
do not know whether you were frightened, but I at any rate was frightened when I
saw pictures coming from the moon to the earth. We don’t need any atom bomb.
The uprooting of man has already taken place. The only thing we have left is purely
technological relationships. This is no longer the earth on which man lives. As you
know, I recently had a long conversation with Rene Char of the Provence, the poet
and resistance fighter. Rocket bases are being built in the Provence and the country is
being devastated in an incredible way. This poet, who certainly cannot be suspected
of sentimentality and of glorification of the idyllic, tells me that the uprooting of man
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which is taking place there will be the end, if poetry and thought do not once more
succeed to a position of might without force.7
For Heidegger and Char, this uprooting is not a future prospect, but a given fact. Man no
longer dwells on the earth. Moreover, the human connection to other human beings has been
destroyed in a world where “the only thing we have left is purely technological
relationships.”8
What can be done? In Heidegger’s view, little can be done because the technological
uprooting of man is the result of the history of Being. Hence, human thought and action
cannot change what has already been decreed by Being itself. As Heidegger declares,
“philosophy will not be able to effect an immediate transformation of the present condition
of the world. This is not only true of philosophy, but of all merely human thought and
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endeavor. Only a god can save us.”9 That being said, human beings can comport themselves
in such a way as to prepare for the return of the absent “god.” This they do by building,
dwelling, and thinking within the “fourfold” (Geviert) of earth, sky, divinity, and mortals.
In this chapter, I shall examine the political implications of Heidegger’s counsel for
mortals to build, dwell, and think within the fourfold. I will begin by examining Heidegger’s
analysis of the plight of homelessness as it is presented in two essays in particular: the
“Letter on Humanism” and the “Memorial Address.” Then, I shall discuss Heidegger’s
critique of modern technology before launching into a discussion of building, dwelling, and
thinking. After considering the ethical implications of Heidegger’s later philosophy, I shall
conclude with some reflections on its political consequences. In sum, Heidegger’s late
thought points to the inadequacy of modern political regimes even as it fails to posit an
identifiable alternative to them. Hence, Heidegger’s later philosophy is essentially apolitical,
counseling radical withdrawal from the political realm and personal spiritual preparation for
a post-technological dispensation of Being.
II. The Plight of Modern Homelessness
In Heidegger’s late thought, his career-long concern with the problem of modern
homelessness becomes explicit. Undoubtedly, Heidegger’s most famous pronouncement on
the plight of modern homelessness occurs in the “Letter on Humanism.” In that essay,
Heidegger argues that homelessness “consists in the abandonment of Being by beings.
Homelessness is the symptom of oblivion of Being. Because of it the truth of Being remains
unthought. The oblivion of Being makes itself known indirectly through the fact that man
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always observes and handles only beings.”10 On this account, modern homelessness is
essentially a “symptom” of the oblivion of Being. But it is also a symptom that prevents man
from addressing the root cause of his homelessness. Man attempts to deal with his
homelessness by focusing on beings. However, because he ignores Being, man fails to come
to grips with the real cause of his homelessness. Viewed from this angle, modern
homelessness is both a cause and an effect of the abandonment of Being by beings.
Who or what is to blame for the oblivion of Being? Certainly not Nietzsche, who was
“the last to experience this homelessness.” Nor can one fault the long line of metaphysicians
who preceded Nietzsche for the disappearance of Being in the modern world. Rather, the
oblivion of Being at the root of modern homelessness is the result of the history of Being
itself. In this sense, homelessness is the destiny of Being. As Heidegger puts it,
Homelessness is coming to be the destiny of the world. Hence it is necessary to think
that destiny in terms of the history of Being. What Marx recognized in an essential
and significant sense, though derived from Hegel, as the estrangement of man has its
roots in the homelessness of modern man. This homelessness is specifically evoked
in the form of metaphysics, and through metaphysics is simultaneously entrenched
and covered up as such.11
In other words, homelessness is engendered, entrenched, and obscured by metaphysics, and
metaphysics itself is a manifestation of the destiny of Being.
Such is Heidegger’s most famous pronouncement on the plight of modern
homelessness. However, Heidegger’s most eloquent statement about the problem of modern
homelessness occurs not in the “Letter on Humanism” but in the “Memorial Address.” On
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October 30, 1955, Heidegger delivered a speech to his hometown of Messkirch to
commemorate the 175th birthday of the composer Conradin Kreutzer.12 In this address,
Heidegger identifies the symptoms of modern homelessness in uncharacteristically lucid
fashion.
At the beginning of the address, Heidegger says a few words about Kreutzer.
Kreutzer, Heidegger emphasizes, was a native son of the Swabian homeland (Heimat).
Indeed, Kreutzer is one of a long line of distinguished artists and thinkers who come from the
Swabian homeland. “As we hold this simple fact in mind,” Heidegger declares, “we cannot
help remembering at once that during the last two centuries great poets and thinkers have
been brought forth from the Swabian land.”13 Inasmuch as Kreutzer’s origin is the
homeland, the homeland is also the ultimate origin of the musical compositions for which
Kreutzer was renowned.
For Heidegger, the example of Kreutzer is emblematic: Kreutzer’s artistic
achievements flow from the fact that the Swabian composer was rooted in his native soil. So
too with all great works of art, all of which depend upon the existence of a homeland that the
artist can call home. “For a truly joyous and salutary human work to flourish,” Heidegger
declares, “man must be able to mount from the depth of his home ground up into the ether.”14
That being said, the ability of man to “mount from the depth of his home ground into
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the ether” is endangered in the modern world. For Heidegger, the most damning evidence of
this fact is the behavior of his fellow Germans. As Heidegger complains,
Many Germans have lost their homeland, have had to leave their villages and towns,
have been driven from their native soil. Countless others whose homeland was saved,
have yet wandered off. They have been caught up in the turmoil of the big cities, and
have resettled in the waste lands of industrial districts. They are strangers now in
their former homeland.15
Whereas Kreutzer was solidly anchored in his native homeland, many contemporary
Germans are homeless. Why? In the case of some, their villages have been destroyed
outright. For others, circumstances have compelled them to leave their towns and migrate
towards large urban areas where they are promptly resettled into the indifferent space of the
modern industrial city. These Germans are effectively reduced to the status of strangers even
as they remain within the borders of the German homeland itself.
What is the ultimate cause of this alarming development? Seemingly, it is
industrialization and urbanization that is ultimately to blame for the plight of homelessness
that afflicts Heidegger’s German compatriots. But there is more to homelessness than this.
Consider the state of those Germans who have remained in their native villages. As
Heidegger laments,
And those who have stayed on in their homeland? Often they are more homeless than
those who have been driven from their homeland. Hourly and daily they are chained
to radio and television. Week after week the movies carry them off into uncommon,
but merely common, realms of the imagination, and give the illusion of a world that is
no world. Picture magazines are everywhere available. All that with which modern
techniques of communication stimulate, assail, and drive man – all that is already
much closer to man than his fields around his farmstead, closer than the sky over the
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earth, closer than the change from night to day, closer than the conventions and
customs of his village, than the tradition of his native world.16
Considered from this angle, the Germans who remain within the confines of their native
villages are no less displaced than their urban compatriots. Indeed, they are “more
homeless.” If the lure of the big city renders the modern urbanite homeless, the villager is
effectively displaced by technological devices (radio, television, movies) and products of the
mass media (picture magazines). In sum, technological contraptions and mass media
displace villagers by transporting them into an illusory world that is seemingly more concrete
than the rural, tradition-based world that they actually inhabit.
For Heidegger, the homelessness that plagues his fellow Germans is representative of
the plight of homelessness that afflicts modern man as a whole. In sum, the problem is that
“the rootedness (Bodenständigkeit), the autochthony, of man is threatened today at its
core!”17 The ultimate cause of the loss of autochthony in modernity is not the result of
contingent historical circumstances, or even of individual inauthenticity: “The loss of
rootedness is caused not merely by circumstance and fortune, nor does it stem from the
negligence and superficiality of man’s way of life.” Rather, it is a reflection of “the spirit of
the age.” And for Heidegger the spirit of the age is technological: “The power concealed in
modern technology determines the relation of man to that which exists.”18 Hence, modern
homelessness is a manifestation of the technological spirit of the modern age.
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III. Heidegger’s Critique of Modern Technology
In the “Letter on Humanism,” Heidegger argues that the plight of modern
homelessness is precipitated – and obscured – by metaphysics. In the “Memorial Address,”
however, Heidegger attributes it to the technological Zeitgeist. It would seem to be the case
that modern homelessness is caused both by metaphysics and technology. How can this be
so? For Heidegger, the answer lies in the nature of technology itself. In sum, modern
technology is a metaphysical phenomenon: “the essence of technology is by no means
anything technological.”19 Hence, one cannot properly understand how modern technology
uproots man from the earth without taking note of its metaphysical, non-technological
essence.
As noted earlier, Nietzsche’s will to power doctrine lies at the heart of modern
technology. Nietzsche’s will to power doctrine did not arise ex nihilo but was anticipated by
the earlier metaphysical doctrines of Descartes, Leibniz, Kant, and Hegel. Hence, precursors
to the Nietzschean will to power doctrine include Descartes’s cogito ergo sum, Leibniz’s
notion of self-actualizing “monads,” Kant’s categorical imperative, and Hegel’s concept of
the world-spirit. But although modern subjectivity begins with the thought of Descartes, the
origins of modern technology can be traced as far back as Plato.20
How did Plato inaugurate the history of productionist metaphysics? An illustrative
example is the Platonic twist on the Greek term eidos. Before Plato, eidos referred to the
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outward aspect (Ansicht) of phenomena. “Plato, exacts of this word, however, something
utterly extraordinary: that it name what precisely what is not and never will be perceivable
with physical eyes.”21 By conceptualizing eidos as eternal presence, Plato enhances man’s
role in the process by which truth becomes undisclosed. From this point on, it would only be
a matter of time before man would assert himself as the source and ground of all truth.
It is beyond the scope of this chapter to delineate Heidegger’s history of productionist
metaphysics in detail. Suffice to say, this history witnesses various changes in the way that
man conceptualizes Being, truth, and substance.22 More specifically, the history of Western
metaphysics is marked by the transformation of Being from Aristotelian existence (energeia)
to actuality; of truth from Greek al‘thia to certainty; and of substance from hypokeimenon to
subjectum. In Heidegger’s narrative, all of these developments culminate in Nietzsche’s will
to power doctrine, which conflates Being with actuality, equates truth with certainty, and
posits the human subject as the source and ground of all substance.
The connective link between Nietzsche’s will to power doctrine and modern
technology was provided by the birth of modern physics in the seventeenth century. Modern
physics orders natural phenomena to present itself in a pre-determined manner that is
amenable to calculation and categorization. This, for Heidegger, is the essential aspect of
physics: “Hence, physics, in its retreat from the kind of representation that turns only to
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objects, which has been the sole standard until recently, will never be able to renounce this
one thing: that nature report itself in some way or other that is identifiable through
calculation and that it remain orderable as a system of information.”23 With the birth of
machine-power technology in the second half of the eighteenth century, modern man is
provided with the technological tools necessary to enforce the scientific conquest of nature in
earnest.
The essence of modern technology is what Heidegger calls “enframing” (Gestell).
Enframing is “the gathering together of the setting-upon that sets upon man, i.e., challenges
him forth, to reveal the actual, in the mode of ordering, as standing-reserve.”24 That is to say,
enframing is the process by which man endeavors to impose a framework upon nature in
order to force it to produce consumable material. Hence, in enframing, man does not allow
nature to present itself of its own accord, but rather forces it to appear in a manner dictated
by the framework itself. Thus, in enframing, man assumes an adversarial posture towards
nature. Indeed, it is so adversarial that it amounts to a type of violence against nature.
Heidegger points to the difference between a windmill and a hydroelectric plant to
elucidate his point. A windmill harnesses the earth’s natural processes in a harmonious
fashion because it lets the wind “be.” The windmills’s sails are propelled by the wind: “Its
sails do indeed turn in the wind; they are left entirely to the wind’s blowing.”25 Hence, the
windmill harnesses nature’s natural processes in a cooperative and non-intrusive fashion. A
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simple device that cooperates with nature’s natural rhythms, such a windmill would not be
out of place in a poetic work.
Now picture a hydroelectric power plant in the Rhine river. The hydroelectric plant
dams up the Rhine so that it can supply the hydraulic pressure that powers the machines that
produce electricity. In other words, the hydroelectric plant turns the Rhine into a “waterpower supplier.” “In order that we may even remotely consider the monstrousness that
reigns here,” Heidegger memorably writes, “let us ponder for a moment the contrast that is
spoken by the two titles: ‘The Rhine,’ as dammed up into the power works, and the ‘The
Rhine,’ as uttered by the art-work, in Holderlin’s hymn by that name.”26 Poets do not
compose hymns about rivers that are damned up into power works.
Heidegger paints this startling image in order to highlight the way in which modern
technology assaults nature. In Heidegger’s example, the Rhine is “set upon” by man who
“challenges” it to reveal itself as a “water-power supplier.” For Heidegger, the example of
the hydroelectric plant is emblematic of the “challenging-forth” that characterizes the
technological manner of revealing reality: “The revealing that rules throughout modern
technology has the character of a setting-upon, in the sense of a challenging forth.”27
The example of the hydroelectric plant is illustrative in an additional sense. By
challenging the Rhine to reveal itself as an energy source, the hydroelectric plant transforms
it into what Heidegger calls “standing-reserve” (Bestand). Standing-reserve is something
that “is ordered to stand by, to be immediately on hand, indeed to stand there just so that it
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may be on call for a further ordering.”28 In other words, standing-reserve is a supply or store
of resources ready for human use. Because standing-reserve is created in order to satisfy
human consumption, it exists solely at the mercy of the human “consumer.” Inasmuch as
standing-reserve is nonautonomous vis a vis human beings, it lacks the dignity of an
“object.”
The technological annihilation of objectivity renders modern technology the
“supreme danger” of our time, in Heidegger’s view. Hence, the danger of technological
dehumanization. Enframing transfigures all objects into sources of standing-reserve. In an
“objectless” milieu, even man himself lacks objective presence inasmuch as his sole value is
as an “orderer” of the standing-reserve: “As soon as what is unconcealed no longer concerns
man even as object, but exclusively as standing reserve, and man in the midst of
objectlessness is nothing but the orderer of the standing-reserve, then man comes to the very
brink of a precipitous fall; that is, he comes to the point where he himself will have to be
taken as standing-reserve.”29
For Heidegger, this represents one of two ways in which enframing manifests itself as
the preeminent danger. The other danger is that man succumbs to the illusion that he is the
“lord of the earth,” that everything that man encounters exists only insofar as it is his
creation. For Heidegger, this illusion is deadly in that it covers up man’s essence as the one
who is spoken to by Being: “Man is the shepherd of Being.”30 Hence, in styling himself the
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unchallenged master of the earth, man fails to come to grips with the true nature of his
Existenz.
On Heidegger’s account, this anthropocentric delusion causes conflict. More
specifically, what engenders conflict is what Heidegger calls “the conquest of the world as
picture.” A picture is the “structured image (Gebild) that is the creature of man’s producing
which represents and sets before.”31 The conquest of the world as picture is the process by
which man attempts to make the world conform to his “world picture.” Why does this
tendency engender conflict? The answer relates to the liberation of subjectivity: in a milieu
characterized by unleashed subjectivity, no single subject’s picture takes precedence. Hence,
a multiplicity of subjects will compete for a position of ultimate supremacy.
In Heidegger’s view, the competition that ensues will not be a mere free-for-all
contest of random participants. Rather, the contest will involve subjects who are the most
able to enforce their particular world-view. As Heidegger puts it,
In such producing, man contends for the position in which he can be that particular
being who gives the measure and draws up the guidelines for everything that is.
Because this position secures, organizes and articulates itself as a world view, the
modern relationship to that which is, is one that becomes, in its decisive unfolding, a
confrontation of world views; and indeed not of random world views, but only of
those that have already taken up the fundamental position of man that is most
extreme, and have done so with the utmost resoluteness.32
Hence, only the subjects that have the most “resoluteness” will be able to compete in this
agonistic contest. And the surest indicator of resoluteness is size. Hence, the modern
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tendency towards the gigantic: “A sign of this event is that everywhere and in the most
varied forms and disguises the gigantic is making its appearance.”33 Considered from this
angle, the formation of ever larger organizational entities is a predictable consequence of the
modern liberation of subjectivity. And of course, such entities will be comprised of
anonymous workers. Hence, the importance of Junger, who had identified the rise of the
worker with striking perspicacity.
All in all, Heidegger’s critique of technology paints a strikingly dark picture of the
technological epoch. Heidegger depicts a world of creeping dehumanization, arrogant
anthropocentrism, and bureaucratic-organizational largesse. But darkest of all is Heidegger’s
pronouncement that man is essentially powerless to stop the technological danger that
threatens his very humanity. “Human activity can never directly counter this danger.
Human achievement alone can never banish it.”34 Why? Because the technological manner
of disclosing reality is a legitimate mode of ontological disclosure. In other words, the
tendency to disclose entities in the mode of enframing is a result of a dispensation of Being.
This fact notwithstanding, man can comport his being in a certain way so as to foster
the growth of the “saving power.” In “The Question Concerning Technology,” Heidegger
argues that the saving power is fostered when man rediscovers the aesthetic connotations of
the Greek term techn‘ (art). To the modern mind, techn‘ conjures up the image of
technology. To the ancient Greeks, techn‘ connoted poetic revealing (po‘isis). Hence, man
fosters the growth of the saving power by rediscovering the capacity for po‘isis hidden
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within techn‘ itself. “Could it be that revealing lays claim to the arts most primally, so that
they for their part may expressly foster the growth of the saving power, may awaken and
found anew our vision of, and trust in, that which grants?”35 The answer, of course, is yes.
In the “Memorial Address,” Heidegger gives yet another answer. In that essay,
Heidegger calls for man to embrace a non-technological manner of experiencing reality.
This is not done by rejecting technological things outright but by refusing to be dominated by
them: “We let technical devices enter our daily life, and at the same time leave them outside,
that is, let them alone, as things which are nothing absolute but remain dependent upon
something higher.” Heidegger calls such a comportment “releasement toward things”
(Gelassenheit). In Heidegger’s view, releasement toward things necessitates a corresponding
“openness to the mystery” of Being that is hidden within the essence of technology itself.36
Hence, poetic revealing and releasement toward things are two ways in which man
can foster the growth of the saving power. To Heidegger, man actualizes his capacity for
poetic revelation and releasement toward things by building, dwelling, and thinking in the
fourfold (Geviert) of earth, sky, divinities, and mortals.
IV. Building, Dwelling, and Thinking in the Fourfold
Heidegger relates the plight of modern homelessness to dwelling in his 1951 essay
entitled “Building, Dwelling, Thinking” (Bauen Wohnen Denken).37 In this essay, Heidegger
contends that man’s homelessness is a consequence of the fact that man does not think about
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the plight of dwelling: “What if man’s homelessness consisted in this, that man still does not
think of the proper plight of dwelling as the plight?” Note the peculiar phraseology here:
homelessness is not necessarily synonymous with the plight of dwelling, but is rather the
result of man’s failure to think about the plight of dwelling. Hence, the proper response to
the plight of modern homelessness is to think about homelessness. As Heidegger writes,
“Yet as soon as man gives thought to his homelessness, it is a misery no longer.”38
The importance of thinking (Denken) is continuously reiterated by the late Heidegger.
By thinking, Heidegger does not mean calculative thinking. Calculative thinking is a type of
thinking that plans, investigates, and computes on “ever new, ever more promising and at the
same time economical possibilities.” In contrast, meditative thinking “dwells on what lies
close and meditates on what is closest; upon that which concerns us, each one of us, here and
now; here, on this patch of home ground; now, in the present hour of history.”39 In other
words, meditative thinking thinks about Being. And for Heidegger, meditative thinking
about “what is closest” inexorably leads man to ponder the fact of his homelessness.
What does meditative thinking reveal about the plight of modern homelessness? To
the modern mind, such a plight is nothing more than a mere “housing shortage.” Such a view
is fundamentally mistaken. As Heidegger explains,
however hard and bitter, however hampering and threatening the lack of houses
remains, the proper plight of dwelling does not merely lie in a lack of houses. The
proper plight of dwelling is indeed older than the world wars with their destruction,
older than the increase of the earth’s population and the condition of the industrial
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workers. The proper dwelling plight lies in this, that mortals ever search anew for the
essence of dwelling, that they must ever learn to dwell.40
Thus, the plight of dwelling lies in the fact that mortals do not know how to dwell. By
extension, learning to dwell is the proper response to the plight of dwelling.
What is dwelling? At the outset, it is necessary to recognize the significance of
Hölderlin to this question, a pivotal source of inspiration to the late Heidegger. It was
Hölderlin who declared that “poetically man dwells on this earth.” Clearly, Hölderlin
possessed keen insight into the nature of dwelling. But Hölderlin’s notion of dwelling has
been cast into oblivion: “The proper meaning of the verb bauen, namely, to dwell, has been
lost to us.”41 Hence, it is necessary to rediscover the real meaning of dwelling as understood
by Hölderlin.
Heidegger attempts to disclose the true nature of dwelling by investigating the
etymological origin of the word dwell (bauen) itself. The word dwelling derives from the
Old Saxon wuon and the Gothic wunian. The Old Saxon term wuon means to remain in a
place, while the Gothic term wunian means to remain in peace. Of these two terms, it is the
latter that illuminates the real meaning of dwelling. More specifically, wunian means “to
dwell, to be set at peace, means to remain at peace within the free, the preserve, the free
sphere that safeguards each thing in its essence.”42 Considered in light of wunian, the
essential aspect of dwelling is sparing.
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To dwell is to spare. But even this seemingly straightforward proposition is more
complex than it first appears. Usually, sparing has a negative connotation: we spare
something when we refrain from inflicting harm on it. But, for Heidegger, sparing also
implies the positive act of restoring a being to its full potentiality: “Real sparing is
something positive and takes place when we leave something beforehand in its own essence,
when we return it specifically to its essential being, when we ‘free’ it in the proper sense of
the word into a preserve of peace.”43 Thus, sparing is both passive and active in nature.
But what do human beings passively and actively spare when they dwell? When
human beings dwell, they safeguard the fourfold (Geviert) of earth, sky, divinities, and
mortals: “Mortals dwell in the way they safeguard the fourfold in its essential unfolding.” As
for the fourfold itself, it is necessary to recognize that the term “fourfold” is somewhat
misleading in that it is really a unity: “By a primal oneness the four – earth, sky, divinities
and mortals – belong together in one.”44 Hence, rather than being four discrete components,
the various elements of the fourfold exist in a state of primordial oneness.
The four elements of the fourfold are earth, sky, divinities, and mortals. The first
element of the fourfold is the earth, “the saving bearer, blossoming and fruiting, spreading
out in rock and water, rising up into plant and animal.” The second element is the sky, “the
vaulting path of the sun, the course of the changing moon, the wandering glitter of the stars,
the year’s seasons and their changes, the light and dusk of day, the gloom and glow of night,
the clemency and inclemency of the weather, the drifting clouds and blue depth of the ether.”
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The third element is the divinities, “the beckoning messengers of the godhead. Out of the
holy sway of the godhead, the god appears in his presence or withdraws into concealment.”
The fourth element is the mortals, the human beings. Heidegger calls human beings “mortals
because they can die. To die means to be capable of death as death. Only man dies, and
indeed continually, as long as he remains on the earth, under the sky, before the divinities.”45
Human beings dwell when they safeguard the various elements of the fourfold. First,
human beings dwell when they “save the earth” by setting the earth free into its own essence.
Second, mortals dwell when they receive “the sky as sky. They leave to the sun and moon
their journey, to the stars their courses, to the seasons their blessing and inclemency; they do
not turn night into day nor day into a harassed unrest.” Third, human beings dwell when
they “await the divinities as divinities” by “hold(ing) up to the divinities what is unhoped for.
They wait for intimations of their coming and do not mistake the signs of their absence.”
Finally, “Mortals dwell in that they initiate their own essential being – their being capable of
death as death – into the use and practice of this capacity, so that there may be a good
death.”46
Such are the various facets of the dwelling act. But what is the ultimate significance
of Heidegger’s concept of dwelling? For one, it is instructive to note that Heidegger’s
concept of dwelling reiterates his career-long emphasis on the embedded nature of human
existence. Thus, Heidegger’s pronouncement that mortals dwell in the fourfold roughly
corresponds to his earlier contention that Da–sein is Being-in-the-world. Second, it is

45

Heidegger, “Building, Dwelling, Thinking,” 352.

46

Heidegger, “Building, Dwelling, Thinking,” 352.
132

instructive to note how the poetic tone of Heidegger’s discussion implicitly rejects the
authority of calculative rationality. Calculative thinking has uprooted man from the world.
Seemingly, poetry is necessitated to help man to rediscover his worldly home.
Consider Heidegger’s call for mortals to await the divinities.47 In this call, one can
detect Heidegger’s disdain for the secular cast of modern life. However, one can also discern
Heidegger’s rejection of the legacy of monotheism.48 Here, it is useful to recall the process
by which Socrates banishes the pagan gods from the ideal city in speech described in Plato’s
Republic. In book two, Plato’s Socrates decrees that the poets in his ideal city can only
depict gods that cause good and not evil, do not change shape, and do not lie. In this
discussion, Plato’s Socrates sets the tone for the rationalist bent of Greek philosophy and
Christian monotheism, particularly in its scholastic manifestation. Following Hölderlin,
Heidegger longs for the return of the gods that were banished from the world by Plato’s
Socrates. In its longing for religious reinvigoration and its pronounced suspicion of
monotheism, Heidegger’s call for mortal man to await the divinities can be viewed as a
decisive confirmation of an observation earlier made by Nietzsche: “This is what I have
found at the bottom of the decline of European theism, on the basis of many conversations,
asking and listening. It seems to me that the religious instinct is indeed in the process of
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growing powerfully – but precisely the theistic satisfaction it refuses with deep mistrust.”49
In summation, dwelling necessitates that human beings safeguard the fourfold by
saving the earth, receiving the sky, awaiting divinities, and initiating mortals. On the basis of
this description, it would seem that the act of dwelling is highly abstract. However,
Heidegger insists that the dwelling act is not accomplished abstractly, but in our concrete
relationship with things. Indeed, Heidegger argues that the human relationship to things is
the principal means by which mortals safeguard the fourfold: “staying with things is the only
way in which the fourfold stay within the fourfold is accomplished at any time in simple
unity.”50
What does it mean to “stay with things”? In Heidegger’s view, staying with things is
accomplished when mortals “nurse and nurture the things that grow, and specially construct
the things that do not grow” in an appropriate manner. Heidegger calls the nursing and
nurturing of organic things and the construction of artificial things building. Building is the
means by which mortals stay with things, a “staying” that is concomitant with the act of
dwelling itself. In other words, dwelling is inextricably connected with building: “Dwelling,
inasmuch as it keeps the fourfold in things is, as this keeping, a building.”51
In Heidegger’s view, our ability to build and dwell is endangered in the modern
world. In sum, the problem is that moderns adhere to an impoverished notion of what
constitutes a thing: “Our thinking has of course long been accustomed to understate the
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essence of the thing.” More specifically, the modern mind typically regards things as entities
that contain various properties. For Heidegger, this concept of the essence of things is so
reductionist that it affects the ability of mortals to dwell.
This barren conception of things is interconnected with a distorted view of space
(Raum). To the ancient Greeks, space “is something that has been made room for, something
that has been freed, namely, within a boundary, Greek peras.”52 However, subsequent
Western conceptions of space have moved farther and farther away from the Greek concept
of peras. In the Roman world, space was viewed in the sense of the Latin word spatium, as
interval or intervening space. Space as interval was gradually replaced by the notion that
space is mere extension (extensio) between three dimensions. Subsequently, space as
extension was supplanted by an analytic-algebraic conception of space. With every
progressive step, the Greek concept of peras becomes progressively more distant.
In his “Building, Dwelling, Thinking” essay, Heidegger uses the example of a bridge
to elucidate the various ways of conceptualizing space. To the modern mind, a bridge is an
entity that occupies a specific physical location. As Heidegger writes, “In a space that is
represented purely as spatium, the bridge now appears as a mere something at some position,
which can be occupied at any time by something else or replaced by a mere marker.”53 To
moderns, the bridge is an anonymous entity that occupies a random place in a spatial
continuum. Such a bridge is not special in any significant sense: a million other things can
readily take its place. As for the location that the bridge occupies, this too is utterly

52

Heidegger, “Building, Dwelling, Thinking,” 356.

53

Heidegger, “Building, Dwelling, Thinking,” 357.
135

anonymous. It makes absolutely no difference whether the bridge exists against the
backdrop of an urban ghetto or a picturesque landscape.
Needless to say, such a bridge certainly does not point toward the presence of the
divine, or to anything else remotely astonishing or wonder-inducing. Things that are built
with this aesthetic sensibility take on the quality of the “empty indifferent things, sham
things, dummies of life” noted by the poet Rainer Maria Rilke in a letter written in 1925:
To our grandparents, a “house,” a “well,” a familial steeple, even their own clothes,
their cloak still meant something more, were infinitely more intimate – almost
everything a vessel in which they found something already there, and added to its
store. Now there are intruding, from America, empty indifferent things, sham things,
dummies of life. . . . A house, as the Americans understand it, an American apple or a
winestock from over there, have nothing in common with the house, the fruit, the
grape into which the hope and thoughtfulness of our forefathers had entered.54
For Heidegger, the mass-produced rubbish lamented by Rilke is the natural result of the
modern view of how things exist in space.
How, then, should we view the bridge? Appealing to the Greek conception of peras,
Heidegger argues that the bridge should be viewed as the location where the fourfold is
gathered in its ontological luminosity. The bridge “gathers the earth as landscape around the
stream.” The bridge gathers the sky by holding “its flow up to the sky by taking it for a
moment under the vaulted gateway and then setting it free once more.” The bridge gathers
the divinities in that it “visibly give(s) thanks for, their presence, as in the figure of the saint
of the bridge.” And the bridge gathers mortals by virtue of the fact that it “initiates the
lingering and hastening ways of men to and fro, so that they may get to other banks and in
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the end, as mortals, to the other side.”55 All in all, the bridge points to its natural
surroundings, illuminates the presence of the divine, and reminds mortals of their essential
mortality.
When things are viewed as gathering (Versammlung) sites of the fourfold, the process
of building takes on a different cast. Building ceases to be the construction of anonymous
entities in indifferent spaces and instead becomes the “founding and joining of spaces” that
admit and install the fourfold: “Building takes over from the fourfold the standard for all the
traversing and measuring of the spaces that in each case are provided for by the locales that
have been founded.”56
Heidegger is no doubt advancing a bold – even revolutionary – theory of architecture
here, but the reader may be left confused as to what all this has to do with dwelling.57 To
Heidegger, everything. Mortals dwell when they spare the fourfold, and sparing the fourfold
is accomplished by building things that enable the fourfold to attain ontological presence.
Hence, a more appropriate theory of building will enable mortals to build things which
enable them to dwell. Human dwelling necessitates proper building, and vice versa: “Only if
we are capable of dwelling, only then can we build.”58
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In the concluding section of his “Building, Dwelling, Thinking” essay, Heidegger
gives an example of the type of building that complements an authentic dwelling.
Heidegger’s description is worth quoting in full,
Let us think for a while of a farmhouse in the Black Forest, which was built some two
hundred years ago by the dwelling of peasants. Here the self-sufficiency of the power
to let earth and heaven, divinities and mortals enter in simple oneness into things,
ordered the house. It placed a farm on the wind-sheltered mountain slope looking
south, among the meadows close to the spring. It gave it to the wide overhanging
shingle roof of whose proper slope bears up under the burden of snow, and which,
reaching deep down, shields, the chambers against the storms of the long winter
nights. It did not forget the altar corner behind the community table; it made room in
the chamber for the hallowed places of children and ‘tree of the dead’ – for that is
what they call a coffin there: the Totenbaum – and in that way it designed for the
different generations under one roof the character of their journey through time. A
craft itself sprung from dwelling, still uses its tools and frames as things, built the
farmhouse.59
Obviously, Heidegger is indulging in a bit of “sentimental glorification of the idyllic” here,
and even many contemporary Heideggerians find such passages to be a constant source of
embarrassment. Still, the passage suffices to makes Heidegger’s larger point. A farmhouse
built by Black Forest peasants effectively gathers the fourfold. Because it does so, the
peasants who live within its walls are able to dwell.
The challenge for modern man is to reproduce their mode of building in a
contemporary historical context. Such building is not the mere erecting of architectural
edifices, but is rather a poetic endeavor. Poetry is the process by which human beings “take
measure” of their existence within the fourfold. Viewed from this perspective, an authentic
builder will poetically survey man’s “ek-sistence” on the earth, under the expanse of the sky,
as a mortal who lives in the company of other mortals, and in the presence of the divinities.
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Hence, building necessitates the existence of poetry: “Poetry is what really lets us dwell.”60
The aforementioned Black Forest peasants had this poetic sensibility. Modern man must
rediscover his capacity for poetry if he is to learn how to dwell.
V. The Question of Ethics
As we have seen, Heidegger’s notion of dwelling entails a transformation of the
relationship between human beings and the things that they encounter over the course of their
lives. In order to dwell, modern man must learn to view things as “locales” that house the
fourfold. But what are the implications of Heidegger’s late philosophy on the relationships
that human beings have with each other? In the “Letter on Humanism,” Heidegger gives an
answer of sorts.
In the essay, Heidegger notes an episode that occurred shortly after the publication of
Being and Time. More specifically, a “young friend” asked Heidegger when he was going to
publish an ethics. Such a question is eminently understandable for several reasons. For one,
it is understandable in relation to Heidegger’s own philosophy, which calls for man to live in
light of the “truth of Being.” The perplexity that is entailed whenever the question of Being
is asked with a requisite degree of seriousness makes the demand for an adequate design for
living that much more acute. Secondly, the question is understandable in a time when the
hegemony of modern technology has transformed human relationships to an unprecedented
extent: “The greatest care must be fostered upon the ethical bond at a time when
technological man, delivered over to mass society, can be kept reliably on call only by
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gathering and ordering all his plans and activities in a way that corresponds to technology.”61
For these reasons, the “young friend(’s)” question is pertinent indeed.
Nonetheless, Heidegger declines to write an ethics. Heidegger does not deny that
society as such relies on the maintenance of ethical bonds, even if such bonds are revealed to
be utterly without natural foundation. “Should we not safeguard and secure the existing
ethical bonds even if they hold human beings together ever so tenuously and merely for the
present. Certainly.”62 But even if existing ethical bonds must be safeguarded, ethics as such
is more of a problem than a solution to our present predicament. More specifically, it is a
problem because thinking about ethics as a specific realm of inquiry is a symptom of
intellectual decline.
For Heidegger, this truism is evident whenever the Greek origins of ethical
philosophy are taken into account. Like other academic disciplines such as logic and
physics, ethics was created when thinking was being transformed into an academic activity
pursued by specialists of the various scholarly disciplines: “These disciplines arose at a time
when thinking was becoming ‘philosophy,’ philosophy epist‘m‘ (science) and science itself
a matter for schools and academic pursuits.”63 Like logic and physics, ethics is the result of
intellectual ossification and academic specialization.
By contrast, the pre-Socratic thinkers and poets did not have an ethics. Nor did they
have a logic, physics, or any other academic discipline: “Thinkers prior to this period knew
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neither a ‘logic’ nor an ‘ethics’ nor ‘physics.’” This is not to say that their thinking is
immoral, illogical, or generally less rigorous, however. Indeed, from the perspective of the
sheer primordial power of their thought, the pre-Socratic thinkers and poets towers over the
thinkers who followed after them. As Heidegger writes, “The tragedies of Sophocles –
provided such a comparison is at all permissible – preserve the ‘thos in their sagas more
primordially than Aristotle’s lectures on ‘ethics.’”64 And perhaps the greatest ethical thinker
of them all is Heraclitus.65
In Heidegger’s view, Fragment 119 of Heraclitus powerfully captures the primordial
essence of ethical phenomena. As Heidegger writes, “A saying of Heraclitus which consists
of only three words says something so simply that from it the essence of the ‘thos
immediately comes to light.” In this fragment, Heraclitus says ‘thos anthrÇpÇi daimÇn, a
saying that is usually translated as “A man’s character is his daimÇn.” For Heidegger,
however, this translation is essentially incorrect in that it mistranslates ‘thos. Understood in
its proper Greek sense, ‘thos means “abode, dwelling place” or “the open region in which
man dwells.” Translating ‘thos in light of its proper Greek meaning, Heidegger translates it
as “Man dwells, insofar as he is man, in the nearness of god.”66
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For Heidegger, Heraclitus’s saying suggests that man’s dwelling place is the
primordial ground that enables man to discover his true essence. As Heidegger writes, “The
open region of this abode allows what pertains to man’s essence, and what in thus arriving
resides in nearness to him, to appear.” Indeed, it is for this reason that man’s abode is
necessary if man is to realize what is truly essential about himself: “The abode of man
contains and preserves the advent of what belongs to man in his essence.”67 Hence, the
Heraclitean fragment points to the pivotal importance of man’s abode.
But what does this have to do with “ethics”? For Heidegger, everything. In
Heidegger’s view, what is decisive about the Heraclitean fragment is the mere fact that it
ponders man’s abode, the underlying ground that man stands upon whenever he endeavors to
posit an ethics. Viewed from this angle, Heraclitus’s three-word saying can be viewed as the
example of an “original ethics.” As Heidegger puts it, “If the name ‘ethics,’ in keeping with
the basic meaning of the word ‘thos, should now say that ‘ethics’ ponders the abode of man,
then that thinking which thinks the truth of Being as the primordial element of man, as one
who ek-sists, is in itself the original ethics.”68
Obviously, Heraclitus’s original ethics is a far cry from the tradition of ethical
philosophy that stretches from Aristotle to Kant. Seemingly, it is more akin to ontology in
the fact that it “thinks the truth of Being.” But even the term ontology misses the mark;
come visit him. Having arrived, they saw him warming himself at a stove. Surprised, they
stood there in consternation – above all because he encouraged them, the astounded ones,
and called for them to come in, with the words, ‘For here too the gods are present’” Aristotle,
De Partibus animalium, I.5.645a17.
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Heraclitus’s thinking is really too primordial for ontology: “The thinking that inquires into
the truth of Being and so defines man’s essential abode from Being is neither ethics nor
ontology.”69 Hence, Heraclitus’s saying cannot be categorized as either ethics or ontology
because it is the manifestation of a type of thinking that underlies both.
The Heraclitean endeavor to ponder man’s abode represents the Heideggerian ethical
imperative. Needless to say, such a notion appears vacuous to those looking for a detailed
set of moral precepts. Certainly, it fails to speak to the questions that human beings face
with regard to what is good and bad and just and unjust. By elevating Heraclitus over the
ethical philosophers who followed in his footsteps, Heidegger effectively performs a tabula
rasa on the entire Western tradition of ethical philosophy. Viewed from this angle,
Heidegger not only refuses to posit a philosophical ethics, he cuts the ground out from those
who do.
Thus, Heidegger’s answer to his young friend’s request to provide an ethics reveals
him to be a thinker radically estranged from the Western ethical tradition. But is Heidegger’s
thought amoral? Here, we are compelled to turn our attention away from the “Letter on
Humanism” and towards “The Question Concerning Technology.” In the original
manuscript of the “Question” essay, Heidegger wrote the following passage: “Agriculture is
now motorized food industry – in essence the same as the manufacturing of corpses in gas
chambers and extermination camps, the same as blockading and starving of nations, the same
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as the manufacture of hydrogen bombs.”70 In other words, the production of food is “the
same as” the production of corpses, and hydrogen bombs. Modern agribusiness is the same
as Auschwitz!
What can one possibly say about this startling passage? Obviously, it is to
Heidegger’s credit that he deleted this sentence from the final version of the lecture that he
delivered in 1949. This fact, however, hardly renders it any more palatable: as Emmanuel
Levinas memorably puts it, “This stylistic turn of phrase, this analogy, this progression, are
beyond commentary.”71 Its callous nature notwithstanding, however, there is nothing in this
sentence that contravenes the strictures of Heidegger’s thinking. After all, the task of
Heideggerian thinking is to meditate on man’s abode, not issue moral judgements. To
condemn the technological production of corpses outright would be to fall prey to the
temptation to issue “a peremptory directive and for rules that say how man . . . ought to live
in a fitting manner.”72 Here, as elsewhere, Heidegger refrains from doing so.
VI. Conclusion
Heidegger’s late philosophy is driven by his conviction that human autochthony is the
necessary pre-condition for full human flourishing. “According to our human experience and
history, at least as far as I see it,” Heidegger declares, “I know that everything essential and
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everything great originated from the fact that man had a home and was rooted in a
tradition.”73 This conviction inspires Heidegger’s concern about the uprooting effect of
modern technology. By extension, it propels his powerful critique of the modern political
systems that sanction the hegemony of modern technology.74
For Heidegger, all existing political systems in the Western world are in the grip of
modern technology. This is as much true of liberalism and socialism as it is of modern
democracy. Modern democracy operates on the assumption that technology is susceptible to
human control. In Heidegger’s view, this assumption is fundamentally mistaken in the fact
that modern technology is the result of the destiny of Being. This is why democracy, like
“the political expression of the Christian worldview” and the “idea of a constitutional state,”
is a “half truth.” As Heidegger explains, “I would characterize them as half truths because I
do not see in them a genuine confrontation with the technological world, because behind
them there is in my view a notion that technology is in its essence something over which man
has control. In my opinion, that is not possible. Technology is in its essence that which man
cannot control by himself.”75 Hence, modern democracy is deficient because it adheres to
the illusion that technology is a ready-to-hand tool that is subject to human mastery.

73

Heidegger, “Only a God Can Save Us,” 106.

74

For a critique of Heidegger’s view of technology, see Jerry Weinberger’s essay
entitled “Politics and the Problem of Technology: An Essay on Heidegger and the Tradition
of Political Philosophy,” American Political Science Review 86, 1 (1992): 112-127. A more
sympathetic treatment of Heidegger’s critique is contained in Gregory Bruce Smith’s article
“Heidegger, Technology, and Postmodernity,” Social Science Journal 28, 3 (1991): 369389. A brief discussion of Heidegger’s view of technology can also be found in George
Kateb, “Technology and Philosophy,” Social Research 64, 3: 1225-1246.
75

“‘Only a God Can Save Us,’” 105.
145

In the view of the late Heidegger, the political system that existed in Germany from
1933 to 1945 harbored similar illusions. However, here a qualification is in order. Whatever
its shortcomings, the German National Socialist movement possessed an “inner truth and
greatness” because it moved in the direction of facilitating a confrontation between modern
man and global technology. Again, the Der Spiegel interview,
On the contrary, I see the task of thought to consist in helping man in general, within
the limits allowed to thought, to achieve an adequate relationship to the essence of
technology. National Socialism, to be sure, moved in this direction. But those people
were far too limited to acquire an explicit relationship to what is really happening
today and has been underway for three centuries.76
In the final analysis, then, the German National Socialist movement is best regarded as a
noble failure, a movement that tried and failed to help man find a home in a posttechnological age. Why did German National Socialism fail? In the above quote, Heidegger
attributes its failure to the intellectual limitations of its leading lights. Presumably, if its
leading theorists were less “limited,” German National Socialism could have achieved “an
adequate relationship to the essence of technology.” But this was not to be.
If the “Letter on Humanism” is any guide, the nationalistic impulse at the heart of
German National Socialism frustrated its attempt to achieve such a relationship. For
Heidegger, the problem with nationalism is that it is inherently subjective. What links
nationalism with subjectivity is “anthropologism.” As Heidegger writes, “Every nationalism
is metaphysically an anthropologism, and as such subjectivism.”77 Which is to say that
nationalism is predicated on an anthropological conception of man as a truth-establishing
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subject. Much as the Cartesian subject asserts itself as the ground of all truth, a national
people asserts itself as the autonomous source of its historical destiny. Considered from this
vantage point, the nationalistic thrust of German National Socialism is yet another
manifestation of modern subjectivity.78 The same can be said of the German National
Socialism’s collectivistic tendencies, tendencies which complete – rather than reverse –
individual subjectivity.
Nationalistic self-assertion and mass collectivism prevented the German National
Socialist movement from arriving at a satisfactory relationship to the essence of modern
technology. But what of the German National Socialist celebration of the homeland?
Seemingly, Heidegger himself echoes the German National Socialist obsession with the
homeland in his 1943 lecture on Hölderlin’s elegy “Homecoming.” In the “Letter on
Humanism,” however, Heidegger argues that the homeland referred to there means “nearness
to Being”: “the word (homeland) is thought here in an essential sense, not patriotically or
nationalistically, but in terms of the history of Being.” Thus, Hölderlin’s call for
homecoming is sounded so that his fellow Germans can find their essence in the “destiny of
the West” rather than the “egoism of his nation.”79 Hence, Hölderlin and Heidegger’s
concept of the homeland is distinct from the Heimat celebrated by the Nazis.
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No doubt, Heidegger’s attempt to purify the concept of the homeland of its
nationalistic connotations is problematic. Here, it is instructive to note that Heidegger never
relinquished his view of the ontological specialness of the German language. In 1966,
Heidegger declared that, “I have in mind especially the inner relationship of the German
language with the language of the Greeks and with their thought. This has been confirmed
form me today by the French. When they begin to think, they speak German, being sure that
they could not make it with their own language.”80 It is evident that Heidegger only has a
problem with nationalism inasmuch as it is subjective in nature. Conceivably, if nationalism
could be cleansed of its anthropocentric and subjective aspects, the attempt to preserve a
sense of national consciousness is an entirely legitimate endeavor.
But even if Heidegger’s view of nationalism is ambiguous, his negative view of selfassertive nationalism is not. Here, it is useful to reiterate the importance of Heidegger’s mid1930s encounter with Nietzsche, an encounter that illuminated the continuity of Nietzsche’s
will to power doctrine with the modern metaphysical tradition. From the perspective
afforded by Heidegger’s confrontation with Nietzsche, the Nazi emphasis on will is revealed
to be yet another manifestation of the modernism that the German National Socialist
movement professed to abhor. His chauvinistic view of the German language
notwithstanding, the later Heidegger came to the conclusion that modern homelessness
cannot be resolutely willed out of existence by a historical Volk.
Hence, Heidegger’s call for mortals to build, dwell, and think in the fourfold of earth,
sky, divinities, and mortals is restrained in tone. As it stands, the attempt to identify the
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political implications of building, dwelling, and thinking is a futile endeavor. The
Heideggerian imperative to build things in which the fourfold can attain ontological presence
is more aesthetic than political. The same goes for Heidegger’s dwelling ethos. Although
the call for mortals to “save the earth” anticipates Green politics and its focus on
environmental stewardship, Heidegger is silent about which political system is most likely to
facilitate this undertaking.81 This is also the case with Heidegger’s advice for mortals to
await the divinities. And while Heidegger’s counsel for mortals to initiate their mortality
evinces an implicit disdain for modern liberal politics – which is founded on the fear of an
untimely death – it fails to tell us which political system can best help mortals to face up to
their mortality. Indeed, to think about such a question is to eschew the meditative thinking
that is needed above all else.
So, Heidegger’s call for mortals to build, think, and dwell in the fourfold tells us very
little about how we should organize ourselves politically. Heidegger’s refusal to speak about
politics is more than understandable in light of the 1933 debacle, of course. But this is not
the only reason for Heidegger’s silence about political matters. For Heidegger, the mere
attempt to delineate a coherent political philosophy is a manifestation of the metaphysical
impulse that exacerbates modern homelessness. This is why there is little room for political
philosophy in Heidegger’s late philosophy. In the words of Strauss,
A dialogue between the most profound thinkers of the Orient and in particular East
Asia may lead to the consummation prepared, accompanied or followed by a return of

81

For Zimmerman, Heidegger can be regarded as a deep ecological theorist of sorts.
See Zimmerman, Heidegger’s Confrontation with Modernity, 243. Zimmerman would
subsequently qualify this view in “Rethinking the Heidegger-Deep Ecology Relationship,”
Environmental Ethics 15 (Fall 1993): 195-224.
149

the gods. That dialogue and everything that it entails, but surely not political action
of any kind, is perhaps the way. Heidegger severs the connection of the vision with
politics more radically than either Marx or Nietzsche. One is inclined to say that
Heidegger has learned the lesson of 1933 more thoroughly than any other man.
Surely he leaves no place whatever for political philosophy.82
Strauss is surely correct. I would only add that Heidegger’s severing of the bond between
philosophy and politics is particularly destructive of modern political orders that are
constructed on theoretical foundations.
As it turns out, Heidegger’s alienation from politics is at one with his estrangement
from ethics. For Heidegger, ethical philosophy is the product of intellectual decline in the
fact that it is a product of the transformation from pre-Socratic thinking into academic
philosophy. Hence, the issuing of ethical judgements is pernicious in that it obstructs man’s
ability to ponder his abode. Heidegger himself signals his reluctance to issue ethical
judgements when he brazenly asserts that the production of food is the same as the
production of corpses. Viewed from this perspective, Heidegger’s late philosophy is not
only apolitical, but also amoral.
All in all, then, Heidegger’s dynamic search for home culminates in an ethicalpolitical impasse. His attempt to help his fellow Germans rediscover their homeland ends
with the concession that modern homelessness cannot be addressed politically. Nor can
modern homelessness be addressed ethically. All that mortals can do to remedy the plight of
homelessness is to build, dwell, and think in a way that prepares the way for the future truthdisclosing event (Ereignis). Only when the absent gods return of their own accord will
mortals finally be enabled to achieve homecoming in a technological age.
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The fatalism implicit in Heidegger’s dwelling ethos has aroused much criticism.
Jürgen Habermas, for example, complains that Heidegger’s personal failure to acknowledge
his culpability in the German National Socialist debacle is inextricably linked with the
fatalism of his post-turn philosophy: “he (Heidegger) did not understand the so-called Kehre
as the outcome of an effort of thought to solve problems, the result of a process of
investigation, but always as the objective event of an anonymous overcoming of metaphysics
staged by Being itself.” To Habermas, the fatalism of Heidegger’s later thought is a
manifestation of the German philosopher’s failure to break with the philosophy of the
subject. Like other parties to the philosophical discourse of modernity – Nietzsche,
Horkheimer and Adorno, Derrida, Bataille, Foucault – Heidegger had struggled to break free
of the tradition of Western subjectivity. Alas, Heidegger’s attempt had failed because he had
failed to consider the possibility that “there are other paths leading out of the philosophy of
the subject” besides impotent mysticism.83
Emmanuel Levinas, another critic of Heidegger, agrees with Habermas, at least up to
a point. To Levinas, Heidegger’s ethical and political failures are a byproduct of his antisubjective ethos. However, Levinas takes Heidegger to task from a different perspective.
For Levinas, the problems attendant to Heidegger’s attempt to transcend the boundaries of
Western subjectivity are manifestations of deeper problems that pervade all varieties of
Western ontology. In Levinas’s view, the ontological search for home that drives the
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Heideggerian project is ethically problematic because it is oblivious to the needs of strangers.
It is to Levinas that this study now turns.
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Chapter 5: The Violence of Homecoming:
Levinas’s Critique of Heidegger

It is impossible to be stinting in our admiration
for the intellectual vigor of Sein und Zeit,
particularly in light of the immense output
this extraordinary book of 1927 inspired.
Its extreme steadfastness will mark it forever.
Can we be assured, however, that there
was never any echo of Evil in it?
Emmanuel Levinas
“As if Consenting to Horror”

I. Introduction
Of the numerous thinkers who benefitted from Heidegger’s tutelage, the FrancoRussian thinker Emmanuel Levinas is singular in personifying the encounter between
philosophy and the Holocaust or Shoah. In an autobiographical sketch entitled “Signature,”
Levinas accurately describes his life as a “disparate inventory . . . dominated by the
presentiment and memory of the Nazi horror.”1 If Heidegger’s biography witnesses the
twentieth century’s most notorious confrontation between philosophy and politics, Levinas’s
life story is comparable in occasioning philosophy’s self-examination of its role in the rise of
political evil.
At an early point in his career, Levinas confronted Heidegger, the thinker who had
authored “one of the finest books in the history of philosophy. . . . One of the finest among
four or five others.”2 At the same time, Levinas also encountered the thinker whose name
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was – to a certain extent – marred by his association with the political movement that
perpetrated the atrocity of atrocities. Alternately attracted to the power of Heidegger’s
intellect and repulsed by his German National Socialist political sympathies, Levinas’s
ambiguous attitude towards Heidegger would leave an indelible imprint on the cast of his
philosophy.
Levinas first encountered Heidegger in 1929, two years after the German philosopher
had published Being and Time. Heidegger’s effect on Levinas was as immediate as it was
profound. What particularly impressed Levinas was Heidegger’s contention that philosophy,
like every other human endeavor, proceeds from a stance of active engagement with the
world rather than Archimedean detachment. However, shortly thereafter, Levinas learned
from Alexander Koyré of Heidegger’s allegiance to German National Socialism, a fact that
was later confirmed by Heidegger’s 1933 rectoral address. Like so many others, Levinas
was scandalized by Heidegger’s capitulation to Germanic fascism. From this point on,
Levinas’s “firm confidence that an unbridgeable distance forever separated the delirious and
criminal hatred voiced by evil on the pages of Mein Kampf from the intellectual virtuosity
displayed in Sein und Zeit” was decisively shattered.3
Heidegger’s subsequent behavior further alienated his former pupil. In the postwar
period, Heidegger had – aside from a handful of evasive and scandalously equivocal remarks
– remained silent about the Shoah. Perhaps more than the rectoral address itself, Heidegger’s
silence hinted at the presence of a discernible ethical insensitivity. As Levinas put it,
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“Doesn’t this silence, in time of peace, on the gas chambers and death camps lie beyond the
realm of feeble excuses and reveal a soul completely cut off from any sensitivity, in which
can be perceived a kind of consent to the horror?”4 This silence, even more than the
rectorship and the posthumous Der Spiegel interview, confirmed the questionability of
Heidegger’s personal character.
Long before Victor Farias revealed the sordid details of Heidegger’s involvement
with German National Socialism, however, Levinas leveled a pointed critique at Heidegger’s
philosophy. For Levinas, the problem with Heideggerian fundamental ontology is that it
effectively subordinates ethics to ontology. For Levinas, this ontological supremacy works
in tandem with the anti-humanistic elements of Heidegger’s thought to render it ethically
pernicious. Moreover, Heidegger’s thought contains another element that is equally, if not
more, disturbing: paganism. For Levinas, Heidegger’s philosophy in general, and his later
thought in particular, is essentially pagan in calling for the sanctification of worldly place. In
Levinas’s view, the Heideggerian consecration of place exercises pernicious political
consequences in that it implicitly sanctions the distinction between native inhabitants of the
sacred hearth and outsiders. This dichotomy, with its inherent capacity to facilitate
nationalistic, chauvinistic, and xenophobic political sentiments, renders Heidegger’s
emphasis on the ontological importance of place decidedly sinister. It also represents one of
several reasons why Heideggerian ontology necessarily engenders tyrannical political
consequences.
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In this chapter, I shall analyze Levinas’s critique of Heidegger’s place-bound ethos
by analyzing his critique of the ontological, anti-humanistic, and pagan elements of the
latter’s thought. I shall begin by examining Levinas’s critique of the ontological cast of
Heidegger’s philosophy. In Levinas’s view, Heidegger’s thematic focus on Being is
objectionable in that it totalizes otherness and promotes egoism. Subsequently, I will
examine Levinas’s critique of modern anti-humanism – and its Heideggerian strand – before
considering his critique of Heidegger’s paganism. For Levinas, Heidegger’s pagan emphasis
on the centrality of place is inherently “cruel” in that it implicitly draws a distinction between
natives and foreigners. I shall conclude by considering Levinas’s view of the political
implications of Heideggerian ontology. For Levinas, Heideggerian ontology inevitably leads
to “imperialist domination” and “tyranny,” and is thus to be regarded as an especially
pernicious temptation of the postmodern age.
II. The Violence of Heideggerian Ontology
Levinas’s incisive critique of Heideggerian ontology is a byproduct of his radical
critique of the entire Western tradition. For Levinas, most of the Western tradition is
ontological in nature: “Western philosophy has most often been an ontology.” When
Levinas identifies the majority of the Western tradition as ontological in nature, he has in
mind a particular notion of what defines ontology as such. Conventionally, of course,
ontology is the philosophical attempt to comprehend the nature of Being. For Levinas,
however, ontology is a “reduction of the other to the same by the interposition of a middle
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and neutral term that ensures the comprehension of Being.”5 In this light, ontological
comprehension, by virtue of its insertion of a “middle and neutral” term such as reason,
spirit, and history, is inherently totalizing in that it effectively eliminates the alterity, or
otherness, of the comprehended being. The use of a neutral term – an arche – as a means of
eliminating alterity is thus not merely a peripheral aspect of ontological thought but is rather
its defining feature. In Levinas’s view, most of the Western tradition is characterized by this
totalizing tendency.
The telos that drives the ontological nullification of otherness is the promotion of the
autonomy of the self. As Levinas writes, “Ontology, which reduces the Other (sic) to the
same, promotes freedom – the freedom that is the identification of the same, not allowing
itself to be alienated by the other.”6 Insofar as ontology effectively annihilates alterity, it
also enables the knowing being to maintain its identity as an autonomous self. To a self that
can readily comprehend every single being that it encounters, there is nothing to fear from
the unknown. In such a milieu, the self is free to pursue its own egoistic imperatives,
unhindered either by the encounter with otherness (autre) generally or with other people –
what Levinas calls “the Other” (autrui) – more concretely.7
What is the Other? Much as the question of Being occupies a position of central
position in Heideggerian ontology, what might be called the question of the Other represents
5
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the core concern of Levinasian ethics. In the Levinasian ethical schema, the Other refers to
other people, and the human relationship with the Other is the medium through which human
beings experience reality. Hence, whereas Heidegger finds that the human relationship to
things is the predominant means by which man encounters Being, Levinas contends that the
human relationship with other humans is the medium through which humans confront the
Other.
The face of the Other expresses infinitude. For Levinas, this fact renders the human
attempt to comprehend the Other decidedly futile. This futility marks the Other as the source
of transcendence, a transcendence that elevates it beyond the purview of ontological thought.
“If ontology – the comprehension of Being – is impossible, it is not because every definition
of Being already presupposes the knowledge of Being, as Pascal had said, it is because the
comprehension of Being cannot dominate the relationship with the Other.”8
Even if they cannot completely totalize the Other, Western ontologists make the
attempt to do so nonetheless. The approach of the Other has a vaguely disquieting effect on
the ego. As Levinas puts it, the approach of the “stranger” (l’étranger) disturbs the being-athome with oneself (le chez-soi)” because the stranger is the “free one” who “escapes my
grasp by an essential dimension, even if I have him at my disposal.”9 Viewed from this
angle, ontology is the means by which the ego’s encounter with transcendence is rendered
less jarring.
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Inasmuch as most of Western philosophy is ontological, most of the thinkers that
comprise the Western tradition are not engaged in an exploration of reality as much as an
appropriation of it. Insofar as Western ontologists remain mired in a dialogue centered
around the notion of the autonomous self, the proper metaphor for their speculative
endeavors is that of a homecoming journey. “For the transcendence of thought remains
closed in itself despite all its adventures – which in the last analysis are purely imaginary, or
are adventures traversed by Ulysses: on the way home.”10 To be sure, past philosophical
sojourners have encountered many unfamiliar and exotic sights over the course of their
ontological Odyssey. However, much like their Odyssean prototype, these wayfarers
encounter alterity in the context of a metaphorical journey homeward, alternately
assimilating or removing the obtrusive Other which stands in the way of their quest to return
to Ithaca. Such is the history of Western ontology from Parmenides to Heidegger.
If Western ontology represents a lengthy Odyssean journey homeward, then
Heidegger represents the ontological tradition’s latest sojourner. Like every other Western
ontologist, Heidegger’s encounter with difference is buffered by a particular intermediary
term: Being. In affirming the priority of Being, Heidegger effectively decrees that all
existent entities must present themselves through the lens of this all-important arche. As
Levinas writes, “To affirm the priority of Being over the existent is to already decide the
essence of philosophy; it is to subordinate the relation with someone, who is an existent, (the
ethical relation) to a relation with the Being of the existent, which permits the apprehension,
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the domination of the existent (a relationship of knowing), subordinates justice to freedom.”11
Hence, the only difference between Heidegger’s thought and earlier thinkers such as
Parmenides, Plato, Aristotle, Descartes, Hegel, and Husserl is that he uses a different arche
to annihilate otherness.
Much like previous Western ontology, Heidegger’s philosophy is characterized by an
inordinate emphasis on comprehension. This is especially the case with Being and Time.
For Levinas, Being and Time is permeated by subjectivity insofar as comprehension is the
fundamental mode of Da–sein’s existence. As Levinas writes, “Being and Time has argued
perhaps but one sole thesis: Being is inseparable from the comprehension of Being (which
unfolds as time); Being is already an appeal to subjectivity.”12 Hence, because Heidegger’s
analysis of Da–sein emphasizes comprehension to such an extent, it is permeated by
subjectivity.
Subjectivism, of course, represents much more than an innocent attempt to
understand reality. For Levinas, subjectivism is inherently exploitative: “‘I think’ comes
down to ‘I can’ – to an appropriation of what is, to an exploitation of reality.”13 Much as the
later Heidegger criticized his own first great work for failing to break out of the Cartesian
subject/object dichotomy, Levinas criticizes Heideggerian subjectivity on the grounds that
the very desire to comprehend reality is indicative of a complementary desire to control it.
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To be sure, Heidegger’s brand of subjectivism is not necessarily synonymous with the
subjectivism propounded by other modern thinkers. Levinas concedes that Heidegger is no
mere proponent of what might be called “free will” philosophy in that, in the Heideggerian
ontological schema, freedom possesses man rather than vice versa: “To be sure, the freedom
involved in the essence of truth is not for Heidegger a principle of free will.”14 Nonetheless,
for Levinas what is decisive is the fact that Heidegger’s philosophy posits a nexus between
Being and freedom per se. This nexus establishes the space in which Da–sein can act, a
space that is “cleared” by the prior reduction of alterity to sameness: “But the dialectic
which thus reconciles freedom and obedience in the concept of truth presupposes the primacy
of the same, which marks the direction of and defines the whole of Western philosophy.”15
In other words, the placing of what is different into pre-formulated ontological categories is
the sine qua non for Da–sein’s autonomous activity in obedience to Being.
Indeed, Heidegger’s thought promotes selfish autonomy to a perhaps greater extent
than previous Western ontologists because his emphasis on Being enables the self to remain
essentially unaffected by its confrontation with alterity. As an inherently impersonal
concept, Being confers on Da–sein an unlimited power to comprehend and control its
surroundings: “If freedom denotes the mode of remaining the same in the midst of the other,
knowledge, where the existent is given by interposition of impersonal Being, contains the
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ultimate sense of freedom.” Or, as Levinas puts it elsewhere, “He (Heidegger) puts over man
a neuter which illuminates freedom without putting it in question.”16
Because it promotes freedom in such a radical manner, Heideggerian ontology is
inherently inimical to ethics. Ethics is characterized by the calling into question of egoistic
spontaneity. As we have seen, Heideggerian ontology does not allow for such a calling into
question. Because of this, Heideggerian ontology is inimical to justice: “It would be
opposed to justice, which involves obligations with regard to an existent that refuses to give
itself, the Other, who in this sense would be the existent par excellence.”17
If one re-considers Being and Time with this Levinasian insight firmly in mind, the
promotion of autonomy operates on a multiplicity of levels. It is almost banal to note that the
Heideggerian notion of care (Sorge) is essentially individualistic in thrust in that Da–sein
cares for its “ownmost” existence, not for the well-being of others. Nor does Heidegger’s
concept of Being-with (Mitsein) negate the subjectivity that permeates fundamental
ontology. With its inherent emphasis on the mineness (Jemeinigkeit) of Da–sein,
Heideggerian ontology fails to posit a positive phenomenology of human sociability. To a
Da–sein that, in its being is concerned about its own being, the Other stands as an obtrusive
impediment that potentially hinders its own self-flourishing.
What is considerably less obvious, however, is that care for self presupposes a prior
degree of individual comfort and contentment to which Heidegger’s thought is entirely
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oblivious. Heidegger’s description of Da–sein’s essentially utilitarian relationship with
ready-to-hand entities fails to account for the enjoyable nature of its existence. Before it
manipulates them, in Levinas’s view, the self experiences “things” as objects to be enjoyed.
The Heideggerian conception of care is thus blind to the experience of existential enjoyment
that underlies Da–sein’s Being-in-the-world. As Levinas quips, “Da–sein is never hungry.
Food can be interpreted as an implement only in a world of exploitation.”18 This crucial
philosophical oversight serves to further obscure Da–sein’s Being-with-the-Other. Insofar as
the enjoyable nature of Da–sein’s existence is hidden from view, the question of how such
enjoyment usurps the place of the Other is also obscured.
We have seen how, for Levinas, Heidegger’s early thought annihilates otherness and
promotes the freedom of the self. But what of Heidegger’s later thought? In his postwar
work, Heidegger develops a critique of metaphysical subjectivity that looks to the preSocratic thinkers such as Parmenides and Heraclitus to point the way to a non-subjective
relationship to reality. For Levinas, however, Heidegger’s turn to the pre-Socratics is as
permeated by the spirit of egoism as his earlier foray into Husserlian phenomenology: “The
‘egoism’ of ontology is maintained even when, denouncing Socratic philosophy as already
forgetful of Being and already on the way to the notion of the ‘subject’ and technological
power, Heidegger finds in Presocratism thought as obedience to the truth of Being.”19
Why is Heidegger’s later thought conducive to egoism, for Levinas? In Levinas’s
view, what is decisive is that Heidegger calls for man to exist in a state of “obedience” to the
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truth of Being. In the Heideggerian schema, man obeys the truth of Being by building things
that enable the fourfold (Geviert) to attain ontological presence. As Levinas puts it, “This
obedience would be accomplished in existing as builder and cultivator, effecting the unity of
the site which sustains space.”20 Hence, ontological obedience necessitates that man embrace
a constructionist stance towards the earth. For Levinas, man’s attempt to assert himself as
“builder and cultivator” recreates the egoism that characterizes Cartesian philosophy in a
new guise.
Because it is egoistic, the Heideggerian imperative to build in the fourfold is ethically
problematic. More specifically, the Heideggerian imperative to build and cultivate supplants
the ethical imperative to tend to the needs of the Other. As Levinas puts it, “In bringing
together under the firmament of the heavens, the waiting for the gods and the company of
mortals in the presence of the things – which is to build and cultivate – Heidegger, with the
whole of Western history, conceives of the relation with Other as enacted in the destiny of
sedentary peoples, the possessors and builders of the earth.”21 Hence, the dweller’s
relationship with the earth takes precedence over his relationship to the Other. Because he
acts in obedience to Being, the Heideggerian dweller is free to totalize the Other without a
second thought.
Viewed from this perspective, Heidegger’s later thought is no less prone to
possessive mastery than modern metaphysics. Paradoxically, Heidegger’s attempt to
disengage his thought from the stance of possessive mastery characteristic of modern
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subjectivity seemingly leads him to counsel a course of action that opens up the possibility of
mastery of a different sort: “Possession is preeminently the form in which the Other
becomes the same, by becoming mine. In denouncing the sovereignty of the technological
powers of man Heidegger exalts the pre-technological powers of possession.”22
The possessive tendencies that characterize Heidegger’s later thought are
complemented by a corresponding tendency towards objectification. Although Heidegger’s
later thought is not objectifying in the same sense that earlier ontological schemas are, the
fact that it is objectifying is evident: “His analyses do not start with the thing-object, to be
sure, but they bear the mark of the great landscapes to which the things refer. Ontology
becomes ontology of nature, impersonal fecundity, faceless generous mother, matrix of
particular beings, inexhaustible matter for things.”23
Whatever its other departures from his earlier thinking, then, Heidegger’s later
philosophy merely repeats the egoistic, possessive, and objectifying tendencies that
characterized fundamental ontology from the start, albeit in a new guise. Whether it is
Da–sein’s freedom to achieve its authenticity or a mortal’s freedom to build, dwell, and think
in the fourfold, the key point is that Heideggerian ontology enables the self to possess and
objectify the Other in order to achieve freedom. In this sense, Heideggerian ontology
continues a long-standing tradition that dates back to Parmenides, the father of Western
ontology to whom Heidegger justly pays tribute.
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A philosophy that exhibits what Levinas calls a “non-allergic” relationship to alterity
is compelled to take into account the infinite and transcendent nature of human existence. A
heteronomous (other-directed) philosophical schema must be “humanistic” in the sense that
it is predicated on a prior conception of an irreducible human essence. However, humanism
has been undermined by the ontological attempt to discern the “being of beings,” an attempt
that insufficiently distinguishes between the “isness” of human being and the source of its
value: “The beyond and the completely other than being of valuing is, as a result, understood
as modalities of being, as adverbs relating to the verb to be – as if ontology, the
understanding of the being of beings, exhausted all the problems.”24 The fact that the crisis
of humanism is ontological in nature points to why Heidegger, the century’s preeminent
ontologist, is also one of humanism’s most trenchant critics. Acutely aware of Heidegger’s
eminence in this regard, Levinas levels a penetrating critique of Heideggerian anti-humanism
even as he attempts to re-ground humanism on a restored and improved foundation.
III. Heidegger and Anti-Humanism
Heidegger’s towering presence on the Continental philosophical scene decisively
confirms the crisis of humanism that marks twentieth-century thought.25 Arriving in the
wake of previous theoretical and methodological critiques of humanism, Levinas writes,
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“Heidegger, the most contemporary philosopher – a philosopher formed by phenomenology
itself which is so important for the notion of value – confirms this calling into question.”26
Heidegger does not merely confirm the questionability of humanism, Levinas recognizes, he
also delivers its coup de grâce: “The end of metaphysics, the end of humanism – this is the
thesis of Heidegger.”27 In order to get proper perspective on Heidegger’s critique of
humanism, it is necessary to briefly consider the argument that he presents in his “Letter on
Humanism.” In that essay, Heidegger levels a critique of humanism in the following
passage:
Every humanism is either grounded in metaphysics or is made to be the ground of
one. Every determination of the essence of man that already presupposes an
interpretation of beings without asking about the truth of Being, whether knowingly
or not, is metaphysical. The result is that what is peculiar to all metaphysics,
specifically with respect to the way the essence of man is determined, is that it is
“humanistic.” Accordingly, every humanism remains metaphysical. In defining the
humanity of man humanism not only does not ask about the relation of Being to the
essence of man, because of its metaphysical origin humanism even impedes the
question by neither recognizing nor understanding it.28
On this account, past humanisms have been tethered to a metaphysical world-view. That is
to say, past humanisms presuppose a given interpretation of the being of Beings. By
focusing on the question of the humanitas of homo humanitas, past humanisms have
neglected to consider the question of the relation of Being to the essence of man. Indeed, in
Heidegger’s view, past humanistic schemas actively hinder the very attempt to ponder such a
question. Hence, previous attempts to posit the human as the arche for all actions focus on
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beings at the expense of Being. Moreover, prior humanistic attempts to posit the human as
the preeminent, if not supreme, value in an ontological hierarchy ignore the centrality of
Being, and contribute to the anthropocentric delusions that drive modernity.
Insofar as previous humanisms have been metaphysical in nature, the metaphysical
attempt to establish the humanitas of homo humanus has also contributed to the modern
plight of homelessness that accompanies the “abandonment of Being by beings.”29 From a
Heideggerian perspective, ending man’s alienation entails jettisoning the notion that man is
the guiding principle of his own actions, a notion that elevates man over Being.
Additionally, it necessitates discarding the corresponding illusion that man possesses an
intrinsic source of value that renders him superior to the rest of reality. All in all, the notion
of an “interior” man who is “as a subject identical with himself, certain of himself in the
cogito, capable of closing in on himself” and “who in his psychological life experiences
values in himself and who in his cultural life extends a meaning to nature” must be
relinquished.30 Only by eschewing these metaphysical presuppositions will man be enabled
to return home to the “house of Being” of language, a homecoming facilitated not through
rational discourse but through the poetic musings of Georg Trakl, Rainer Maria Rilke, and
especially Friedrich Hölderlin.
Levinas undermines Heidegger’s critique of metaphysical humanism by taking issue
with Heidegger’s diagnosis of modern homelessness. Against Heidegger’s contention that
homelessness results from the metaphysical inquiry into the Being of beings, Levinas argues
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that homelessness is endemic to human existence. As a universal aspect of the human
condition, homelessness pre-dates Greek antiquity: “The notion of a man exterior to being
and exiled on earth is older than Greek metaphysics, and has certainly already directed the
development and orientation of this metaphysics towards the idea of a man foreign to the
earth.”31 Rather than being a derivative mood that refers back to an original state of
ontological wholeness, then, homelessness is man’s primordial condition.
By contending that modern alienation is essentially unrelated to the influence of
metaphysics, Levinas effectively makes space for the resuscitation of humanism. Insofar as
it is mistaken to blame modern homelessness on Western metaphysics, it is equally
misguided to attribute it to the influence of past humanisms. But Levinas does not reject the
Heideggerian critique tout court; he concedes the partial truth of Heidegger’s diagnosis.
Levinas agrees with Heidegger that modern man is homeless. But so was Greek and
medieval Christian man, for that matter. By historicizing the phenomenon of homelessness,
Heidegger fails to recognize its universality: “There always being a distance from the I and
the self, the recurrence of the I to the self is impossible.”32 As it turns out, Heidegger’s
failure to recognize this truism is symptomatic of his inability to recognize the ultimate
source of man’s homelessness.
For Levinas, the Other is the reason why man is homeless. In sum, the ego is
oppressed by its inability to completely separate itself from the Other. This inability is
especially disturbing because it signifies a corresponding incapacity to evade its infinite
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responsibility for the well-being of the Other. Indeed, the self is a veritable “hostage” to the
Other: “stranger to himself, obsessed by others, uneasy, the self is a hostage, a hostage in his
very recurrence to himself, never ceasing to measure up to himself, but always in this way
ever closer to others, ever more indebted, aggravating his own self-bankruptcy.”33 Beingwith-the-Other, rather than Being itself, is the reason for the ego’s inability to consolidate its
identity.
To get proper perspective on how the connection between the self and the Other is the
ultimate source of man’s homelessness, one is compelled to consider a tradition that
Heidegger had contemptuously shoved aside in the process of focusing on the philosophic
speculations and poetic musings of the ancient Greeks: the Judaic theological tradition.
Heidegger’s emphasis on Athens at the expense of Jerusalem not only overlooks a key source
of the Western tradition, but also prevents him from considering Hellenic philosophy in light
of its most significant alternative. As Levinas writes, “Have not the Sacred Scriptures read
and commented on in the East given a new slant to the Greek writings?”34 The answer, of
course, is yes. Taking as his point of departure the recognition that Western civilization is as
indebted to the ancient Hebrews as to the ancient Greeks, Levinas is able to consider the
problem of modern homelessness from an augmented perspective.
Levinas points to several Biblical passages as evidence that the ancient Hebrews
pondered the question of exile prior to its subsequent philosophical and mythopoetic
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investigation by the ancient Greeks. More specifically, Levinas quotes Psalm 119: “I am a
stranger on earth, do not conceal your commandments from me.” In Levinas’s view, this
psalm alludes to Chapter 25, verse 13, of the Book of Leviticus in which Yahweh declares
that “No land shall be irrevocably alienated, for the earth is mine, for you are but strangers
dwelling in my abode.”35 Besides providing empirical evidence that sustained reflection on
man’s utter strangeness in the world did not originate in Hellenic antiquity, Judaic scripture
also provides – from Levinas’s perspective – a more compelling and convincing account of
its real source.
Whereas Platonic metaphysics had attributed man’s ontological incompleteness to the
body/soul dualism, the Book of Psalms locates it in the unsatisfiable ethical obligations that
arise from our common status as “strangers” in the world. As Levinas writes: “For in Psalm
119, in the context of this difference which is proclaimed between the self and the world, are
to be found the commandments, those which impose an obligation towards other people.”36
Rather than being a manifestation of its longing to return to a place where it can exist in a
state of holistic oneness, then, the self’s jarring feeling of worldly displacement arises from
the responsibilities that it must shoulder for the well-being of the Other.
As a universal experience, the feeling of not-Being-at-home is one that is shared by
all human beings in all times and places. As such, it also provides the impetus for human
fraternity. Even as it confirms our status as strangers in a strange land, the communal
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experience of homelessness unites worldly sojourners in a common enterprise. Indeed,
Levinas regards this truism as perhaps the Bible’s “principal message”:
An Echo of the Bible’s permanent message and perhaps its principle message, this
condition – or uncondition of – stranger and “slave in the land of Egypt” draws man
together with his neighbor. Men seek themselves out in the uncondition of strangers.
This latter unites humanity. The difference which accounts for this strangeness in the
world is fundamentally a nonindifference in regard to men – in regard to value.37
Characteristically, Levinas appeals to Biblical support to buttress his case. Much as
the Book of Psalms alludes to man’s nomadic condition, the Book of Genesis points to the
intersubjectivity that accompanies the communal experience of nomadism. As Levinas
approvingly notes, it was Yahweh, rather than Noah, that closed the door on humanity when
it was condemned to die in the flood: “It is ‘the Eternal which closed the door of the Arc on
Noah,’ a text of Genesis tells us with wonderful precision.”38 Noah’s utter inability to close
the door behind him in the face of human suffering is, for Levinas, exquisitely symbolic of
the ego’s incapacity to remain wholly aloof to the fate of the Other. Rather than signifying a
mere failure of nerve, this incapacity plays a constructive role in facilitating the oscillation
from solitary egoism to communal altruism.
At the same time, however, man’s inability to remain detached from his fellows
serves as an implicit confirmation of his interior dimension. The fact that the ego can have
its sense of Being-at-home disturbed by the Other signifies its separateness from the Other:
“Having no rest in one’s self, without any bias in the world, this strangeness to every place,
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this Being-on-the-other-side of being – this is certainly an interiority in its own way.”39 The
ego’s responsibility for the Other grounds human subjectivity and confirms man as the arche
of his own actions. Moreover, this responsibility constitutes the ultimate source of man’s
supreme value on the ontological value-hierarchy. Viewed alongside all other beings, man
stands alone in bearing responsibility for the remainder of humanity.
Viewed from the perspective of Levinas’s “Biblical humanism,” Heidegger’s
conflation of humanism with post-Platonic metaphysics is revealed to be a product of his
Hellenic provincialism. Nonetheless, one should not categorically dismiss Heidegger’s
critique of humanism. For Levinas, Heideggerian anti-humanism is correct in alluding to the
impoverished nature of past humanisms. The being of human being does not lie in the realm
of existent entities, nor in a conception of man as the truth-establishing subject. As Levinas
writes, “Modern antihumanism is no doubt right when in man conceived as an individual in a
genus or a being situated in an ontological region, persevering in being like all other
substances, it does not discover a privilege which would make of him the aimed at end of
reality or when it calls into question man as a being belonging to no genus, to no ontological
region but only to his interiority.”40 All in all, Levinas agrees with Heidegger that traditional
humanism has failed to posit a source of human value that is commensurate with man’s
dignity.
One should reject, however, Heidegger’s prioritization of Being over man that
underlies his anti-humanistic critique. Coming in the wake of modern philosophy – and its

39

Levinas, “The Contemporary Criticism of the Idea of Value,” 186.

40

Levinas, “The Contemporary Criticism of the Idea of Value,” 186.
173

selfish and egoistic focus on the autonomous self – such a conception has a certain
undeniable appeal, as the large number of contemporary Heideggerians eloquently attests.
However, it fails to recognize man’s status as an ethically responsible being and, by
extension, the irreducible source of his value.
As we have seen, this failure is a by-product of Heidegger’s exclusive focus on the
Greek component of the Athens-Jerusalem axis. Heidegger’s inability to find “in man, lost
in history and the order of things the trace of this responsibility which makes a subjectivity,
and, in the other person, the trace of this value” represents a symptom of his failure to
consider, and take seriously, the Hebraic theological tradition.41 As it turns out, this
oversight is hardly incidental. Part of the reason why Heidegger was drawn to the ancient
Greeks was that their thought proved to be more hospitable to the pagan religiosity that
looms in the background of much of his philosophy. By way of confronting Heidegger’s
anti-humanistic philosophy with Biblical humanism, Levinas is thus compelled to confront
Judaism’s age-old nemesis.
IV. Heidegger and the Pagan Temptation
In his essay entitled “Heidegger, Gagarin, and Us,” Levinas links Heidegger’s
paganism with his influential critique of modern industrial technology. As modern
technology’s most articulate and influential critic, Heidegger sounds a passionate cry of
protest against the technological standardization that afflicts the modern age. As with his
critique of humanism, Heidegger’s achievement in this regard is not to be completely
dismissed. Regardless of whether one welcomes or loathes the growth of technology, it must
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be conceded that its development poses certain undeniable dangers. Hence, whatever its
other shortcomings, there is “some truth” to the Heideggerian critique in that it alerts us to
the dangers posed by the advent of the technological age. As Levinas recognizes, “There is
some truth in this declamation. Technical things are dangerous. They not only threaten a
person’s identity, they risk blowing up the planet.”42 If only because it points to these two
dangers, thoughtful persons are compelled to give this critique its due.
Be that as it may, one is also obligated to remain cognizant of the poisoned sources of
the Heideggerian critique. One such source is, of course, reactionary conservatism: “But the
enemies of industrial society are in most cases reactionary. They forget or detest the great
hopes of our age.”43 Like a myriad of other thinkers, Heidegger paints a sentimental and
idyllic picture of the pre-modern past in order to dwell on the dark side of modernity.
The other source represents perhaps the greater danger: paganism: “I am thinking of
one prestigious current in modern thought, which emerged from Germany to flood the pagan
resources of our Western souls. I am thinking of Heidegger and the Heideggerians.”44 The
pagan aspect of Heidegger’s philosophy not only separates it from that of other reactionaries
– the vast majority of whom profess a vestigial faith in Christianity – but also renders it
uniquely seductive.
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On Levinas’s account, the pagan cast of Heidegger’s thought derives from its
persistent emphasis on the world (Welt): “One would like man to rediscover the world.”45
Heidegger’s conception of the world was prone to a certain flux. In Being and Time, the
world consisted of equipmental items-of-gear, while in the “Origin of the Work of Art” the
world is the sparring partner of the earth in works of art. In his later work, the world
consisted of the fourfold (Geviert) of earth, sky, divinities, and mortals. For Levinas, what is
significant about Heidegger’s persistent focus on the world is that it contains a corresponding
attempt to “rediscover” the ineffable mystery it contains.
The Heideggerian project of worldly rediscovery entails calling attention to the
experiences of mystical transcendence that occasion our everyday use of things and our
inhabitation of the natural environment. As Levinas writes, to rediscover the world “means
to follow a path that winds its way through fields, to feel the unity created by the bridge, the
bridge that links the two river banks and by the architecture of buildings, the presence of a
tree, the chiaroscuro, of the forests, the mystery of things, of a jug, of worn-out shoes of a
peasant girl, the gleam from a carafe of wine sitting on a white tablecloth.”46 In the
Heideggerian world of whatever configuration, natural and man-made things possess a
sacred aspect that is often obscured by the hustle-and-bustle cadence of modern life.
Concomitant with the rediscovery of the holy aspect of things is a corresponding
emphasis on the centrality of place. Indeed, things are sacred because they are gathering
places in which transcendence and immanence merge in harmonious oneness. Insofar as
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places in general admit the fourfold, they are to be treasured accordingly. Man’s natural
habitat is one such place that merits special consideration in that it contains an impenetrable
mystery that demands respect, if not awe. “To rediscover the world,” as Levinas writes, “is
to attempt to recover a childhood mystery snuggled up inside the place, to open up to the
light of great landscapes, the fascination with nature and the delight of camping in the
mountains.”47
What is wrong with Heidegger’s pagan call for worldly rediscovery? The problem
that afflicts Heidegger’s brand of pagan religiosity is the same problem that afflicts all past,
present, and future varieties of paganism: cruelty: “The mystery of things is the source of all
cruelty towards men.”48 In its very radicalness, this point bears repeating: paganism is not
merely cruel but represents the ultimate “source” of “all cruelty.” How can this be so? How
can a religion that has been, for most of Western history, displaced by the world’s great
monotheistic faiths represent a perpetual source of human wickedness? The answer, as it
turns out, relates to the manner in which paganism complements a nationalistic political
impulse.
On Levinas’s account, nationalism is the inevitable consequence of paganism’s
overwhelming stress on the ontological significance of place.49 As we have seen, paganism
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for Levinas represents a “putting down (of) roots, almost in the etymological sense of the
term.”50 In turn, the pagan stress on “enrootedness” engenders nationalism because it
effectually constructs an ontological dichotomy between natives and strangers. As Levinas
writes, “One’s implementation in a landscape, one’s attachment to place, without which the
universe would become insignificant and would hardly exist, is the very splitting of humanity
into natives and strangers. And in this light technology is less dangerous than the spirits
(génies) of the place.”51 Hence, the pagan sanctification of place draws an implicit
distinction between the privileged insider who occupies the sacred hearth and the despised
outsider who dwells outside of its purview.
What renders this distinction uniquely “cruel” is its pure arbitrariness. The baseless
distinction between those rooted in the place and those who are placeless stigmatizes the
latter on the basis of a wholly conventional distinction. Despite its sheer artificiality,
however, the native/foreigner dichotomy encouraged by paganism represents the toxic source
from which the very real pathologies of nationalism, chauvinism, and xenophobia originate.
As Levinas writes, paganism is “a nationalism in terms of its cruelty and pitilessness – that is
to say, in its immediate, naive, and unconscious sense.”52
Even if it does not engender rabid nationalism, however, man’s attempt to put down
roots is ethically pernicious in that it radicalizes the ego’s separation from the Other. Before
it can develop a sentimental attachment to the site in which it is placed, the ego must
50
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necessarily separate itself from the Other. In the fact that paganism implicitly demands that
the ego sever its ties with the Other, it also demands that the ego cut itself off from
transcendence and from the “exteriority” that comes from its erotic desire to connect with
otherness. In this light, paganism evinces not only the ego’s separation from other people
but also from the realm of transcendence: “The separated being must run the risk of the
paganism which evinces this separation and in which this separation is accomplished.”53
In light of the cruelty that looms in the background of paganism’s call for roots –
eventuating as it does in inflammatory nationalism – the spread of planetary technology is
revealed to be a salutary, if not downright progressive, development. For Levinas, modern
technology uproots human beings from the earth. In this sense, Levinas agrees with
Heidegger. However, whereas Heidegger laments the uprooting effect of modern
technology, Levinas celebrates it for the same reason. Insofar as “technology wrenches us
out of the Heideggerian world and the superstitions regarding place,” Levinas recognizes, it
likewise wrenches out of the native/foreigner dichotomy encouraged by the pagan emphasis
on place. As Levinas puts it, “Technology does away with the privilege of enrootedness and
the related sense of exile.54
By destroying the very distinction between native and foreigner, technology makes
possible a novel global order free from the superfluous distinctions that have historically
plagued relations among men. Hence, the possibility of a new intimacy, one based on naked
human fraternity: “From this point on, an opportunity appears to us: to perceive men outside
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the situation in which they are placed, and let the human face shine in all its nudity.”55 In
rendering an undiluted face-to-face encounter with the Other possible, technology should be
properly regarded as the positive phenomenon that it generally is.
For Levinas, the “achievement” of the Russian astronaut Gagarin is emblematic of
modern technology’s liberating potential. Through the wonder of aeronautic technology,
Gagarin was freed from the “superstition of place.” Levinas’s ecstatic description of
Gagarin’s feat is worth quoting in full: “But what perhaps counts most of all is that he left
the place. For one hour, man existed beyond any horizon – everything around him was sky
or, more exactly, everything around him was geometrical space. A man existed in the
horizon of homogenous space.”56 The great hope of our age, for Levinas, is that all human
beings will be enabled to enjoy the utter sense of placelessness that Gagarin briefly
experienced. For in existing outside of any geographical boundary, Gagarin was neither
native nor foreigner, neither insider nor outsider, neither inhabitant nor exile. Extended to
the rest of humanity through technological advancement, such a placeless condition promises
liberation from the arbitrary divisions that continually obstruct person-to-person relations.
In its displacing effect, modern technology completes the work of Judaism, which is
likewise characterized by a nomadic ethos: “Judaism has always been free with regard to
place.” In light of the cruelty entailed by the putting down of roots, this represents one of
Judaism’s noblest features, in Levinas’s view. Much in contrast to the mythological earthworship that is standard fare for pagan thinkers of the Heideggerian stripe, the Bible
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downplays the aesthetic beauty of nature and instead emphasizes its utility for satisfying
human needs: “the Book of Books is sober in its descriptions of nature! ‘A land flowing with
milk and honey’ – the landscape is described in terms of food.” Moreover, Judaism
subordinates place to the ethical imperatives of justice, a prioritization inherent in the
concept of the promised land itself: “The Bible knows only a Holy Land, a fabulous land
that spews forth the unjust, a land in which one does not put down roots without certain
conditions.”57
Levinas points to a particular episode in the Torah to buttress his point. As recounted
in the Biblical Book of Genesis, Abraham plants a tamarisk at Beersheba. Seemingly, the
beauty of the tamarisk provides a refreshing aesthetic contrast to the desolation of the desert.
As Levinas puts it, the tamarisk is “one of the rare ‘individual’ trees planted in the Bible,
which appears in all its freshness and colour to charm the imagination in the midst of so
much peregrination, across so much desert.” However, in the Talmudic imagination, the
significance of the tamarisk is purely utilitarian: “Tamarisk is an acronym; the three letters
needed to write the word in Hebrew are the initials used for Food, Drink, and Shelter, three
things necessary to man which man offers to man.” Hence, the tamarisk is a source of
“Food, Drink, and Shelter,” nothing more. On Levinas’s account, the ultimate significance
of this Biblical episode is that “The earth is for man. Man is his own master, in order to
serve man. Let us remain masters of the mystery that the earth breathes.”58
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Of course, the Bible is not only indifferent to the worldly idols extolled by the pagan
imagination; it is actively hostile to them. In Levinas’s view, the Jewish religion is
distinguished by its unremitting hostility to any and all forms of paganism. As Levinas puts
it, “The sacred filtering into the world – Judaism is perhaps no more than the negation of all
that.” How does Judaism “negate” the irruption of the sacred into the world? For Levinas,
Judaism demystifies the cosmos by destroying the earthly “idols” that signify worldly
enchantment: “Judaism has not sublimated idols, it has demanded that they be destroyed.”59
Indeed, it is this unrelenting hostility to all manifestations of Baalism that most
renders Judaism most “distant from Christianity,” on Levinas’s account. Christianity,
especially in its Catholic manifestation, sublimates the pagan worship of idols into a
monotheistic framework: “Through sublimation, Christianity continues to give piety roots,
nurturing itself on landscapes and memories culled from family, tribe and nation. This is
why it conquered humanity.” Judaism, however, refused to make compromises with
paganism. Because of its “abstract universalism,” Judaism has consistently combated the
“imaginations and passions” unleashed by paganism. However, because of its
uncompromising vision, Judaism has effectively “demystified the universe” and “nature from
a spell.” More importantly, it has enabled man to be discovered “in the nudity of his face.”60
Inasmuch as modern technology carries on the Judaic task of worldly disenchantment, it, too,
enables man to be discovered in the nakedness of his true condition. For this reason, its
spread should be welcomed, not lamented.
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V. Conclusion
The Dutch philosopher Theo de Boer describes the difference between Heidegger and
Levinas as follows:
In Levinas the central point of his thought is not truth or unconcealment of Being, but
rather the reality of persecuted people in the daily history of the world. Levinas does
not blame traditional metaphysics for having forgotten the truth of Being, but he
holds against it that it has forgotten the dignity of men. In its insensitivity to justice
and injustice, and its indifference to good and evil. The jurisdiction of history is a
form of terror. The victims of history make their judgement on history. To listen to
their voice is more in line with the dignity of philosophy than to lend an ear to the
anonymous event that is called the truth of Being.61
As this chapter has noted, Levinas’s emphasis on “the reality of persecuted people in the
daily history of the world” informs his critique of Heidegger. Levinas’s critique of
Heideggerian ontology identifies how the ontological, anti-humanistic, and pagan cast of the
latter’s thought is inherently totalizing. This can be viewed as the first of Levinas’s two
principal objections to fundamental ontology. The second major objection, which I have
ignored until now, relates to its political consequences. In sum, fundamental ontology
necessarily leads to tyranny: “Even though it opposes the technological passion issued forth
from the forgetting of Being hidden by the existent, Heideggerian ontology, which
subordinates the relationship with the Other to the relationship with Being in general,
remains under obedience to the anonymous and leads inevitably to another power, to
imperialist domination, to tyranny.”62
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Viewed from the perspective of Levinas’ critique of the Occidental ontological
tradition, such a conclusion is to be expected. For Levinas, Heideggerian Being represents
merely the latest arche utilized by Western ontologists to eliminate the alterity of the Other
and promote the freedom of the self. As the political manifestation of the totalization of the
Other that ontology perpetrates in the realm of thought, tyranny represents the diluted
essence of ontological politics. Much as ontological thought facilitates the domination of the
other person by the autonomous ego, so too does it enable the state to totalize its “Other”– its
subjects – in a comparatively comprehensive manner: “For the philosophical tradition the
conflicts between the same and the other are resolved by theory whereby the other is reduced
to the same – or, concretely, by the community of the state where by anonymous power,
though it be intelligible, the I rediscovers war in the tyrannic oppression it undergoes from
the totality.”63 In this light, the tyrannical rule of the modern state extends into the political
realm the violent, thematizing tendencies that characterize ontology generally.
Nor is this conclusion shocking in light of the anti-humanistic cast of Heidegger’s
thought. In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, anti-humanistic thinkers often posited
grandiose schemes designed to put an end to the alienation supposedly engendered by
subjective humanism. Much like earlier theoretical anti-humanists such as Marx and
Nietzsche, Heidegger accuses past humanisms of contributing to modern estrangement by
overlooking a pivotal aspect of the human condition.64 A key difference between Heidegger
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and his anti-humanistic forebears lies in the fact that, for him, it is metaphysical inquiry into
the Being of beings that engenders modern alienation rather than philosophical idealism or
slave-morality. Nonetheless, the comparison remains instructive: like Marx, Heidegger
anticipates a future historical epoch in which man will finally recover his original ontological
unity free from the obfuscating effect of past philosophical distortions. And like Marx and
Nietzsche, Heidegger provides an ample supply of metaphysical pathos that unwittingly
complements the violent political objectives of totalitarian political movements. In this
sense, Heidegger’s rectorship merely repeats the Marxist tragedy as farce.
And in a cruelly ironic twist, the disastrous failure of these eschatological projects
has left contemporary man more homeless than ever: “Today’s anxiety is more profound. It
comes from the experience of revolutions that sink into bureaucracy and repression, and
totalitarian violences that pass as revolutions. For in them the disalienation itself is
alienated.”65 For Levinas, the fact that Heidegger’s anti-humanistic philosophy briefly
crossed paths with the century’s most barbaric anti-humanistic political movement points
towards the tyrannical impulse that unites both.
Heidegger’s paganism, with its inherent capacity to engender nationalistic,
xenophobic, and chauvinistic political tendencies, renders this danger even more acute.
Indeed, at times Levinas suggests that paganism is the ultimate source of tyranny: “Tyranny
is not the pure and simple extension of technology to reified men. Its origin lies in the pagan
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‘moods,’ in the adoration that enslaved men devote to their masters.”66 Through its emphasis
on human rootedness and autochthony, Heidegger’s thought encourages human beings to
divide themselves into natives and foreigners, thus inviting political persecution of the
perceived outsiders who threaten the sanctity of the homeland (Heimat). Just as importantly,
the pagan emphasis on place effectively closes off transcendence, leaving man powerless
before the arbitrary exercise of worldly power. In a milieu where immanence and
transcendence have been collapsed into a monolithic worldly totality, there can be no appeal
to justice, nor indeed to any other metaphysical standard capable of curbing the exercise of
immanent power. Because the homeland is the court of final appeal, the state that claims to
act on its behalf possesses a blank check to dominate its subjects unhindered by external
constraints.
From a Levinasian standpoint, then, the banal consequence of Heideggerian ontology
is not individual heroism, communal intimacy, or an enlivened relationship to things but
quiet sanction to – if not encouragement of – the expansion of impersonal state power. In the
context of a philosophical schema that subordinates human beings to an ontological arche,
refuses to posit an absolute source of human value and prizes place over people, such a
conclusion is more than understandable. A “philosophy of power” as much as “injustice,”
Heidegger’s thought is tragically emblematic of the dangerous political tendencies attendant
with the subordination of ethics to ontology.67
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Even as he bemoans the pernicious political consequences of ontological supremacy,
however, Levinas does not call for its complete eradication. Indeed, Western ontology has a
constructive role to play in Levinas’s ethico-political schema. More specifically, Levinas
suggests that the Greek ontological tradition is needed to universalize the ethical truths
unearthed by the Judaic ethical tradition. As he writes, “At no point did the Western
philosophical tradition lose its right to the last word; everything must, indeed, be expressed
in its tongue; but perhaps it is not the place of the first meaning of beings, the place where
meaning begins.”68 Similarly, even as he distances himself from Heideggerian antihumanism, Levinas seconds many of Heidegger’s criticisms of past humanism. Furthermore,
insofar as he emphasizes the worldly aspect of ethical action, Levinas is no proponent of a
radical transcendence that would be diametrically opposed to pagan worldliness. In these
respects, the gap between Heidegger and Levinas is not as stark as it first appears.
The ambiguity of Levinas’s attempt to distance himself from Heidegger’s ontological
and anti-humanistic philosophy also characterizes his corresponding attempt to separate
himself from Heidegger’s place-bound ethos. To be sure, Levinas identifies the cruelty
intrinsic to pagan attempts to “put down roots.” In this respect, a political home worthy of
our allegiance presents itself as a virtual impossibility: all homes must first be founded, and
the act of founding is revealed as inherently violent and totalizing. If this was the end of the
matter, Levinas’ significance for political thought would be of entirely negative import.
However, Levinas does not call for a radical nomadism: if only implicitly, Levinas
recognizes the validity of the human desire for homecoming. To appeal to another Judaic
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metaphor, even Abraham possesses a vision of home that sustains him in his nomadic
wanderings. What propels Abraham’s journey through the wilderness is the vision of a
“great land” of Canaan. What distinguishes it from the Odyssean sojourn is the ethical desire
for the Other that inspires it. Cognizant of the Abrahamic ideal, and well aware of the
pitfalls endemic to Heidegger’s ontological, anti-humanistic, and pagan philosophy, in
Totality and Infinity Levinas posits a relationship to place that is ethical in emphasis,
humanistic in stress, and transcendent in scope. The political implications of a Levinasian
relationship to place will be fully examined in the following chapter.
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Chapter 6: Dwelling in the Face of the Other:
Levinas and the Politics of Hospitality

A sojourner, you are not to oppress:
you yourselves know (well) the feeling of the sojourner,
for sojourners were you in the land of Egypt.
Exodus 23:9

I. Introduction
Like Heidegger, Levinas is concerned about the problem of modern homelessness.
However, whereas Heidegger interprets homelessness as an ontological symptom of the
abandonment of Being by beings, Levinas regards it as a reminder of man’s failure to meet
his ethical obligation to the Other. Hence, whereas Heidegger considers the problem of
homelessness from a ontological standpoint, Levinas contemplates it from an ethical vantage
point. For Levinas, the problem of homelessness is epitomized not in man’s failure to heed
the call of Being but in the existence of unhoused people who have been territorially
uprooted by economic destitution, political upheaval, and war. This change of emphasis
from the ontological plight of homelessness to the ontic plight of the homeless marks the
distance that separates Heidegger from Levinas. Coming from a theological tradition heavily
imprinted with the experience of exile, Levinas ponders the plight of the homeless with a
persistence and intensity that is matched by few contemporaries. As Derrida writes, Levinas
“never turned his eyes away” from the “violence” and “distress” experienced by the
“foreigner, the immigrant (with or without papers), the exile, the refugee, those without a
country, or a State, the displaced person or population.”1
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A keen awareness of the suffering experienced by those who lack access to a home
(maison) informs Levinas’s discussion of the dwelling in Totality and Infinity. In this
discussion, Levinas identifies the home as the place of origin that underlies subjective
thought and action. More specifically, the home undergirds mental activities such as
recollection (recuillement), representation, and the physical activity of labor. The home is
foundational to these endeavors because it shelters the self from the elements. Once
liberated from the elemental realm, the ego is free to assert itself as a possessive being. But
this achievement of interior and exterior mastery comes at the invariable expense of the self’s
connection to transcendence. When the Other is welcomed into the home, however, the I
overcomes its egoistic attempt to dominate its surroundings. Moreover, by extending
hospitality (hospitalité) to the Other, the self transforms the home into an instrument of
ethical action.2
Levinas’s description of the home and of the welcoming act that potentially occurs
within its confines makes no overt mention of politics. The fact that Levinas’s hospitality
ethos bears potential political implications, however, is evident when his concept of the
Third (la tiers) is taken into account. The Third is the third person who faces the self
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whenever it confronts the Other. As the representative of the larger human fraternity, the
Third demands the ego’s undivided attention. Considered from the perspective of Levinas’s
discussion of the home, this implies that the I is equally called to welcome (accueil) the
Third into its political space. Being hospitable to the Third necessitates the creation of
political and juridical institutions that reflect the nature of the human fraternity.
Extending a warm welcome to the Third, however, is no mean feat because the
political realm is not coterminous with the ethical. For Levinas, politics is inherently violent
and totalizing, a fact that renders the relation between ethics and politics heterogeneous in
nature. The abyss that separates the ethical from the political – and which renders the
deduction of the latter from the former manifestly impossible – is symbolized by what
Levinas calls the “State of Caesar.” The defining feature of the Caesarian State is an
aversion to ethical constraints, a fact that renders it an inappropriate organ for the extension
of hospitality. A more apt vehicle for welcoming the Third is what Levinas labels the “State
of David.” In explicit contrast to the State of Caesar, the Davidic State points beyond the
State to the realm of the infinite, to ethics. The State of David, which reaches its culmination
in the Messianic State, breaks the stranglehold of political immanence by extending
hospitality to the foreigner, exile, refugee, and immigrant into the territory over which it is
sovereign.
In this chapter, I will examine the political implications of Levinas’s concept of
hospitality. I shall begin by elucidating Levinas’s analysis of the home as it is presented in
Totality and Infinity. In Levinas’ description, the home achieves its full dignity when the
Other is welcomed into it, thereby transforming it from a pagan site to one that illuminates
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the existence of the transcendent. Subsequently, I will consider Levinas’s concept of the
Third, noting how its presence illuminates the fact of human fraternity and demands the
creation of political-juridical institutions that are apt vehicles for extending hospitality. After
discussing Levinas’s critique of the traditional State of Caesar as it has developed under the
influence of the Augustinian real/ideal dichotomy, I shall consider his conception of the State
of David and its Messianic culmination. By way of overcoming the real/ideal dualism, the
State of David points towards the possibility of an authentically monotheistic politics. I will
then examine the hospitality ethos that is one of the defining features of such a politics,
noting how the monotheistic State distinguishes itself from its pagan predecessors by
welcoming the transnationally homeless into its sphere of its jurisdiction. I shall conclude
with some criticisms of Levinas, noting how the ethical thrust of his hospitality ethos is
undermined by his Zionist loyalties and his racist fear of a “yellow peril.” These
shortcomings notwithstanding, however, Levinas’s politics of hospitality retains its enticing
appeal in an age in which the plight of the homeless has become a topic of increasing
concern.
II. Levinas’s Concept of the Home
In Totality and Infinity, Levinas considers the nature and significance of the home or
dwelling. Considered as an implement, the home’s utility is obvious in the fact that it
shelters its inhabitant from “the inclemencies of the weather” and the threat posed by
“enemies or the importunate.” As valuable as these functions are, however, they do not
account for the “privileged role” that the home occupies in relation to other items of “gear.”
What makes the home a uniquely valuable implement is the fact that it represents the point of
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origin from which intentional human activities originate: “The privileged role of the home
does not consist in being the end of human activity but in being its condition, and in this
sense its commencement.”3 No mere “‘implement’ among ‘implements,’” then, the home
constitutes the conditione sine qua non of subjective human actions such as recollection,
representation, and labor. Of these activities, the act of recollection stands out as particularly
significant.
The self’s ability to recollect itself is precarious in an unhoused state. Prior to its
subsequent inhabitation in a home, the ego “lives from” the elements in which it is immersed.
Even as it is dependent upon its elemental surroundings, however, the I enjoys its existence
as an autonomous ego that is at home (chez-soi) in the world: “In enjoyment throbs egoist
being . . . To be separated is to be at home with oneself. But to be at home with oneself . . .
is to live from . . . is to enjoy the elemental.”4
However, the mere fact that the self is dependent upon the elements renders its
happiness decidedly ambiguous. The elements possess a strangeness, an anonymous “there
is” (il y a) quality that causes the ego to speculate about its future happiness. Concerned
about the “morrow,” the I attempts to master its insecurity by attempting to possess the world
and thereby establish its economic autarky. Such independence, in turn, presupposes the
ability of the self to suspend “the immediate reactions the world solicits in view of a greater
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attention to oneself, one’s possibilities,” an ability that is denied to the self in the elements.5
Hence, the significance of the home, which facilitates the inhabitation necessary for the ego
to withdraw from the elemental realm and recollect itself in earnest.
The home enables the self to recollect itself because it welcomes the I into its
confines. By extending an original welcome to the self, the home enables it to dwell in the
world.6 “To dwell,” Levinas writes, “is not the simple fact of the anonymous reality of a
being cast into existence, as a stone one casts behind oneself; it is recollection, a coming to
oneself, a retreat home with oneself as in a land of refuge, which answers to a hospitality, an
expectancy, a human welcome.”7 In the fact that the act of dwelling “answers to” an earlier
extension of hospitality, one can say that the dweller, the prospective host (hôte), is first of
all a guest. The host’s uncertain identity as host – an ambiguity mirrored in the French term
hôte, which connotes both host and guest – is reflected in the various courses of action that
are available to the self once it has achieved refuge in the home.
Once it has been welcomed into the “extraterritoriality” of the home, the self is
enabled to assert itself as a possessive being.8 After accepting the home’s welcoming
5
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For Levinas, the welcoming aspect of the home is symbolized by the figure of the
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the laboring activity is essentially egoistic, it can be viewed as the process by which the
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embrace, the I can attempt to use this hospitality to its own advantage by shutting itself up in
its self-enclosed world. In metaphorically locking the doors and windows of the home, the I
reveals the latter as the cipher of its interiority. The centripetal nature of this process marks
the self as an autonomous being that is radically divorced from the exterior realm of alterity
and from its immanent source, the Other: “And this possibility of forgetting the
transcendence of the Other – of banishing with impunity all hospitality (that is, all language)
from one’s home, banishing the transcendental relation that alone permits the I to shut itself
up in itself – evinces the absolute truth, the radicalism, of separation.”9 By way of
radicalizing its status as a separate being, the self thereby ensures that the home will remain a
pagan shrine to itself.
Levinas illustrates his point in this regard by pointing to Gyges.10 As described in
Plato’s Republic, the descendent of Gyges takes advantage of his possession of a magical
ring that renders him invisible by killing the king and seducing his wife. For Levinas,
Gyges’s descendant can be viewed as a particularly egregious example of the egotistical self
in that he helps himself to the hospitality offered by others – particularly with regard to the
king’s throne and his wife – and reciprocates none in return. Acknowledging his
connectedness to the Other in perverse fashion, he cynically manipulates it to his own
elemental other is reduced to the same. For Levinas, the annihilation of elemental alterity
through labor is the necessary pre-condition for the creation of money: “Because it is not in
itself the thing can be exchanged and accordingly be compared, be quantified, and
consequently already lose its very identity, be reflected in money.” Totality and Infinity, 162.
Inasmuch as the laboring process presupposes the existence of the home, the home’s
importance in relation to the economic realm is manifest.
9
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advantage by way of asserting his unlimited freedom to do what he pleases. As Levinas
writes, “Gyges plays a double game, a presence to others and an absence, speaking to
‘others’ and evading speech; Gyges is the very condition of man, the possibility of injustice
and radical egoism, the possibility of accepting the rules of the game, but cheating.”11 And
the instrument that enables Gyges’s ancestor to perpetrate injustice is his ring, the symbol of
his separation. In this respect, it is akin to the home which, as the emblem of the self’s
interiority, can likewise be utilized to act in a similarly ignoble fashion.
Needless to say, not all homes are condemned to play the role of Gyges’s ring. The
home can potentially be a place where hospitality is given as well as taken. Hospitality is
extended when “I welcome the Other who presents himself in my home by opening my home
to him.”12 For Levinas, the seemingly unremarkable act of “opening my home” to the Other
is a gesture that is fraught with uncommon ethical significance. Indeed, it is of such ethical
import that decisive political implications result from its performance, as will become
apparent later.
On Levinas’s account, accepting the Other into the home represents an act of
obedience to a timeless moral imperative commanded by the Decalogue: “Thou shalt not
murder.” Not harming the Other in this fashion represents the most basic and rudimentary
law of hospitable conduct. As Levinas makes clear, however, it also constitutes an act of
recognition by which the presence of transcendence is suitably acknowledged: “But the
untraversable infinity of the negation of murder is announced by this dimension of height,
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where the Other comes to me concretely in the ethical impossibility of committing this
murder.”13 As significant as this act of obedience is, in and of itself it is insufficient,
inasmuch as the hospitable gesture requires corollary obligations of a more positive nature.
This is most evident with respect to the economic components of the welcoming act.
For Levinas, the face of the Other “paralyzes possession” insofar as it implicitly demands
that the self take an active, caring interest in its material well-being. Viewed from this
perspective, the mere offering of kind words and best regards is decidedly inadequate: words
must be supported with concrete actions. Hence, opening one’s home to the Other
necessitates the offering of nourishing food, warm, dry clothing, and comfortable shelter to
one who may not be well-fed, well-clothed, and sheltered from the elements. This facet of
the hospitable gesture is a reflection of the fact that the self’s relationship with the Other is,
like all other human relationships, necessarily economic in character: “No human or
interhuman relationship can be enacted outside of economy; no face can be approached with
empty hands and closed home.”14
Opening one’s home to the Other in this fashion, however, benefits not only the guest
who is the recipient of the host’s economic hospitality. It is also to the advantage of the host
who is in perpetual danger of conflating his or her identity with the ownership of material
possessions. By giving its possessions to the Other, the host is enabled to view them with a
degree of clarity that is otherwise impossible: “But in order that I be able to free myself from
the very possession that the welcome of the home establishes, in order that I be able to see
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things in themselves, that is, represent them to myself, I must know how to give what I
possess.”15 Considered from this perspective, hospitality makes a non-slavish and reflective
relationship to material possessions possible.
The Other is able to effect these remarkable transformations with regard to the self’s
relationship to its possessions through language. The language evoked by the presence of the
Other is uniquely powerful because it emanates from transcendence. Indeed, the language
expressed by the face of the Other is of such compelling power that the self’s very identity is
called into question: “The calling in question of the I, coextensive with the manifestation of
the Other in the face, we call language.”16
Language undermines the identity of the self by way of calling the more egregious
manifestations of its ipseity into question. Prior to the approach of the Other, the self clings
to a blissfully ignorant view of its own freedom: as Heidegger would put it, the self’s
possession of freedom is not an “issue” for it. In the process of discoursing with the Other,
however, the ego discovers that the exercise of this freedom is potentially unethical. Newly
conscious of the inter-subjective consequences of its autonomy, the I now becomes ashamed
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of the “naiveté” that previously accompanied its unconscious, spontaneous exercise: “In this
commerce with the infinity of exteriority or of height the naiveté of the direct impulse, the
naiveté of the being exercising itself as a force on the move, is ashamed of its naiveté.”17
The self’s discovery of the ethically problematic consequences of its freedom
constitutes the decisive stage in its transformation from an egoistical being to an altruistic
servant of the Other. The self is not all that is changed by its encounter with the Other,
however. The symbol of its autonomy – the home – likewise experiences a profound
transfiguration. When the Other is welcomed into the home, the latter ceases resembling a
“root” that the self puts into the ground as a means of isolating itself from its fellows: “The
chosen home is the very opposite of a root.”18 Instead, the home attains the status of a
chosen place because the presence of the Other graces it with the presence of the infinite.
Such a home ceases resembling Gyges’s ring and instead becomes an ethical instrument
worthy of Abraham.
The home attains an Abrahamic character by virtue of the fact that it mirrors the
common experience of exile that unites host and guest. Of course, it goes without saying that
the guest “has no other place, is not autochthonous, is uprooted, without a country, not an
inhabitant, exposed to the cold and the heat of the seasons. To be reduced to having recourse
to me is the homelessness of the neighbor.”19 However, at the most primordial level, the host
is also homeless. By welcoming the Other into the home, the host implicitly acknowledges
17
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its own exilic status. Viewed from this perspective, the home that houses the hospitable
gesture is an “inn” in that both of its inhabitants are self-admitted exiles.
Its exilic nature notwithstanding, the inn is no less solidly anchored than a more
conventional home. The hospitable home “indicates a disengagement, a wandering (errance)
which has made it possible, which is not a less with respect to installation, but the surplus of
the relationship with the Other, metaphysics.”20 In the fact that it is grounded on a solidly
metaphysical, rather than pagan, foundation, it represents the only proper object of man’s
attempt to achieve homecoming. As Brian J. Walsh evocatively puts it, “True homecoming
is only possible if the security of the home is extended to the vulnerability of the other, if the
safety of the familiar is extended beyond the boundaries of the home to the unfamiliar, the
alien.”21
Brief as it is, Levinas’s discussion of the home stands as one of the most fruitful
discussions of his entire corpus. What it posits is nothing less than a normative standard by
which the adequacy of the human relationship to place can be ethically judged. More
specifically, what Levinas’s analysis suggests is that our status as moral beings stands or falls
with our treatment of the strangers who presents themselves on our doorstep. By way of
positing an ethics of hospitality, Levinas also provides an ethical gauge with which the
home’s status as a legitimate entity can be assessed. Is the home an Abrahamic instrument of
ethical compassion for the stranger, widow, and orphan? Or is it little more than a miserable
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domicile that Gyges retires to after a long day of regicide and seduction? In this respect,
Levinas provides a welcome dose of ethical sensitivity to a postmodern genre more often
dominated by considerations of aesthetic delicacy.
As notable as this achievement is, however, the question of politics remains open.
Although ethics permeates Levinas’s discussion of the home, politics is conspicuously
absent. The notable lack of political themes in this respect is a reflection of the fact that the
self’s relationship to the Other occurs on an anarchical, non-political plane. Even so, this
fact does not preclude the possibility of what might be called a “politics of hospitality.” As
other sections of Totality and Infinity make clear, the self does not confront the Other in
isolation, but also faces “the Third” (la tiers). As it turns out, Levinas’s concept of the Third
transforms his ethical philosophy into a theory of politics and renders his hospitable ethos
into a political doctrine.
III. The Third and the Possibility of Human Fraternity
In his two major works – Totality and Infinity and Otherwise than Being or Beyond
Essence – Levinas discusses the ethico-political significance of the Third (la tiers).22 What is
the Third? Perhaps the most instructive way of defining the Third is to consider it in relation
to the Other. Whereas the Other refers to the other person, the Third refers to another person.
And while the locution Third seemingly implies that the third party occupies a position of
secondary importance vis-a-vis the Other, Levinas maintains that the Other is equal to the
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Third because the face of the former reflects the presence of the latter: “His (the Other’s)
equality within this essential poverty consists in referring to the third party, thus present at
the encounter, whom in the midst of his destitution the Other already serves.”23 Inasmuch as
the Third exists in a condition of parity with respect to the Other, the self is no less
responsible for the welfare of the other person than for the third party.
That being said, taking ethical responsibility for the personal well-being of the Third
is no elementary matter inasmuch as it does not represent a singular person but rather the rest
of humanity. If the Other corresponds to the Thou of Martin Buber’s I-Thou relationship, the
interlocutor that the self faces in the form of the Third more closely approximates a “we.”
Phrased in Buberian parlance, then, one can say that the I confronts a we every time it
encounters a Thou: “The thou is posted in front of a we.”24 The fact that the rest of the
human race confronts the self contemporaneously with the Other entails that the ego is
obligated not only to take ethical responsibility for the single, lone stranger that faces it but
also the rest of the human plurality. In this sense, the I is compelled to model itself after the
character of Alyosha Karamazov in Dostoyevsky’s The Brothers Karamazov, a character
who had declared that “each one of us is guilty before everyone, and I more than others.”25
It goes without saying that the appearance of the Third significantly complicates the
self-Other relationship. At the very least, the interjection of an alien party eliminates the
Other’s status as the sole object of the self’s moral concern. As Levinas writes, the
23
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introduction of the Third entails a certain “betrayal” of the I’s “anarchical relation with
illeity.”26 At the same time, however, Levinas is at pains to emphasize that the Third’s
presence is salutary. In order to grasp Levinas’s point in this regard – and in order to relate
his concept of the Third to his hospitality ethos – it is necessary to reconsider the act of
welcome described at the end of the previous section in light of the changes wrought by the
entrance of the third person.
Consider the example of language. Levinas’s description of the hospitable act
identifies the crucial role that language plays in undermining the self’s identity as a self.
With the insertion of the Third into the I’s relationship with the Other, however, a wholly
new communicative situation arises. Insofar as language now involves not just two
interlocutors but the entire human collective, intimate one-on-one discourse is no longer
sufficient. As Levinas writes, “Language as the presence of the face does not invite
complicity with the preferred being, the self-sufficient ‘I-Thou’ forgetful of the universe; in
its frankness it refuses the clandestiny of love, where it loses its frankness and meaning and
turns into laugher or cooing.”27 In order to speak to the mass of humanity, language must
adapt accordingly and assume more general form. If the linguistic exchange between the self
and the Other resembles a Socratic dialectic, the language that accompanies the presence of
the Third more closely resembles the “sermon, exhortation,” and “prophetic word” of an Old
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Testament prophet.28 Considered in this light, language oscillates into a thematizing – even
violent – instrument that aggressively solicits the self’s attention.
The Third exhorts the self to respond to it. In this respect, it is akin to the Other,
whose demand on the ego’s undivided attention is no less compelling. Faced with two
parties that simultaneously vie for its attention and concern, the ego is compelled to weigh
between competing ethical obligations. Besides being a distinctive mental activity, such an
act is necessary because it forces the self to consider the welfare of those who fall outside of
the parameters of the self-Other relationship. As Levinas puts it, the presence of the Third
prevents the self from seeking “the complicity of a private relation and a clandestiny” with
the Other.29 In compelling the self to enlarge its sphere of moral concern, the third party
ensures that its attempt to satisfy its “asymmetrical” obligations to the other person will not
be pursued at the excessive expense of others. In this sense, the Third serves as an “incessant
correction” to the danger of ethical myopia.
Up until this point, I have noted how Levinas’s concept of the Third engenders
significant transformations with respect to language and the nature of ethical obligation. It is
not difficult to predict the consequences of these changes vis-à-vis Levinas’s hospitality
ethos. With respect to language, welcoming the Third necessitates a discourse of sufficient
“frankness and meaning” to reflect the fact that “language is justice.”30 Moreover,
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expressing hospitality toward the Third necessitates that the self curtail the extent of its
ethical responsibility to the Other. On Levinas’s account, these changes are engendered by
the self’s newfound consciousness of an aspect of the human condition that the face of the
Third brings home to it: fraternity (fraternité).
Perhaps the most appropriate way to consider Levinas’s idiosyncratic conception of
fraternity is to note what is not. Human fraternity, Levinas emphasizes, is not grounded in a
common genus based on biological or linguistic characteristics. Rather, the cement that
binds the members of the human fraternal order to one another is collective responsibility:
“It is my responsibility before a face looking at me absolutely foreign (and the epiphany of
the face coincides with these two moments) that constitutes the original fact of fraternity.”
Put differently, the link that binds the human community together is the shared ethical
responsibility of everyone for everyone else. The ethical obligation to welcome the face of
the Other is equally dispersed among the members of the Levinasian community. Moreover,
the ethical imperative that serves as the foundation of human egalité also determines the core
characteristics of the human fraternité.
In Totality and Infinity, Levinas identifies two principal aspects of human fraternity.
One such aspect is the irreducible singularity of every human being: “It (human fraternity)
involves individualities whose logical status is not reducible to the status of ultimate
differences in a genus, for their singularity consists in each referring to itself.”31 Like
equality, human singularity is predicated on the individual responsibility that each person has
for the welfare of the larger human community. In sum, each member of the Levinasian
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fraternal order is unique by virtue of the fact that each is singularly responsible for the wellbeing of fellow members.
Obviously, the grounding of individual dignity in shared moral obligation represents
Levinas’s attempt to salvage the respect for individual personhood that is one of the more
valuable legacies of the Enlightenment from the attacks leveled by its Heideggerian critics.
Even so, Levinas’s defense is ambiguous in the fact that it jettisons modern philosophy’s
emphasis on the self and supplants it with a heteronomous schema. Levinas’s conscious
attempt to defend the dignity of the individual while avoiding the egoistic excesses of
modern philosophy is also reflected in the second aspect of the Levinasian human fraternity:
monotheism.
Monotheism, of course, is the belief that there is but one God. For Levinas, the
human fraternity is monotheistic in the sense that its members are inextricably linked by the
“commonness of father.” Such “commonness” is reflected in the “primary proximity, in
which the face presents itself to my welcome.” Put differently, God’s paternal reign over the
human fraternity is manifested in the self’s connection to the Other. Indeed, Levinas goes so
far as to maintain that monotheism cannot be properly comprehended without reference to
the self-Other relation: “Monotheism signifies this human kinship, this idea of a human race
that refers back to the approach of the Other in the face, in a dimension of height, in
responsibility for oneself and the Other.”32
Clearly, Levinas’s advocacy of monotheism is tailored to appeal to postmodern
sensibilities. By rendering the locus of divine presence in ethical relationships, Levinas’s
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theological vision emphasizes its this-worldly import. That being said, the monotheistic
aspect of Levinasian ethics cannot be dismissed as mere “flavoring.” In the fact that
monotheism is the source of the human fraternity’s communal coherence, the collective
recognition of irreducible human singularity is only possible “thanks to God”: “it is only
thanks to God that, as a subject incomparable with the other, I am approached as an Other by
others, that is, ‘for myself.’”33 From a Levinasian vantage point, then, respect for human
personhood is unthinkable without the “father” whose presence underlies the proximity that
inheres in the human community. Hence, the “commonness of God” prevents the human
fraternal order from collapsing into a Hobbesian free-for-all of separate, autonomous selves.
As the ultimate source of community, divine paternity also makes possible the
practice of politics. Politics is prefigured in the face of the Third inasmuch as its presence
demands the creation of politico-juridical institutions to govern the human brotherhood: “In
the measure that the face of the Other relates us with the third party, the metaphysical
relation of the I with the Other moves into the form of the we, aspires to State, institutions,
laws which are the source of universality.”34 Insofar as the Third inspires the creation of
“State, institutions, laws,” one can say that its presence projects the self into the realm of
politics.
Obviously, the State and its accompanying institutions should mirror the human
community over which it is sovereign. That is to say, it should respect irreducible human
dignity and rest on a monotheistically ethical foundation. The necessity for the political
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sphere to fulfill its governing function while reflecting the structural features of the human
fraternity represents the Levinasian ethico-political imperative. Adhering to this imperative
necessitates welcoming the Third into the self’s public space by creating a political
community where individual human dignity is respected and ethical conduct encouraged. As
it turns out, extending such a welcome turns out to be a highly problematic endeavor insofar
as the sphere where political action occurs is radically dissimilar from the anarchical realm
where the hospitable gesture is ethically performed. For Levinas, the non-ethical aspect of
the political realm is epitomized in the historic prominence of what he calls the “State of
Caesar.”
IV. From the State of Caesar to the Messianic State
Levinas’s discussion of the State of Caesar occurs in the context of a piece entitled
“The State of Caesar and the State of David.” Like the other writings gathered in Beyond the
Verse: Talmudic Readings and Lectures, Levinas’s essay is presented in the form of a
reading of the Talmud. Even if it is not one of Levinas’s more straightforward philosophical
writings, the piece is of unusual interest to students of political theory. Indeed, it sheds
considerable light not only on Levinas’s view of politics but also on the critique of
Christianity that informs that view.
Levinas utilizes the locution State of Caesar to designate the non-ethical, autonomous
practice of politics. No mere reference to the Roman res publica, then, the term potentially
encompasses everything from the Greek polis to the modern nation-State. Even if its
existence precedes the birth of Christianity, however, the definitive feature of the State of
Caesar is its conformity to the Christian imperative to “Render to Caesar the things that are
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Caesar’s, and to God the things that are God’s.” In other words, the Caesarian State is the
political entity that complements the Augustinian dichotomy between the temporal and the
spiritual that, in Levinas’s view, epitomizes the Christian conception of politics.
For Levinas, the Christian approach is inherently problematic in that its demarcation
between the earthly City and the City of God leaves the former ethically unregulated. The
Augustinian distinction between the City of Man and the Civitas Dei is problematic not
because it introduces a tension between the political and the ethical but because it precludes
the possibility of such tension: “In Christianity, the kingdom of God and the earthly
kingdom are separated yet placed side by side without touching and, in principle, without
contesting each other.”35 While this arrangement is advantageous in that it facilitates the
harmonious co-existence of political power and its spiritual competitor, the fact that
Christianity has often been a State religion reveals that one of its chief beneficiaries is the
State itself. By promoting Christianity with the seal of official approval, the State in turn
receives a blank check to conduct itself in whatever fashion it fancies. Liberated by
Christianity’s “political indifference,” the State is left free to succumb to Machiavellian
power-aggrandizement.
In Totality and Infinity, Levinas vividly describes the praxis of politics as it has
developed under the influence of centuries of spiritually-sanctioned ethical neglect. In sum,
the political realm is inhospitable to moral action: “politics is opposed to morality, as
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philosophy to naivete.”36 As “the art of foreseeing war and of winning it by any means,” the
practice of the political art (techn‘) is inspired by an overriding desire to get the better of
one’s fellows. The fact that this particular techn‘ has historically “been enjoined as the very
exercise of reason” is a disturbing reflection of the degree to which ratio itself is tainted by
the same agonistic spirit. Indeed, even the actions of the most peace-minded political actors
are driven by the desire to dominate adversaries and ascend to a position of power and
influence on the political hierarchy. In the fact that it is inherently warlike, the practice of
the political art is revealed to be not only amoral but downright immoral.
The political art is also impersonal. Politics is inextricably connected with the art of
lawgiving, with the formulation and execution of abstract laws. By virtue of their general
quality, laws make no allowance for the fact of human alterity, an alterity exemplified in the
form of the unlucky exception whose very existence confounds the broad brush of
generalization that animates the lawgiving art. Even in their most enlightened form, laws
oppress the individual. The universalizing spirit that inspires the legislation and execution of
laws mark the political realm as inherently tyrannical. As Levinas writes, “politics left to
itself bears a tyranny within itself; it deforms the I and other who have given rise to it, for it
judges them according to universal rules, and thus in absentia.”37
For Levinas, the impersonal – and hence tyrannical – nature of political life is
reflected in the manner in which it prizes “works” over the men who constitute them.
Whether it is the ancient city-State or the modern nation-State, the State-work totalizes the
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individual. As Levinas writes, “In political life, taken unrebuked, humanity is understood
from its works – a humanity of interchangeable men, or reciprocal relations.”38 In such a
milieu, exploitation is inevitable. Viewed from this perspective, the first casualties of the
war that political actors attempt to win by hook or by crook are the actors themselves, all of
whom must submerge their identity into the State totality.
Much as the political sphere is organically incapable of fostering respect for human
dignity, it is equally hostile to a monotheistic orientation. Indeed, the State of Caesar more
closely resembles a pagan idol. Unlike other pagan gods, however, the State-god reveals
itself to be a particularly jealous deity. Ever mindful of challenges to its sovereignty, the
“pagan State” will brutally suppress all internal and external threats: “The State of Caesar
separates humanity from its deliverance by developing without hindrance and reaching the
plenitude (or hypertrophy – natural, as it were) of the form it received from the GraecoRoman world, the pagan State, jealous of its sovereignty, the State in search of hegemony,
the conquering, imperialist, totalitarian, oppressive State, attached to realist egoism.”39
In the context of a critique of Augustinian politics, it is ironic that Levinas’s
description of the State of Caesar recalls Augustine’s critique of the City of Man. Like
Augustine, Levinas suggests that the practice of politics is inherently immoral. Seemingly,
Levinas would concur with Augustine’s notion that kingdoms are akin to bands of robbers.
As Augustine puts it:
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Remove justice, and what are kingdoms but gangs of criminals on a large scale?
What are criminal gangs but petty kingdoms? A gang is a group of men under the
command of a leader, bound by a compact of association, in which the plunder is
divided according to an agreed convention. If this villainy wins so many recruits
from the ranks of the demoralized that it acquires territory, establishes a base,
captures cities and subdues peoples, it then openly arrogates to itself the title of
kingdom, which is conferred on it in the eyes of the world, not by the renouncement
of aggression but by the attainment of impunity. For it was a witty and a truthful
rejoinder which was given by a captured pirate to Alexander the Great. The king
asked the fellow, ‘What is your idea, in infesting the sea?’ And the pirate answered,
with uninhibited insolence, ‘The same as yours, in infesting the earth! But because I
do it with a tiny craft, I’m called a pirate: because you have a might navy, you’re
called an emperor.40
Levinas shares Augustine’s dark view of the political. The face of the Third calls for the
creation of political and juridical institutions that reflect the respect for individual
personhood that befits “children of God.” What the Caesarian State delivers instead is war
and individual self-alienation, relegating ethics to the margins of political life. Insofar as the
State of Caesar persists by virtue of Christianity’s ethical abdication of the political sphere,
however, its prominence is, to a certain extent, historically-contingent. That is to say, the
State of Caesar is not the only – or even the most likely – institutional expression of man’s
political existence. There are, and have been, alternatives.
For Levinas, the most compelling such alternative is elucidated in rabbinic Judaism.
What renders rabbinic Judaism unusually notable in this respect is its unique vision of the
relationship between the political and spiritual. Unlike Augustinian Christianity, rabbinic
Judaism blurs the line between the City of Man and the City of God: “In the Judaism of the
Rabbis, in the centuries immediately preceding the birth of Christianity, as in post-Christian
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rabbinical doctrine, the distinction between the political order and spiritual order (between
the earthly City and the City of God) does not possess the clear-cut character suggested by
the evangelical expression ‘Render to Caesar the things that are Caesar’s and to God the
things that are God’s.’”41 At the same time, rabbinic Judaism eschews the contrary notion
that “political power and the divine order are one and the same.” Levinas explicates the
unique manner in which rabbinic Judaism navigates between these opposing extremes by
way of describing what he calls the “State of David.”
Like his reference to the State of Caesar, Levinas’s use of the locution State of David
is deliberate. In sum, the State of David designates the State whose governing practices are
directly “related to the ideal world.” Hence, the Davidic State blurs the line between the real
and the ideal in decidedly un-Augustinian fashion. Why the reference to David? David is a
member of the family line that engenders the Messiah. Much as David’s bloodline produces
the Messiah, the State that bears his name culminates in the Messianic State: “the State of
David remains in the final stage of Deliverance.”42 Hence, the State of David can be viewed
as an intermediary political form that exists halfway between the State’s primitive Caesarian
manifestation and its Messianic apotheosis, which I will discuss shortly.
In stark contrast to the Caesarian State, the State of David is built upon a
monotheistic foundation. The Davidic State reflects the “commonness of Father” in the fact
that its ruler is responsive to a transcendent source of obligation. Its paradigmatic figure is,
of course, King David. What makes David a monotheistic political leader? As noted in the
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Talmud, David maintains an intimate relationship with the Torah. The link that binds David
to the Book constitutes the pathway by which transcendence enters into the governing
practices of the State. Moreover, by immersing himself in the Torah, David enables the State
to realize its full potential as a monotheistic political entity: “the State, in accordance with
its pure essence, is possible only if the divine word enters into it; the prince is educated in
this knowledge; this knowledge is taken up by each person on his own account; tradition is
renewal.”43
It should be continually borne in mind that Levinas’s discussion of the State of David
occurs in the context of his Talmudic commentaries. Hence, Levinas is not suggesting that
political leaders must immerse themselves in the Torah to become capable of ethicallyinformed political action. All the same, the example of David is instructive. For Levinas,
this legendary Biblical figure derives his political excellence from his connection with
transcendence. David’s connection with the infinite enables him to navigate political
obstacles with a degree of ethical sensitivity wholly foreign to the Caesarian prince
wallowing in the muck of Machiavellian raison d’état.
This is not to suggest that such a State is fully liberated from the demands of political
necessity. In the Talmudic literature, the Davidic State is a “bearer of promises” in the fact
that its existence foreshadows the impending Messianic epoch. Inasmuch as the Deliverance
that it anticipates is not yet “at hand,” the State of David’s day-to-day conduct will be
preoccupied less with the realization of grandiose eschatological schemes than with the
problems attendant with day-to-day governance: “The epoch of the Messiah can and must
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result from the political order that is allegedly indifferent to eschatology and preoccupied
solely with the problems of the hour.”44 In the fact that it is “preoccupied solely with the
problems of the hour,” then, the State of David remains somewhat mired in the world of
Realpolitik. While its actions acknowledge the existence of the transcendent, the Davidic
State is not yet fully delivered from the occasional necessity to act in a more Caesarian
fashion in order to facilitate its self-preservation.
The dualism that characterizes the State of David’s existence is epitomized in the
figure of King David. David’s style of governance is distinctive in that he “wages war and
rules during the day, and at night, when men are resting, he devotes himself to the Law.”
Seemingly, David lives a double life in that he engages in warmongering by day and pious
contemplation of the Word by night. David succumbs to this duality with the quiet
expectation that the coming age of deliverance will restore the unity that is absent in his life
by way of instituting an era of justice and freedom: “a double life in order to remake the
unity of life.”45 Even as he limits the horizon of his actions to seemingly mundane affairs of
state, then, the ruler of the State of David nonetheless prepares the way for the subsequent
messianic transfiguration.
The State of David reaches its culmination in the Messianic State, which announces
the end of “all exile and all violence.”46 Seemingly, its arrival ends – or at least renders less
acute – the dualism that had characterized the State of David, which was only imperfectly
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freed from the taint of Caesarianism.47 In the process of setting the people of Israel free from
“exile” and “violence,” however, the Messiah who presides over the Messianic State initiates
the chain of events that will gradually eventuate in the liberation of all humanity: “The
Messiah institutes a just society and sets humanity free after setting Israel free.”48 In the fact
that its appearance portends the liberation of the human race, the Messianic State possesses a
universal significance that far transcends the limited scope of Jewish experience. No mere
creature of Jewish particularism, the Messianic State heralds a human as well as an Israelite
homecoming.
What are we to make of Levinas’s discussion of the Messianic State? Obviously, the
Messianic State stands at the farthest possible remove from the Caesarian State. Whereas the
State of Caesar totalizes its subjects, the Messianic State liberates them. And while the
former is a pagan entity, the latter is the monotheistic political institution par excellence. In
these respects, the Messianic State is the ideal political organ for extending hospitality to the
Third. Must all states, then, undergo a messianic transformation in order to become apt
vehicles for hospitable political action? Levinas admits that even when the concept of the
Messianic State is removed of its supernatural and apocalyptic connotations, it nonetheless
strikes the secular mind as “premature” at best and “utopian” at worst.49 Be that as it may,
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the Messianic State is superior to other political institutions because of the radical manner in
which it points “beyond the State” to a transcendent source of human obligation. But
Levinas also emphasizes that the Messianic State retains political form. Indeed, this is
perhaps the central thesis of Levinas’s “State of Caesar” piece: “What is most important is
the idea that not only does the essence of the State not contradict the divine order, but it is
called by it.”50
For Levinas, the fact that the Messianic State strikes modern sensibilities as “utopian”
is at least partially the result of historico-political circumstances. For most of Western
history, the dominance of a particular religion – Christianity – has rendered the question of a
monotheistic politics merely “academic.” In Levinas’s view, however, the 1948
establishment of the State of Israel has propelled what was formerly an abstract question into
the lebenswelt of concrete political practice. Formerly, the notion of any type of
monotheistic State was a moot question inasmuch as its historical vehicle – Israel – was
factually non-existent.51 With the formation of the Zionist State, however, Israel suddenly
finds itself capable “of thinking a politics which would bring to completion its monotheistic
message.”52
That said, the challenge of creating a monotheistic politics is a formidable one. For
Levinas, the political leaders who preside over the Zionist political experiment are presented
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with the challenge of striking a balance between the demands of ethics and the necessities of
politics. Put in Levinasian parlance, Israelite political actors are faced with the challenge of
responding to both the face of the Other and the Third. As if this challenge is not formidable
enough, it is rendered even more daunting by a notable lack of theoretical guidance. That is
to say, a priori formulations are of limited utility in the realm of politics. Indeed, even the
Talmudic literature fails to provide firm and authoritative guidance with respect to the
implementation of a monotheistic politics: “At the heart of daily conflicts, the living
experience of the government – and even the painful necessities of the occupation – allow
lessons as yet untaught to be detected in the ancient Revelation.”53
Given the conspicuous lack of theoretical guidance in this regard, political agents are
compelled to act spontaneously. This is not to say that such agents act in a complete
theoretical vacuum, but rather that pre-conceived formulas must be appropriately calibrated
with respect to what Heidegger would call the “facticity” of the current situation: “Only the
responsibility of a modern State, exercised on the land promised to Abraham’s descendants,
should allow his heirs to elaborate explicitly, by comparing formulas to facts, a political
doctrine suitable for monotheists”54 The content of “a political doctrine suitable for
monotheists,” then, is contingently related to the “facts” of Israel’s particular historicopolitical context. While a myriad of political theorists from Aristotle to Publius have
celebrated the necessity of prudence in the conduct of politics, Levinas reveals himself to be
unusually averse to supplying the conceptual specifics of a coherent political theory.
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In Derrida’s view, the fuzzy nature of Levinas’s monotheistic political vision is a
reflection of the “hiatus” that separates the ethical from the political realm.55 In Levinas’s
thought, ethics is not coterminous with politics. Whereas the anarchical realm of the former
is a realm of peace and face-to-face interaction, the latter sphere is characterized by warlike
aggression and anonymous uniformity. The hiatus that renders ethics heterogeneous in
relation to politics compels the political actor to leap from the realm of the former to the
sphere of the latter through an act of almost heroic resolve. In this light, the realization of a
monotheistic politics necessitates an act of resolve whereby the political actor accepts
responsibility for the burden of engaging in ethically-informed political action.
Viewed from this perspective, welcoming the Third into the self’s political space
proves to be a daunting challenge. Indeed, Levinas’s discussion suggests that the likelihood
creating political and juridical institutions that are capable of extending welcome necessitates
the appearance of a Messianic overman. Even if the lacuna between ethics and politics
compels the monotheistic political actor to navigate the divide that separates ethics from
politics, however, the face of the Third nonetheless demands that the attempt be made.
Recognizing this necessity, Levinas propounds several “formulas” of a politics of hospitality
that should be consulted by political actors who endeavor to make the difficult, but
necessary, leap from the anarchical realm of ethics to the violent, totalizing sphere of
politics.
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V. Conclusion
As described in Totality and Infinity, the hospitable gesture by which the self
welcomes the Other into its private space is accomplished through language and the
relinquishment of material possessions. While it is tempting to suggest that political
hospitality replicates these same actions in the public space, Levinas’s view of politics
renders such a conclusion decidedly uncertain. Insofar as politics is inherently warlike and
self-alienating, even the most ethical political actions are morally tainted. While this insight
has been a staple of Western political thought since Augustine, Levinas stresses how
Talmudic Judaism is particularly alert to the dangers of political totalization: “Talmudic
wisdom is entirely aware of the internal contradiction of the State subordinating some men to
others in order to liberate them, whatever the principles of those who hold power.”56 It is
hardly surprising, then, that Hebraic political thought is often characterized by an anarchical
impulse, an impulse exemplified in the pronouncements of Old Testament prophets who rail
against the State’s failure to meet its ethical obligations. Levinas mirrors this anarchical
tendency in his radical critique of politics.
At the same time, Talmudic thought evinces a Messianic bent in recognizing that “the
City in its simplest sense is never this side of the religious.”57 Here, too, Levinas follows the
lead of Talmudic Judaism in endeavoring to propound the “positive” elements of a politics of
hospitality. For Levinas, the significance of the Torah lies in the fact that it “demands in
opposition to the natural perseverance of each being for his or her own being (a fundamental
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ontological law), care for the stranger, widow, and the orphan, a preoccupation with the other
person.”58 In a similar vein, Levinas points to several key Biblical passages that illuminate
how such “care” and “preoccupation with the other” can be transplanted into the political
space.
One such passage occurs in the context of the Book of Deuteronomy. In chapter 23,
verse 8, the Biblical text commands that “Thou shalt not abhor an Edomite, for he is thy
brother; thou shalt not abhor an Egyptian, because thou wast a stranger in his land.”59
Obviously, this commandment is of political import in the fact that it is directed towards a
particular people, the citizens of the newly-established State of Zion. Besides its obvious
political significance, the particular manner in which the commandment is phrased resonates
with several key Levinasian themes that have been noted in this chapter. In order to
appreciate its full ethico-political significance, it is necessary to consider its peculiar
phraseology in greater detail.
The first part of the commandment prohibits Israelites from “abhor(ing)” the
Edomites because of their status as “brother(s).”60 The Edomites are brothers not because
they are kindred spirits in the Zionist project but because they are members of the human
race. As such, the Edomites approach the Israelites from a position of “height” that
commands respect. For their part, the Israelites are ordered to respond accordingly by
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subordinating all local, provincial, and national loyalties to a greater commitment to the
human plurality. In this light, the extension of hospitality to the national stranger is coeval
with a corresponding embrace of human fraternity. As Levinas writes, “Fraternity (but what
does it mean? Is it not, according to the Bible, a synonym of humanity?) and hospitality: are
these not stronger than the horror a man may feel for the other who denies him in his
alterity?”61 The answer, it would seem, is yes, provided that human beings properly comport
themselves so as to let this “stronger” impulse take its proper course.
The next part of the commandment is just as significant. Here, the Israelites are
prohibited from “abhor(ing)” an Egyptian on the grounds that “thou wast a stranger in his
land.” Whereas the Edomites deserve respect because of their status as “brothers, ” the
Egyptians merit it because the Israelites were previously guests in their land. In the Book of
Exodus, the Egyptians initially welcomed the Israelites into their homeland. Of course, the
Egyptians eventually betrayed their hospitality by eventually subjecting the Hebrews to
arbitrary political domination and back-breaking servitude. But the commandment makes no
mention of this. Instead, the Israelites are commanded to reciprocate the Egyptians for their
previous extension of hospitality. By ordering the Israelites to welcome the Egyptians into
the homeland, the commandment compels them to reciprocate what is rightly owed. At the
same time, the commandment effectively orders them to forego any attempts at vengeance.
The commandment thus enjoins both remembrance of past kindness and forgiveness of
previous transgressions.
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In the aforementioned example, the ethico-political imperative to welcome the
Edomite and Egyptian strangers is ordered by God. Yahweh commands the Israelites to act
hospitably towards their national guests because He is the only authentic possessor of the
earth. This point is amply conveyed in chapter 25, verse 13 of the Book of Leviticus, where
the Biblical text declares “No land shall be irrevocably alienated, for the earth is mine, for
you are but strangers dwelling in my abode.” Approvingly cited by Levinas in “The
Contemporary Criticism of the Idea of Value,” this declaration vividly illustrates the
covenantal nature of territorial possession.62 Yahweh has a covenant with His people that
renders the latter stewards, rather than owners, of the territory that He has given to them.
Cognizance of this fact marks the conduct of a “chosen” people, a point made in Franz
Rosenzweig’s The Star of Redemption: “And so even when it has a home, this people, in
recurrent contrast to all other peoples of this earth, is not allowed full possession of that
home.”63 Viewed in light of its real owner, the assertion that a particular piece of territory is
owned by a particular people is revealed to be an act of impious ingratitude to the divine
Host of hosts who enables the land to be possessed at all.
What exactly does it mean to be a steward, rather than a possessor, of the earth? For
Levinas, welcoming the foreigner into the homeland represents the principal means by which
attempts to possess the land are repudiated. Considered in relation to the grandiose political
projects that have characterized the twentieth century, the simple toleration of outsiders
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appears to be a simple, even unremarkable, affair. Considered in relation to the nationalistic,
xenophobic, and chauvinistic political enthusiasms that continue to mark the contemporary
political climate, however, it represents an act of Nietzschean overcoming of the ever-present
temptation to prize one’s particular people over the rest of humanity. As Levinas puts it,
“Simple tolerance? God alone knows how much love that tolerance demands.”64
Tolerance of foreign strangers represents a decidedly monotheistic political act. The
fact that such an act can occur at all stands as nothing less than a shining testament to the
God who makes it possible: “That a people should accept those who come and settle among
them – even though they are foreigners, with their way of speaking, their smell – that a
people should give them an aksaniah, such a place at the inn, and the wherewithal to breathe
and to live – is a song to the glory of the God of Israel.” Indeed, Levinas goes so far as to
maintain that those who sing this particular “song” by “admit(ting) others among one’s own”
mark themselves as members the “Messianic order.”65
This represents Levinas’s unique contribution to postmodern politics. Far from
counseling a glib relativism, Levinas’s thought provides a normative criterion by which
nations can be held ethically responsible. In Levinas’s ethico-political calculus, a nation will
distinguish itself as either noble or base – as either a State of Caesar or as a member of the
Messianic order, as it were – by virtue of how it treats foreigners. As Levinas writes, “To
shelter the other in one’s own land or home, to tolerate the presence of the landless and
homeless on the ‘ancestral soil,’ so jealously, so meanly loved – is that the criterion of
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humanness? Unquestionably so.”66 This “criterion of humanness” is central to a politics of
hospitality, and is reiterated continuously throughout Levinas’s entire corpus. As such, it
represents perhaps the pivotal “formula” that political actors are compelled to take with them
when making the leap from ethics to politics.
That being said, it suffers from a crippling vagueness. What exactly does it mean to
“tolerate” the presence of the “landless” on the “ancestral soil”? What is the extent and
nature of the native’s responsibility to the foreigner? Levinas’s failure to provide definitive
answers to these questions is hardly incidental. Like Heidegger, whose aversion to the
political was deeply embedded in his philosophical thought, Levinas’s “politics of suspicion”
has a deep-seated rationale. Whereas Heidegger is humbled by Being, Levinas is left
speechless in the face of the Other. Although the face of the Third calls for the language of
justice, Levinas seems hesitant to oblige for fear of harming the Other.
Levinas’s lack of conceptual specificity in this regard is complemented by a related
difficulty. Here, I am compelled to mention the question of Israel in Levinas’s thought. For
Levinas, the founding of the Zionist State is “one of the greatest events of internal history,
and, indeed, of all History.”67 In ascribing world-historic importance to the Israeli State,
Levinas reveals himself to be a proponent of Zionist exceptionalism. Is Levinas guilty of
sneaking nationalism in through the Zionist back door? To be sure, Levinas’s doctrine of
Zionist exceptionalism is no ordinary nationalism. Levinas, it should be borne in mind, was
an official citizen of France, not Israel. Furthermore, Israel poses a double function in
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Levinas’s thought both as an ideal state where social justice is incarnated and as a real state
where the drive to realize justice is compromised by existing political reality. As an
expression of universalism, Levinas’s Zionism transcends the boundaries of mere
nationalism: “Our text, which began with the cities of refuge, reminds or teaches us that the
longing for Zion, that Zionism, is not one more nationalism or particularism; nor is it a
simple search for a place of refuge.”68
By the same token, however, when Levinas conflates the existing state of Israel with
the Messianic State, he falls prey to the temptation of nationalism. Coming from a thinker
unusually alert to the “cruelty” entailed by the nationalistic attempt to “put down roots,”
Levinas’s Zionism is in obvious tension with the universalistic spirit of his thought. For
when Levinas praises the existing State of Israel, “the non-place of alterity has become the
place of Israel’s borders.”69
Nothing more eloquently attests to this tension than a radio broadcast that Levinas
participated in shortly after the massacres in the Chatila and Sabra camps in Israel-occupied
Lebanon in 1982. In this radio broadcast, the interviewer Shlomo Malka asked Levinas the
following question: “Emmanuel Levinas, you are the philosopher of the ‘Other,’ Isn’t
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history, isn’t politics the very site of the encounter with the ‘Other,’ and for the Israeli, isn’t
the ‘Other’ above all the Palestinian?” Levinas’s reply is worth quoting in full:
My definition of the Other is completely different. The Other is the neighbor, who is
not necessarily kin, but who can be. And in that sense, if you’re for the Other, you’re
for the neighbor. But if your neighbor attacks another neighbor or treats him
unjustly, what can you do? Then alterity takes on another character, in alterity we
can find an enemy, or at least then we are faced with the problem of knowing who is
right and who is wrong, who is just and who is unjust. There are people who are
wrong.70
Thus, the Other presents himself as a neighbor who can present himself or herself as either a
friend or an enemy. Presumably, the Palestinian refugees murdered by the members of the
Phalngist Militia had presented themselves as enemies not worthy of welcome. In this
pronouncement, ethical sensitivity is supplanted by Machiavellian Realpolitik.
This statement cannot be dismissed as a mere aberration because the problem of
alterity transcends the question of Israel in Levinas’s thought. The Palestinian Other is not
the only Other that can present itself as an enemy. For example, in a notorious essay,
Levinas argues that both Jews and Christians are threatened by “the rise of countless masses
of Asiatic and undeveloped peoples . . . who no longer refer to our holy history, for whom
Abraham, Isaac and Jacob no longer mean anything.” But why should the influx of Asian
immigrants be a threat to the Judeo-Christian heritage of the West? Levinas’s answer is that
the threat posed by “the yellow peril” is “not racial, it is spiritual. It does not involve inferior
values; it involves a radical strangeness, a stranger to the weight of its past, from which there
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does not filter any familiar voice or inflection, a lunar or Martian past.”71 Hence, the threat
posed by the Asian Other lies in its “radical strangeness.”
Levinas’s dire warnings about the threat posed by the “yellow peril” represent the
Franco-Jewish philosopher at his very worst. The fact that such statements could be made by
Levinas, the “philosopher of the ‘Other’,” attests to just how formidable a challenge it is to
extend hospitality to the Other. In these instances, Levinas fails to extend hospitality to the
Other, and fails spectacularly. Even so, the fact that Levinas’s hospitality ethos staggers
under the burden of his own shortcomings does not negate his insights any more than
Heidegger’s temporary support for Nazism nullifies his status as one of the twentieth
century’s preeminent thinkers. Levinas’s contribution lies in conceptualizing a politics that
is wholly centered around the “needs of strangers.”
Against the Heideggerian notion of putting down roots, Levinas emphasizes the
ethical necessity of uprooting oneself from one’s “place in the sun” in obedience to an
imperative of divine origin. In celebrating the virtues of a nomadic relationship to place,
Levinas reveals himself to be a thinker who eloquently speaks to the plight of those displaced
by the crisis of the nation-state system. His politics of hospitality responds to the suffering
of the homeless by insisting that political leaders are morally compelled to welcome the
refugee into the sanctity of the homeland. That said, the fact that Levinas fails to uphold his
hospitality ethos with respect to the Palestinian and Asian Other suggests that there is
something fundamentally amiss about Levinas’s politics of hospitality. Thus, as ethically
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compelling as Levinas’s political vision might be, it fails to due justice to what Heidegger
characterized as the human desire for rootedness. As such, it raises the question of whether
the human need for rootedness can be reconciled with the ethical imperative to welcome the
stranger. The possibility of such a politics is the subject of the next, and concluding, chapter.
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Chapter 7: Conclusion:
Towards a Postmodern Politics of Place

Where is my home? I ask and seek and have sought
for it. I have not found it.
Friedrich Nietzsche
Thus Spoke Zarathustra

I. Introduction
Heidegger’s concern with the problem of homelessness stretches from Being and
Time to his postwar work, animating everything from his early analysis of everydayness
(Alltäglichkeit) to his later critique of modern technology. In response to this perceived
crisis, Heidegger advances several ontological models that highlight the embedded nature of
human existence. In Being and Time, Heidegger identifies the world as the place where
Being becomes manifest. In the first division of the text, Heidegger suggests that human
beings avoid becoming existentially uprooted from their worldly moorings when they
individually comes to grips with the finite nature of their existence. In the second division,
however, Heidegger argues that human beings achieve authenticity when they engage in
communicative struggle to realize the destiny (Geschick) of a people or community (Volk).
In the years of his 1929-1935 turn (Kehre), Heidegger would eliminate the rhetorical tension
between individualism and collectivism by arguing that language or art is the locus of
ontological revelation. In An Introduction to Metaphysics, Heidegger suggests that a
spiritual rejuvenation of the German nation is the means by which the German people can
maintain its sense of linguistic autochthony in an epoch characterized by standardized
rootlessness. However, in his postwar lectures and writings, Heidegger would retreat from
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the notion that voluntaristic action is the panacea to the loss of Bodenständigkeit in
modernity. For the late Heidegger, human beings naturally dwell in the fourfold (Geviert) of
earth, sky, divinities, and mortals. Hence, only by saving the earth, receiving the sky,
awaiting the divinities, and escorting mortals can human beings find a home in a homeless
age.
Such is the nature of Heidegger’s career-long homecoming project, a project that is as
dynamic as it is provocative. For Levinas, Heidegger’s homecoming project is objectionable
because it is averse to transcendence and conducive to tyranny. Mindful of the flaws
endemic to the Heideggerian project, Levinas advances an alternative that is infinite in scope
and liberationist in intent. For Levinas, the self maintains a proper relationship to place
when it welcomes the Other into the home (la maison). However, the host is also obligated
to extend welcome to the Third (la tiers) by creating political institutions that are ethically
responsible, respectful of human dignity, and monotheistic in orientation.
Levinas thus not only levels an insightful critique of Heideggerian ontology, but also
advances an alternative vision of how human beings should properly relate to place. But
what are the larger philosophical and political implications of the Heidegger-Levinas debate?
In this chapter, I shall attempt to answer this question by way of a more dialogic engagement
with the thought of Heidegger and Levinas. I will begin by relating their conflicting views,
once again, to Hegel’s discussion of the homeless spirit. For Hegel, the rise of the homeless
spirit is a consequence of the liberation of subjectivity. Although Heidegger and Levinas are
critical of the subjective stance that engenders the rise of the homeless spirit, they posit
different solutions to the Hegelian problematic, with Heidegger advocating an ontology of
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place and Levinas propounding an ethics of hospitality (hospitalité). After examining the
political implications of Heideggerian homecoming and Levinasian hospitality, I will level
some criticisms at both of their respective positions. Then, I will attempt to identify some of
the essential elements of a postmodern politics of place through a consideration of
Heidegger’s interpretation of Sophocles’s Antigone and Levinas’s reading of the Biblical
story of Abraham. As I will argue, a postmodern politics of place is ontological and ethical.
As such, a postmodern politics of place navigates a middle ground between the polar
extremes of nationalistic chauvinism and rootless cosmopolitanism.
II. Heidegger, Levinas, and the Problem of the Homeless Spirit
This study began with a consideration of Hegel’s discussion of the birth of the
homeless spirit in Greek antiquity. In Hegel’s narrative, the Socratic liberation of
subjectivity represents the birth of individual self-consciousness in the Greek polis.
However, for Hegel, the rise of self-consciousness is profoundly alienating. As an
individual, the subject feels separated from the tribe. Similarly, as a creature characterized
by self-consciousness, the subject is condemned to regard its community from a certain
distance. Hence, the split between individual and community engendered by the rise of
subjectivity introduces a feeling of estrangement that demands reconciliation.
Like Hegel, Heidegger argues that the problem of homelessness is an inevitable
byproduct of the liberation of subjectivity. And like Hegel, Heidegger suggests that the
liberation of subjectivity occurred in the thought of the ancient Greeks, although it would
only assume modern form in the thought of Descartes, Leibniz, Kant, Hegel, and Nietzsche.
However, whereas Hegel had regarded the liberation of subjectivity as an essentially
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progressive development, in Heidegger’s view the Cartesian liberation of subjectivity is
tragic because it engenders the plight of homelessness that blights the modern age. Thus,
Heidegger’s project is to effect a return to the pre-subjective state that man enjoyed prior to
the irruption of individual self-consciousness. However, because modern subjectivity is the
logical outgrowth of pre-modern metaphysics, a homecoming does not merely entail a return
to man’s pre-subjective state but also to his pre-metaphysical state as well. In sum,
Heidegger calls for man to return home to his homeland (Heimat) where he will exist in a
state of nearness to Being that has been absent in the West since Greek antiquity.
In the homeland, individuals will not be autonomous but will be fundamentally
embedded within the larger community. Furthermore, individuals will relate to their
communities in a spirit of devotional appreciation rather than critical distance. In the
Heimat, then, the individual is ensconced in the community and there is no consciousness of
self. Moreover, there is no politics in the modern sense. As Catherine Zuckert notes,
Compared to the dehumanizing alienation and exploitation, standardization and
pollution characteristic of contemporary industrial society, Heidegger’s homey world
initially looks very attractive. Upon reflection, however, we see that his turn away
from the technological results of metaphysics leads him to embrace an entirely
tradition-based world. Founded on explicit denial of any eternal or universally valid
moral truths, this world would have no philosophy or science. There would be no
moral principles applicable to human beings as such, although there would be mores
or customs. Although thought and poetry would be needed to help people recollect
the origin and beauty of their way of life, there would, strictly speaking, be no
innovation or criticism. (Nor would there be much criticism; there would be only
devotional appreciation). Articles of use would be crafted and buildings erected, but
there would be no scientific discoveries or technological innovations. Production
would occur primarily for domestic consumption; there would be little commerce
from (or challenge from) other countries. Rather than a means of calculation,
mathematics would once again become a leisured activity as it had in ancient Greece.
Most important of all, there would be no politics in the modern sense. According to
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Heidegger, the power-seeking attributed to human “nature” belongs only to the
philosophically-defined world of the West.1
Heidegger’s longing for the homeland looms in the background of his career-long
critique of Western subjectivity. In Being and Time, however, Heidegger’s critique of
Western subjectivity is decidedly ambiguous. On the one hand, Heidegger’s assertion that
Da–sein is Being-in-the-world points to the rooted nature of human existence. Da–sein,
Heidegger declares, is not a self-conscious individual but is a being that is ensconced in a
communal world that dictates its practical and theoretical concerns. On the other hand,
Heidegger’s discussion of angst (Angst) drives a wedge between the self and world. In sum,
Heidegger’s analysis of anxiety suggests that human beings are never truly at home in the
world. Of course, Heidegger’s discussion of the Volk can be read as an attempt to reassert
the embedded nature of human existence. Seemingly, the historical destiny that unites
Da–sein to its Volk is the nexus that links the self to the world. Overall, however,
Heidegger’s early homecoming attempt is ambiguous.
Heidegger’s critique of subjectivity would become more internally consistent in his
middle-period work. In arguing that Being becomes unconcealed in language, Heidegger
effectively suggests that the individual subject is ensconced in a linguistic whole that
precludes the possibility of detached theoretical contemplation. However, the stress on
voluntarism that underlies Heidegger’s ringing call for the German nation to engender a
metaphysical revolution in the West suggests that he has not wholly freed his thought from
the taint of subjectivism. Arguably, Heidegger has merely substituted collective
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subjectivism for individual subjectivism. While this substitution is of no small consequence,
especially in relation to the question of politics, the spirit of subjectivism is arguably no less
pronounced in Heidegger’s middle-period work than in his early work.
In the aftermath of his mid-1930s confrontation with Nietzsche and his failed
rectorship, however, Heidegger himself subsequently came to the conclusion that nationalism
is merely subjectivity writ large. Indeed, to the later Heidegger, all political “isms” are
manifestations of modern subjectivism. Hence, the non-political tone of Heidegger’s call for
mortals to dwell in the fourfold of earth, sky, divinities, and mortals can be seen as a
manifestation of his anti-subjective ethos. To the extent that such an enterprise is feasible,
Heidegger’s later-work consummates his attempt to overcome the spirit of subjectivism.
Insofar as the fourfold is characterized by a primordial oneness, there can be no separation
between the individual “mortal” and its other components. Similarly, non-subjective
meditation on man’s “abode” in the “house of Being” supplants critical reflection in
Heidegger’s later work, thus effecting a reconciliation between subject and object in a
decidedly mystical manner.
For Levinas, Heidegger’s critique of subjectivity is tainted by ontological supremacy,
anti-humanistic bias, and pagan religiosity. Not surprisingly, then, Levinas posits himself as
a defender of subjectivity, an intention that he announces at the very beginning of Totality
and Infinity: “This book does then present itself as a defense of subjectivity, but it will
apprehend subjectivity, not at the level of its purely egoist protection against totality, nor in
its anguish before death but as founded in the idea of infinity.”2 However, as the above
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statement makes clear, Levinas is by no means an unqualified defender of subjectivity.
Levinas is no apologist for a subjectivity predicated on Cartesian egoism or Kierkegaardian
angst, but only for a subjectivity founded on the idea of infinity. As we shall see, this
qualification is of no small consequence.
In Levinas’s view, subjectivity is worthy of being defended because individuality is
the vital prerequisite for ethical action: “I am defined as a subjectivity, as a singular person,
as an ‘I’ precisely because I am exposed to the Other.”3 Similarly, only an individual
conscious of its autonomy can shoulder its asymmetrical, infinite responsibility for the Other.
However, subjectivism is problematic because it potentially complements the totalization of
alterity that characterizes the history of Western ontology. While individualism is
foundational to ethical action, it can foster a callous disregard for the welfare of the Other.
Similarly, while self-consciousness is a vital prerequisite for ethical conduct, it can facilitate
a solipsistic manner of approaching reality that is averse to transcendence. Hence, for
Levinas, subjectivity only merits defense if it recognizes the inter-subjective nature of human
existence and if it is open to its infinite dimension.
We can see Levinas’s ambiguous view of subjectivism in his view of Socrates. On
the one hand, Socrates’s urbanity complements Judaism’s humanistic thrust: “Socrates
preferred the town, in which one meets people, to the countryside and the trees. Judaism is
the brother of the Socratic message.”4 However, Socrates’s manner of philosophizing is
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objectionable because its inward-looking ethos effectively annihilates otherness: “The
primacy of the same was Socrates’s teaching, to receive nothing of the Other but what is in
me, as though in all eternity I was in possession of what comes to me from the outside – to
receive nothing free.”5 So, while Socrates’s manner of existence is marked by a
responsiveness to otherness, his mode of philosophizing remains centered on the self. In this
sense, Socrates is emblematic of the ambiguous legacy of subjectivity.
Unlike Socratic subjectivity, ethical subjectivity is open to transcendence. Indeed,
the Levinasian subject is a host (hôte) of otherness. As Levinas puts it, “Prior to every vision
of self it (self-consciousness) is accomplished by holding oneself up (se tenant); it is
implanted in itself as a body and it keeps itself (se tient), in its interiority, in its home. It thus
accomplishes separation positively, without being reducible to a negation of the being from
which it separates. But thus precisely, it can welcome that being. The subject is a host.”6
By acting as host to the Other, the subject realizes itself as an ethical being.
Hence, in the debate between Heidegger and Levinas on subjectivity, we come face to
face with two conflicting views of subjectivity. For Heidegger, man’s attempt to assert
himself as a self-conscious individual is a symptom of his homelessness. For Levinas,
however, man is primordially homeless, and his attempt to assert himself as a subject is a
necessary component of his existence as a moral being. Just as importantly, the HeideggerLevinas debate on subjectivity is fraught with political consequences. The irruption of
subjectivity is a politically consequential development because it propels the self’s attempt to

5

Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 43.

6

Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 299.
237

return to the tribe or community from which it is estranged. For Heidegger and Levinas, the
political search for home results in two radically dissimilar political visions.
III. The Politics of Heideggerian Homecoming and Levinasian Hospitality
For Heidegger, modern politics is tainted by the spirit of subjectivism. In Being and
Time, Heidegger argues that the public space is a place where Da–sein is dominated by the
they (das Man). In An Introduction to Metaphysics, Heidegger suggests that the modern
practice of politics is plagued by the spirit of social standardization and scientifictechnological calculation. And in his later work, Heidegger argues that all modern political
systems are in the grip of metaphysics and are hence organically incapable of facilitating a
confrontation between modern man and global technology. In all three phases of his work,
then, Heidegger accuses modern politics of exacerbating the crisis of homelessness that
plagues the West as a whole.
Given the inherently subjective nature of modern politics, the most appropriate
response would seem to be withdrawal from the political realm altogether. And sure enough,
much of Heidegger’s work counsels the abdication of the political realm. In the first half of
Being and Time, Heidegger argues that Da–sein safeguards its authenticity by avoiding the
public space that encourages inauthenticity. In his later work, Heidegger’s quietism is
evinced by his counsel for mortals to dwell rather than pursue political action. In these
respects, Heidegger’s homecoming project is apolitical, perhaps even antipolitical.
However, in other instances, Heidegger assumes a different stance towards the
political. In the second half of Being and Time, Heidegger implies that fully realized
authenticity necessitates that Da–sein pursue collective action. In An Introduction to
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Metaphysics, Heidegger calls upon the German nation to “wrest” a destiny from within itself
to save Europe and the Continent from the threat of nihilism. And in “The Origin of the
Work of Art,” Heidegger argues that the founding of a political state is a means by which
ontological truth comes to presence. In such instances, Heidegger reveals himself to be a
thinker who is intimately concerned with the question of politics.
What are we to make of Heidegger’s ambiguous attitude towards the political? The
answer, of course, hinges around the concept itself. Here, it is useful to draw a distinction
between the ancient and the modern concepts of the political. For Heidegger, modern
politics is permeated by the spirit of subjectivity because it is metaphysical in nature. That is
to say, modern politics presupposes a given interpretation of the Being of beings, an
interpretation that is beyond the realm of questioning. In contrast, the practice of politics in
ancient Greece was non-metaphysical. Because it did not presuppose a metaphysical
foundation, the practice of the Greek political art invited questioning. As Stuart Elden puts
it,
Heidegger suggests that for modern eyes, the ‘political’ is the way in which history is
accomplished, and as such is itself unquestioned. The failure to question the
‘political’ belongs with its totality. The totality of the political is not simply based on
the arbitrary wilfulness of dictators, but in the metaphysical essence of modern
actuality in general. This metaphysical essence is, of course, fundamentally different
from the way in which the Greek world was historical. The ‘political’ is
unquestioned, yet the polis was for the Greeks that which was altogether worthy of
question. Hence, rethinking the polis leads us explicitly to question the ‘political,’ to
historicise it, to situate it.7
Viewed from this perspective, Heidegger’s critical stance to politics is really a manifestation
of his antipathy to modern politics. Conversely, Heidegger’s more politically-charged
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pronouncements are manifestations of his attempt to recover the ancient Greek concept of the
political.
What is the ancient Greek concept of the political, for Heidegger? Here, it is
instructive to note the motif of struggle (Auseinandersetzung) that permeates Heidegger’s
writings. In Being and Time, Heidegger’s emphasis on struggle is evinced in his discussion
of how the Volk frees up its destiny through communal “battle.” In An Introduction to
Metaphysics, Heidegger’s stress on struggle is exhibited in his discussion of how the founder
creates the polis through the performance of ontological violence. In its celebration of
struggle, Heidegger’s thought evinces a discernible enchantment with the agonistic character
of Greek political life. As Hannah Arendt notes, political action in the Greek polis was
agonal in character: “the public realm itself, the polis, was permeated by a fiercely agonal
spirit, where everybody had constantly to distinguish himself from all others, to show
through unique deeds or achievements that he was the best of all (aien aristeuein).”8
Considered from this vantage point, Heidegger’s emphasis on struggle is a manifestation of
his attempt to recover the agonistic aspect of the vita activa that animated the world of the
polis.
Heidegger’s celebration of the agonistic character of polis-life is at one with his
celebration of its hierarchical social structure. The Heideggerian stress on hierarchy appears
at numerous instances in Heidegger’s oeuvre. In Being and Time, the Heideggerian
celebration of hierarchy manifests itself in Heidegger’s brief yet significant mention of the
“heroes” who spearhead the Volk’s attempt to realize its historical destiny. In An
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Introduction to Metaphysics, an explicit elitism colors Heidegger’s discussion of the process
by which select individuals found the site of man’s “being-there.” In these instances,
Heidegger evinces a discernible, if subtle, enchantment with the emphasis on hierarchy that
characterized the outlook of the ancient Greeks. Indeed, the philosophical thought of the
post-Socratic Greek philosophers who stand opposed to Greek politics also exhibits the
Greek sense of hierarchy. In Plato’s Republic, Socrates conceptualizes a city where
philosopher-kings rule over guardians and ordinary craftsmen. In Aristotle’s Politics, a clear
distinction is drawn between the free citizen and the slave by nature: “Now, nature wishes to
make a difference also in the bodies of free and slave, with those of the latter being strong for
necessary uses and those of the former being erect and useless for such working but useful
for a political way of life” (1254b7).9 Considered from this vantage point, Heidegger’s
elitism is a manifestation of his attempt to recover the sense of rank that characterized both
Greek politics and philosophy.
Seemingly, the Heideggerian polis is characterized by agonistic conflict and a
hierarchical structure. While these are important features of the Heideggerian political
vision, an equally significant aspect of Heidegger’s political theory is his stress on the
ontological significance of place. For Heidegger, the Greek practice of politics was
necessarily place-bound. As we have seen, Heidegger continually stressed that the proper
translation of polis is not “city-state” but “site.” In defining the polis as site, Heidegger
suggests that the Greek practice of politics was spatially circumscribed. As it stands, the
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recognition that, in Henri Lefebvre’s words, “there is a politics of space because politics is
spatial,” runs counter to the cosmopolitan thrust of modern politics.10
The most ringing expression of the cosmopolitan universalism that underlies modern
politics was sounded by Immanuel Kant in his essay entitled “Perpetual Peace.” In that
essay, Kant writes the following:
Although this body politic presently exists only in very rough outline, a feeling seems
nonetheless to be already stirring among all its members who have an interest in the
whole, and this gives rise to the hope that, finally, after many revolutions of reform,
nature’s supreme objective, a universal cosmopolitan state, the womb in which all of
the human species’ original capacities will be developed.11
In this pronouncement, Kant expresses the modern longing for the arrival of the “universal
cosmopolitan state.” In the Kantian imagination, the universal cosmopolitan will supervene
over all national differences and thus render them politically inconsequential.
Like Kant, Heidegger anticipates the arrival of the universal cosmopolitan state. But
whereas Kant welcomes its arrival, Heidegger loathes it. For Heidegger, the universal
cosmopolitan state celebrated by Kant is the product of the metaphysical mode of thought
that is unique to the West. Or perhaps it is more accurate to say that the universal
cosmopolitan state is the product of the end of Western metaphysics: “The end of
philosophy means the beginning of the world civilization that is based upon Western
European thinking.”12 Suffice to say, by emphasizing the place-bound nature of political
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action, Heidegger undermines the universalist pretensions of the universal cosmopolitan state
celebrated by Kant.
In contrast to the universal and cosmopolitan state, Heidegger celebrates the
particular and provincial community. Whereas the universal and cosmopolitan state
encompasses all of the world’s peoples, the Heideggerian community houses a particular
Volk. Similarly, whereas the universal and cosmopolitan state is spatially boundless, the
Heideggerian community is limited in its geographic scope. Moreover, whereas the
universal and cosmopolitan state is governed by a state structure constructed on metaphysical
foundations, the Heideggerian community is governed by conventions that are decidedly premetaphysical in nature. Putting all of this together, Heidegger’s homecoming project looks
to effect a return to a world of agonistic struggle, heroic creators, and Bodenständigkeit.
What of the Levinasian political vision? As we have seen, Levinas is no less critical
of modern politics than Heidegger. But whereas Heidegger criticizes the metaphysical cast
of modern politics, Levinas charges it with being ontological in nature. For Levinas,
ontology is the process by which the self utilizes an arche to totalize the Other. By
extension, ontological politics is the process by which political actors utilize the institutions
of the state apparatus to totalize the Other. As Levinas puts it,
For me, the negative element, the lament of violence in the state, in the hierarchy
appears, appears even when the hierarchy functions perfectly, when everyone submits
to universal ideas. There are cruelties which are terrible because they proceed from
the necessity of the reasonable order. There are, if you like, the tears that a civil
servant cannot see, the tears of the Other.13
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Given the inherently violent nature of politics, it comes as little surprise that the bulk
of Levinas’s writings exhibit an aversion to conventional, practical politics. However, the
fact that Levinas is hardly an apolitical thinker becomes evident when his concept of the
Third is taken in account. In the Levinasian ethical schema, the appearance of the Third
compels the self to pursue social justice by creating monotheistic political institutions that
respect the dignity of the individual.
Here, it is not difficult to discern how Levinas’s thought overlaps with modern
liberalism. Like Hobbes and Locke, Levinas argues that political institutions should respect
the dignity of the individual qua individual. That said, Levinas’s defense of individual
dignity is decidedly non-liberal. For Levinas, the individual should be respected not because
it possesses rights, but rather because it is singularly responsible for the welfare of the Other.
As Levinas puts it, “As I see it, subjective protest is not received favourably on the pretext
that its egoism is sacred, but because the I alone can perceive the ‘secret tears’ of the Other
which are caused by the very reasonableness of the hierarchy.”14 Needless to say, Levinas’s
apologia for liberalism is highly idiosyncratic; as Fred C. Alford puts it, “Levinas’s defense
of liberalism is likely the strangest defense the reader has encountered.”15 Indeed, for Alford,
Levinas’s defense of liberalism is so qualified that it can be described as a type of “inverted
liberalism.” “Inverted” or not, Levinas’s brand of liberalism recognizes the importance of
protecting individual human dignity.
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If Levinas’s idiosyncratic defense of individualism is in tension with liberalism, his
celebration of fraternity underscores just how far the Franco-Jewish philosopher’s political
thought stands from traditional liberal political theory. In calling for a politics of fraternité,
of course, Levinas echoes a time-honored theme of French republican thought. However,
Levinas’s emphasis on fraternity is perhaps more akin to an Aristotelian politics of friendship
(philia) than French republicanism. In Levinas’s thought, “at the level of politics, the ethical
relation is translated into . . . a classical conception of political friendship as fraternity, as a
relation between free equals who happen to be male.”16 In the French republican tradition,
the stress on fraternité is balanced by a corresponding emphasis on liberté. In the Levinasian
ethico-political schema, however, liberté is downplayed in favor of fraternité. In this
respect, Levinas’s political thought echoes the Aristotelian emphasis on communal holism.
For Levinas, the human fraternity is a coherent community by virtue of its
monotheistic character. That is to say, the Levinasian fraternal order is undergirded not by
universal possession of the rights of man, but by the sovereignty of God. For Levinas, God
is the ultimate source of ethical responsibility. Absent the existence of God, the self would
be free to totalize the Other without a second thought. As Caygill puts it, “Against the
principle of freedom and being as gathering or domination, Levinas seeks protection from
elemental evil in the thought of a human dignity emerging from a fraternity in which humans
are called by God to responsibility for the other man.”17
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In its monotheistic component, Levinas’s political theory does not recall Aristotle as
much as St. Augustine, who had argued that human friendship is mediated by the presence of
God. In the City of God, Augustine argues that life’s dangers make a “carefree” friendship
impossible: “Yet the more friends we have and the more dispersed they are in different
places, the further and more widely extend our fears that some evil may befall them from
among all the evils of this present world.”18 From an Augustinian perspective, the evils of
this world make a purely immanent friendship impossible. Levinas agrees with Augustine in
the sense that the members of the Levinasian fraternity are brothers and sisters with one
another only because of the presence of God. Hence, there can be no strict separation
between fraternity and monotheism in Levinas’s political theory.
For Levinas, the family is a model of human fraternity. Totality and Infinity
concludes with an invocation of the “marvel of the family”: “The situation in which the I
thus posits itself before truth in placing its subjective morality in the infinite time of its
fecundity – a situation in which the instant of eroticism and the infinity of paternity are
conjoined is concretized in the marvel of the family.” In Levinas’s view, the family is a
“marvel” because it is an expression of human fecundity. Unlike the State, the individual’s
submission to the familial order is based upon human fecundity, not arbitrary coercion. In
this sense, the family is a paradigm of a communal arrangement that preserves human
plurality: “In the biological fact of fecundity are outlined the lineaments of fecundity in
general as a relation between man and man and between the I and itself not resembling the
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structures constitutive of the State, lineaments of a reality that is not subordinated to the State
as a means and does not represent a reduced model of the State.”19
As a thinker who celebrates the “marvel of the family,” Levinas is a philosopher who
recognizes the importance of community. However, although Levinas is a defender of
community, he is not a defender of communal particularism. For Levinas, the imperative to
create a monotheistic community demands a corresponding embrace of moral universalism.
In the Levinasian community, individuals will demonstrate their fidelity to God by
overcoming their localized attachments. For Levinas, this is accomplished through the
extension of hospitality to the stranger.
The ethical imperative to welcome the Other operates on a variety of levels. Here, it
is instructive to note the ambivalent nature of Levinas’s concept of the Other. For Derrida,
the stranger who merits welcome are the aliens who request asylum in a given national
territory. As Derrida writes,
By means of discreet though transparent allusions, Levinas oriented our gazes toward
what is happening today, not only in Israel but in Europe and in France, in Africa,
and Asia, since at least the time of the first World War and since what Hannah Arendt
called The Decline of the Nation State: everywhere that refugees of every kind,
immigrants with or without citizenship, exiled or forced from their homes, whether
with or without papers, from the heart of Nazi Europe to the former Yugoslavia, from
the Middle East to Rwanda, from Zaire all the way to California, from the Church of
St. Bernard to the thirteenth arrondissement in Paris, Cambodians, Armenians,
Palestinians, Algerians, and so many others call for a change in the socio- and geopolitical space – a juridico-political mutation, though, before this, assuming that this
limit still has any persistence, an ethical conversion.20
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On this account, Levinas is a thinker who speaks to the plight of the “refugees” and
“immigrants” displaced by the crisis of the nation-state system. To Annabel Herzog,
however, the Other who merits welcome are the disenfranchised. In this view, Levinas is a
thinker who speaks to the plight of all those who are unable to find a place in modern
society. Which interpretation is correct? Actually, there is no necessary contradiction
between the two respective positions. Arguably, Levinas is concerned about the plight of
everyone who lacks access to a home. In his discussion of the “Dwelling” in Totality and
Infinity, Levinas describes the act of hospitality as occurring in the anarchical plane where
ethical action occurs. However, the entrance of the Third renders the act of hospitality a
decidedly political act. Putting all of this together, the self is compelled to welcome the
Other into the private space of the home and the public space of the homeland.
So, with Heidegger and Levinas, we are presented with two conflicting political
visions. Heidegger’s politics of homecoming looks to a world of rooted communities
founded by and presided over by the exceptional few who experience the struggle
(Auseinandersetzung) of Being with singular intensity. Levinas’s politics of hospitality
looks to a universal world order presided over by a single godhead who commands human
beings to overcome their local attachments and extend hospitality to the homeless.
Obviously, Heidegger’s politics of homecoming stands far removed from Levinas’s politics
of hospitality. Be that as it may, both political visions are similar in the sense that they both
suffer from significant weaknesses.
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IV. Heidegger and Levinas: Misgivings
In Continental philosophy, criticisms of Heidegger have become a familiar part of
the intellectual landscape. Everyone from Derrida to Habermas has taken Heidegger to task
for a variety of perceived shortcomings. Indeed, even such non-Continentals such as Richard
Rorty have participated in this celebrated Continental pastime.21 Viewed from this
perspective, Levinas is one of a long line of critics of the philosopher of Being. Although
Levinas’s critique of Heidegger is couched in a Continental vernacular that is seemingly
impenetrable, the crux of Levinas’s argument is actually quite simple: Heidegger prizes
ontology over ethics. And because he elevates ontology over ethics, the German
philosopher’s political vision is tainted by ontological supremacy.
As noted earlier, Heidegger looks to reinvigorate the Being of Western politics with
the agonistic spirit of Greek antiquity. At its best, the Heideggerian celebration of struggle
(Auseinandersetzung) provides a refreshing counterpoint to the emphasis on reconciliation
and compromise that characterizes modern liberal politics. From a Levinasian standpoint,
however, the last thing that the world needs is an infusion of Greek agonism into the already
violent realm of politics. But even in the context of a more humane age, agonism is
objectionable on moral grounds. The excessive celebration of conflict renders precarious the
possibility of a peaceful co-existence between the self and the Other. In order to be ethical,
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peace must be sought “in a relation that starts from an I and goes to the Other, in desire and
goodness, where the I both maintains itself and exists without egoism.”22
A similar critique can be leveled at the Heideggerian defense of hierarchy.
Obviously, Heidegger’s celebration of hierarchy is a cry of protest against the homogenizing
tendencies of modern egalitarianism. At its worst, Heidegger’s celebration of the “violent
men” who found and preside over a given polis raises the specter of a Nietzschean master
morality in which the dignity of the many is trampled on by the few. To be sure, Heidegger
does not explicitly advocate a master morality. Even so, Heidegger’s defense of hierarchy is
nonetheless disconcerting if only because it evinces an utter lack of concern for the welfare
of those who occupy a less exalted position on the ontological hierarchy. As Fried notes,
“Heidegger’s Nietzscheanism, that is, his withering scorn for democracy, morality, and
equality, draws him into an ontological politics where only the rare and great can lead a
people into a confrontation with history.”23
Heidegger’s lack of concern for the victims of heroic self-aggrandizement is
indicative of a deeper problem that afflicts the German philosopher’s thought. Put simply,
Heidegger’s philosophy is ethically vacuous. In Being and Time, this ethical vacuum is
apparent in Heidegger’s pejorative description of Being-with (Mitsein). In An Introduction
to Metaphysics, it is evinced in Heidegger’s disturbing indifference to the ethical
consequences of the founding act. And in the “Letter on Humanism,” Heidegger’s blindness
is manifest in his refusal to posit a normative ethics. From Being and Time to the “Letter on
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Humanism,” the amoral cast of Heideggerian ontology is manifest. As John Caputo puts it,
in Heidegger’s thought, “The victim never comes to presence, never makes an appearance on
the scene of the history of Being. . . . That is why the gas chamber is the same as the tractor,
as motorized farm equipment. The victim is not a matter of concern, is not what is at
issue.”24
Heidegger’s emphasis on the ontological significance of place is tainted by the same
spirit of ethical insensitivity. Heidegger’s place-bound ethos can be read as an eloquent cry
of protest against the deracinating effects of globalization. For Levinas, however, the
Heideggerian stress on place is inherently cruel because its demarcation between sacred and
profane space reinforces the distinction between native and foreigner that underlies
nationalism. Indeed, viewed from Levinas’s perspective, the specter of cruelty haunts all
place-oriented political theories. As William E. Connolly puts it, “the nostalgia in political
theory (and the culture at large) for a ‘politics of place’ in which territoriality, sovereignty,
electoral accountability and belonging all correspond to each other in one ‘political place’
has the double effect today of depoliticizing global issues and weakening the ability to
challenge state chauvinism.”25
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If Heidegger’s politics of homecoming can be accused of ontological chauvinism and
ethical insensitivity, what of Levinas’s politics of hospitality? Arguably, Levinas
excessively emphasizes ethics at the expense of ontology. For Levinas, all attempts to speak
to the question of Being are inherently violent. While the example of Heidegger suggests
that there is more than a grain of truth to this position, it nonetheless presents a skewed
picture of ontology. While ontology can potentially engender the totalization of the Other,
ontology is also necessary for ethical action. As Derrida notes,
Not only is the thought of Being not ethical violence (as Levinas claims), but it seems
no ethics – in Levinas’s sense can be opened without it . . . (The thought of Being)
conditions the respect for the other as what it is. Without this acknowledgement,
which is not a knowledge, or without this ‘letting-be’ of an existent (Other) as
something existing outside me in the sense of what it is (first in its alterity), no ethics
would be possible . . . to let the other be in its existence and essence as Other means
that what gains access to, is that which is essence and that which is existence; and
that is the Being which they presuppose. Without this, no letting-be would be
possible, and first of all, the letting be of respect and of the ethical commandment
addressing itself to freedom. Violence would reign to such a degree that it would no
longer able to appear and be named.26
Derrida illuminates how Levinas’s rigid dichotomy between ontology and ethics, like his
corresponding distinctions between philosophy and ethics and Greek and Jew, is untenable.
Indeed, the ethics/ontology dichotomy is implausible even within the limited purview of
Levinas’s own thought. How can the self act ethically on behalf of the Other if the Other is
not identified as Other? Seemingly, Levinasian ethics rests on an inadequate ontological
foundation.
Because he is oblivious to the importance of ontology, Levinas is blind to the
ontological significance of place. On one level, Levinas’s obliviousness to the importance of
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place is admirable in that it renders him largely – thought not completely – immune to the
chauvinistic enthusiasms that ensnared Heidegger. On another level, however, it is a
regrettable oversight. The uprooting engendered by the spread of modern technology, as
even Levinas recognizes, undermines identity. The technological destruction of identity
creates an ontological vacuum begging to be filled. For Hannah Arendt, the existence of
“homelessness on an unprecedented scale, rootlessness to an unprecedented depth” provided
an atmosphere conducive to the rise of modern totalitarianism.27 Viewed from the
perspective of twentieth-century political history, the problem of homelessness demands
attention if only because of the catastrophic political consequences that potentially flow from
it.
Even if we ignore the political consequences that are entailed by it, however, the
predicament of homelessness demands attention for another reason. In our time, the march
of globalization annihilates cultural differences though the spread of Western science and
technology. None foresaw this development with greater perspicuity than Heidegger. In the
words of Strauss, Heidegger anticipated “the victory of an ever more completely urbanized,
ever more completely technological West over the whole planet – complete levelling and
uniformity regardless of whether it is brought about by iron compulsion or by soapy
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advertisement of the output of mass production.” In staring into the abyss of global
uniformity, Strauss observes, “Heidegger is the only man who has an inkling of the problem
of a world society.”28 The “world society” of the future, Heidegger foresaw, is a society in
which otherness is absent. In seemingly dismissing the danger to otherness represented by
the spread of globalization, Levinas ignores a potent source of ontological violence in the
contemporary world.
Here, it is instructive to reconsider Levinas’s view of technology. In “Heidegger,
Gagarin, and Us,” Levinas draws a linkage between modern technology and Judaism. For
Levinas, Judaism and technology are linked by their nomadic ethos: both Judaism and
technology uproot human beings from the earth and thereby free them from the cruelties
engendered by the pagan emphasis on place.29 Hence, because modern technology carries on
the uprooting work of Judaism, its spread is an essentially salutary development. By
uprooting human beings from the earth, modern technology returns human beings to the
homeless state that characterizes them at the most primordial level of their existence.
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As it stands, Levinas’s apologia for modern technology is flawed because it fails to
consider the possibility that there is a significant difference between natural and
technologically-induced homelessness. As Tijimes puts it,
Levinas identifies the nomadic existence too readily with the homelessness and
uprootedness of modern man. The adventure of Abraham leaving his own country
and going to the promised land is of a quite different character from the uprootedness
produced by modern technologies. Failing to comprehend the difference leads
Levinas to speak uncritically about modern technique.30
Tijimes’s point raises an obvious question: what is the difference between the “nomadic
existence” and the “homelessness and uprootedness of modern man”? Here, Heidegger’s
critique of technology gives us a possible answer.
For Levinas, the spread of global technology engenders a situation in which the self
and the Other face each other in a situation of perfect “nudity.” For Heidegger, however, the
rise of modern technology transforms human beings into standing-reserve (Bestand) raw
material. Hence, whereas Abraham’s departure from home enables him to encounter the
Other in a situation of perfect clarity, the uprooting engendered by modern technology
precludes the possibility of undistorted face-to-face interaction. In the technological epoch,
all individuals are compelled to present themselves as standard-reserve.
Seemingly, Levinas’s hostility to Heidegger leads him to adhere to an overly
sanguine view of modern technology. Hence, if Heidegger’s homecoming ethos potentially
engenders ontological chauvinism and ethical insensitivity, Levinas’s politics of hospitality
exhibits a blindness to the importance of ontology, a blindness that causes him to
underestimate the dangers of modern technology. Seemingly, both Heidegger and Levinas
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leave us pining for a politics of place that is ontological and ethical. Is it possible to envision
a politics of place that strikes a balance between the ontological need for rootedness and the
ethical imperative to respect alterity?
V. Conclusion
Up until this point, I have painted a decidedly negative portrait of Heidegger, noting
how his thought potentially engenders ontological chauvinism and ethical insensitivity.
While these dangers are risks of Heidegger’s thought, they are not necessary consequences of
his manner of thinking (Denken). As Thiele puts it,
It cannot be denied that Heidegger occasionally spoke of homelessness as if its
remedy entailed a national retrenchment. But a national, racial, ethnic or linguistic
circumspection of home, which is likely to produce a malignant chauvinism, is not
intrinsic to Heidegger’s thought. Heidegger’s philosophic understanding of human
being indicates that most fundamentally home is not found within the confines of
national borders, though it is not, for that reason, a private domain. Home does not
refer primarily to a spatial location. Rather, home is a relation of nearness to the
world. In this light, Heidegger’s lingering nationalism represents a nostalgic, and
therefore misconstrued, effort that stands opposed to the thrust of his philosophy as a
whole.31
Following the lead of Thiele, I will now attempt to explore the possibility of a Heidegger
who is open to otherness, a Heidegger whom Dallmayr calls “the Other Heidegger.”
In 1934, Heidegger offered a lecture course on Hölderlin’s “Germania” (Germanien)
and “The Rhine” (Der Rhein). At the beginning of the lecture course, Heidegger quotes the
following lines from Hölderlin: “Forbidden Fruit, like the laurel, however, / Is most of all
the fatherland. This (fruit) everyone should taste last.” The fact that Heidegger would quote
lines from the German poet that identify the “fatherland” as a “forbidden fruit” suggests that
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the German philosopher himself was beginning to grow wary of the nationalist euphoria that
seized Germany in the mid-1930s. However, Heidegger did not delineate exactly how the
German nation should comport its existence in an alternative fashion until 1941 when he
offered two more lecture courses on Hölderlin entitled “Remembrance” (Andenken) and “The
Ister” (Der Ister). In these lecture courses, the principal theme is the encounter between
native and foreign modes of existence. Taken together, these lecture courses present a
picture of Heidegger as a philosopher of cross-cultural encounter rather than a standardbearer of völkisch nationalism.
The subject matter of Heidegger’s lecture on the Ister is the motif of journeying.
Heidegger begins the lecture by discussing the river Danube that is the subject of Hölderlin’s
hymn. On one level, the river is a site for human settlement: “The river ‘is’ the locality that
pervades the abode of human beings upon the earth, determines them to where they belong
and where they are homely.” On another level, however, the river is a place of journey:
“The river is the locality of journeying. Yet the river is also the journeying of locality.”32
All in all, the river is both a site (Ortschaft) and a journey (Wanderschaft).
For Heidegger, the example of the river is emblematic of the home because the home
is also both a site and a journey. From this perspective, homecoming is less a sedentary
appropriation of otherness than an external journey into the realm of the foreign. As
Heidegger puts it,
Locality and journeying, however, in which the poetic essence of the rivers is
announced, relate to becoming homely in what is one’s own. And this is so in the
distinctive sense that one’s own, finding one’s own, and appropriating what one has
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found as one’s own, is not that which is most self-evident or easiest but remains what
is most difficult. As what is most difficult, it is taken into poetic care. . . . This
coming to be at home in one’s own in itself entails that human beings are initially,
and for a long time, and initially forever, not at home. And this in turn entails that
human beings fail to recognize, that they deny, and perhaps even have to deny and
flee what belongs to the home. Coming to be at home is thus a passage through the
foreign.33
Heidegger considers the theme of homecoming through journey through a discussion
of Sophocles’s Antigone. At the beginning of his exegesis, Heidegger focuses on the
opening lines of the first chorus song (polla ta deina kouden anthropou deinoteron pelei),
which he translates as “Manifold is the uncanny, yet nothing more uncanny looms or stirs
beyond the human being” (333-334). Seizing on the word deinon, which is customarily
translated as “strange” or “enormous,” Heidegger argues that deinon is properly translated as
“uncanny” (Unheimlich) or “unhomely” (Unheimisch). Properly understood, the opening
lines of the choral ode express the truism that human beings are distinguished by the fact that
they are homeless: “Sophocles’ word, which speaks of the human being as the most uncanny
being, says that human beings are, in a singular sense, not homely, and that their care is to
become homely.”34
In Heidegger’s view, the figure of Sophocles’s tragedy who most exemplifies the
homelessness of human existence is its main character, Antigone. This facet of Antigone’s
character is perhaps most apparent in her dialogue with her sister Ismene. In this dialogue,
Ismene attempts to dissuade Antigone from burying her brother Polynices. Insofar as such
an action defies Creon’s prohibition against burying the individual who had led an attack on
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Thebes, it is also one that invites retribution. In response, Antigone declares that she is
prepared pathein to deinon touto, which Heidegger translates as “to take up into my own
essence the uncanny that here and now appears.”35 That is to say, Antigone is prepared to
face up to the uncanny essence of her existence no matter what the consequences.
For Heidegger, Antigone’s response to Ismene is indicative of the spiritual
transformation that is entailed by the experience of homelessness. Estrangement is not a
product of human convention (nomos) but is instead a natural aspect of the human condition
that, properly experienced, causes human beings to rise to the fulness of their existential
potentiality. As Heidegger puts it, “This first of all entails that the unhomely is nothing that
human beings themselves make but rather the converse: something that makes them into
what they are and who they can be.”36 Viewed from this perspective, Antigone’s peculiar
excellence lies in the fact that she resolutely faces up to the homeless facet of human
existence. At the same time, by accepting her primordial uncanniness, Antigone achieves a
homecoming in the truest sense. Contemplated from this vantage point, Antigone’s death
represents an authentic homecoming. In Heidegger’s words, “Her dying is her becoming
homely, but a becoming homely within and from out of such being unhomely.”37
For Heidegger, this reading of Antigone’s character is further confirmed by the
closing words of the choral ode. In these lines, the chorus proclaims “Such shall not be
entrusted to my hearth, nor share their delusion with my knowing, who put such a thing to
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work” (373-375). In these lines, the chorus effectively expels Antigone from the “hearth,” or
the abode of human dwelling. However, the key question is what is meant by hearth. Does
the hearth mean a conventional home where human beings exist in a state of homeliness? If
this is the case, then the choral ode would be a mere affirmation of placid conformity.
However, the rest of the choral ode mitigates against such an interpretation. As noted earlier,
the beginning lines of the ode recognize human beings as “not homely.” If human beings are
not homely, then no human being can be completely at home in the hearth. Because it is a
place where the not homely are homely, then, the hearth is really a place of homeliness and
homelessness. For Heidegger, this is the “knowledge” of the hearth that is expressed by the
choral ode: “And if the most uncanny consists in being unhomely, then this knowledge must
be closer to the un-homely, indeed closer to the homely, and from such nearness have some
intimation of the law of being unhomely.”38
Thus, much as the river is a site of journey, the hearth is an abode of homelessness.
Seemingly, in his “Ister” lecture, Heidegger conceptualizes the home as a place that
transcends fixed boundaries. As Dallmayr puts it, “home or homecoming for Heidegger is
by no means a native possession but only the farthest horizon of the soul’s journey abroad.”39
Considered in relation to the question of Germany itself, Heidegger’s “Ister” lecture suggest
that a Germanic homecoming does not involve a renewed commitment to autochthony, but
rather a journey abroad.
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Needless to say, this is a very different Heidegger than the one that has been
presented thus far. Here, Heidegger’s emphasis on rootedness is counterbalanced by a
corresponding stress on journey. In these lectures, Heidegger counsels a return to the roots
of Western existence in order to cultivate a thinking of difference. In order to overcome the
hubris of the modern West, Heidegger advocates that the West return to its deepest roots. By
descending to its pre-metaphysical origins, the West effectively overcomes the rationalism
that is the modern expression of Western metaphysics. As it stands, this Heideggerian return
to the origins not only undermines Western rationalism but also the ontological
underpinnings of the West itself. As Strauss puts it, “the West has first to recover within
itself that which would make possible a meeting of West and East: its own deepest roots,
which antedate its rationalism, which in a way antedate the separation of West and East.”40
Hence, a journey to the origins of Western existence is at the same time a journey beyond the
boundary that separates the Occident from the Orient.
For Heidegger, homecoming necessitates a journey towards otherness. Interestingly
enough, the Biblical story of Abraham, a story much admired by Levinas, vividly illustrates
the sojourn towards alterity. For Levinas, the story of Abraham’s departure from home is
emblematic of the self’s journey from interiority to exteritority: “To the myth of Ulysses
returning to Ithaca, we wish to oppose the story of Abraham who leaves his fatherland for a
yet unknown land, and forbids his servant to even bring his son to the point of departure.”41
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In Levinas’s view, Abraham symbolizes the metaphysical journey towards otherness that is
manifest in what Levinas calls the “Jewish moments” of the Western tradition.42 For
Levinas, the Jewish moments are the instances in Occidental thought when infinity breaks
through the walls of totality. Such Jewish elements include Socrates’s daimon, Plato’s Good
(Agathon) beyond being, Aristotle’s active intellect, the trace in Plotinus, PseudoDionysius’s doctrine of via eminentiae, as well as Descartes’s idea of the infinite. In its own
way, the story of Abraham illuminates how a “Jewish moment” plays itself out on a spatial
continuum.
The story of Abraham is a story of departure: God orders Abraham to depart from his
“fatherland” in obedience to an imperative of divine origin (Gen: 12:1-3). Understood
symbolically, God’s command to Abraham implies that human beings are morally compelled
to sever their ties to their fatherland. It goes without saying that the story of Abraham has
profound Levinasian echoes. Like the Levinasian journey towards otherness, Abraham’s
journey is exterior in its trajectory. Indeed, not only does Abraham depart from his
fatherland, he also “forbids his servant to bring his son to the point of departure.”
Seemingly, the Abrahamic itinerary is unambiguously centrifugal in nature.
The affinity between the story of Abraham and Levinas’s thought is self-evident.
That being said, the story of Abraham also resonates with the vision of the home that
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Heidegger presents in his Hölderlin lectures. For Heidegger, the Danube river that is the
subject of Hölderlin’s hymn is a place of journey. Similarly, the hearth identified in the final
lines of the choral ode of Sophocles’s Antigone is a home occupied by the unhomely.
Likewise, in the Biblical story of Abraham, the home is a particular “land” that can only be
reached through the process of journey by a person who has embraced exile. In both the
Abrahamic story and Heidegger’s Hölderlin lectures, the home is a place that lies on the
other side of a journey.
At the same time, the story of Abraham takes us beyond Heidegger because the
Abrahamic journey is ethical in import. Abraham does not enter into a condition of exile in
order to exist in an authentic relationship with Being, but in order meet the needs of the
Other. “Infinity is not ‘before’ me; I express it in giving a sign of the giving of signs, of the
‘for-the-Other’ in which I am dis-interested: here I am! The accusative (me voici) here is
remarkable: here I am, under your eyes, at your service, your obedient servant.”43 By
responding to the otherness of God’s voice, Abraham distinguishes himself as an “obedient
servant” of the Other.
Heidegger and Levinas interpret the mythopoetic literature of the ancient Greeks and
Hebrews in a manner that conceptualizes the process of homecoming in terms of journey.
No doubt, such a solution to the Heidegger-Levinas debate on home and homelessness is
bound to strike some observers as perhaps too convenient. However, using these narratives
to find a middle ground between Heidegger and Levinas is a fruitful endeavor in an age in
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which the spread of globalization clashes with the resurgence of tribalism. One the one
hand, the process of globalization uproots human beings from the traditions of land,
language, ethnicity, and religion that stabilized their ancestors for millennia. On the other
hand, the resurgence of tribalism presents us with the specter of communities that strive to
maintain their autochthony through “ethnic cleansing” and the violent suppression of
difference. In such a milieu, there is a pressing need for a politics of place that is ontological
yet ethical; humanistic yet non-anthropocentric; worldly yet transcendent. Inasmuch as
Heidegger was a thinker who famously proclaimed that “questioning is the piety of thought,”
it seems appropriate to end this study with a series of questions.44 For one, is it possible for
man to find a home on earth in an age in which the possibility of having a home is
increasingly called into question? And if it is, can such a home facilitate a close human
relationship to Being and the Other? Such are the questions of home that haunt us in a
homeless age.
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